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Preface

Though the passion for this study is evident in the text, the initial idea came from Dr. Dan
Mitchell. After graciously agreeing to be the mentor for this project it became clear that settling
upon a topic choice was anything but easy. Dr. Mitchell’s accomplishments as a very fine artist
made his suggestion to consider an aesthetic approach understandable. After serious
consideration of what could be done within that area of study, it became more appealing,
resulting in the approach demonstrated in the following. When the idea was shared with Dr.
Dave Baggett, faculty member of the School of Divinity and co-author of Good God: The
Theistic Foundations of Morality, and after he was told that the argument was going to be
employing abductive inference, he described the concept as “brilliant.” With affirmation such as
this, that spark sufficiently ignited the fire which has consumed over a year of research and
writing.
The study has an aesthetic focus which binds it from beginning to end. Along the way,
however, it enters the dialogues present within the disciplines of logical argumentation,
philosophy, psychology, science, and theology. What is consistent throughout the journey is a
passion for a proposed theistic argument based on man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value,
which often rises to the point of a polemic against the views of naturalism, particularly the
dogmatism of Richard Dawkins. No apology is being offered for this passion. If, however, the
intensity of the polemic disturbs a reader, it is prudent to encourage that reader to try and look
past the polemic and concentrate on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the data presented. The reader
should also know that the project blatantly reflects the views of evangelical Christianity. One
should expect nothing else from a Ph.D. candidate seeking a degree from Liberty University’s
Rawlings School of Divinity. Throughout the following pages, however, validating the thesis
viii

that man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is the result of divine causation, with scholarly
research reflecting multiple academic disciplines, is the primary focus. That this results in a
rational refutation of naturalism should not be a surprise.
It is a major hope that this project might be at least an encouragement for Christians. It
would be even more gratifying if the Lord God used it to open the eyes of someone who has
been blinded by the errant dogma of Darwinian and neo-Darwinian naturalism.

Walter H. Davis Sr.
Lynchburg, VA. 2016.
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Abstract
This work presents a theistic argument for the existence of God based on man’s ability to
apprehend, aesthetic value. The argument is called the Aesthetic Theistic Argument. Man’s
ability to appreciate aesthetic value is unique among biological life forms and is common to
every human culture. Explaining the origins of this ability implies a creator/designer who also
apprehends aesthetic value. The study both affirms the argument for theism and critiques the
philosophical and scientific foundations of Darwinian naturalism. The result of this study affirms
the cause for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is best explained by the existence of
God as revealed in Holy Scriptures and the person of the Lord Jesus.

xii

Introduction

Commenting on the regard current re philosophers demonstrate toward aesthetic thought,
Peter Williams,1 states:
Philosophers rarely advocate arguments from beauty for the existence of God, and those
who do advocate them rarely spend more than a few paragraphs in their cause. This is so
much the case that major critiques of theistic arguments, such as J.L.Mackie's The
Miracle of Theism, feel no need to respond to aesthetic arguments. However, the range,
subtlety and power of aesthetic arguments is greater than commonly realized, and they
have been defended by such luminaries as Richard Swinburne, F.R.Tennant and Keith
Ward.2
Addressing the religious philosophers’ lack of regard for the value of aesthetic arguments, as
stated above, is a significant motivation for the following pages. Further, Williams notes that
when philosophers do regard aesthetics, their common practice is to prioritize the ontological
characteristics of aesthetics or the nature of beauty.3 Thus, he implies a minimal consideration of
the epistemological characteristics of aesthetics or how man comes to have knowledge of
aesthetic value. Apparently, the preference of religious philosophers who do focus on the

1

Williams is Distinguished Professor of Comparative Religion and American Studies at Miami University,
Oxford, OH.
Peter Williams, “Aesthetic Arguments for the Existence of God,” Quodlibet Journal, Vol 3, No. 3, 2001,
1. (Quodlibet Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy is registered with the United States Library of
Congress as an international electronic academic publication and has been issued the International Standard Serial
Number (ISSN) 1526-6575.) It should be noted that On page 1 of Williams’ article cited above, he identifies four
categories of aesthetic arguments for God’s existence. These arguments fall into one of two categories: ontological
or epistemological. For the ontological arguments, emphasis can be either on the nature of the subjective experience
or on the reality that there is an awareness of aesthetic value. For the epistemological arguments, emphasis rests on
the question of how the existence of God is the unique source of aesthetic value. According to Williams, the
ontological approach is used by Augustine in City of God. While acknowledging the potential of Williams’
taxonomy, this study does not reflect this level of precision in its parsing of aesthetic arguments. This study simply
acknowledges that most philosophers have approached the relationship of aesthetics and theology ontologically. In
contrast, this study seeks to address the argument epistemologically as it focuses primarily on the experience of
apprehending aesthetic value so as to avoid the potentially endless debate on the often intangible nature of aesthetics
typical of the ontological approach.
2

3

Ibid.

1

relationship of aesthetics to theology primarily focus on the beauty inherent in God and nature
rather than the capacity man has for apprehending that beauty.4 Three examples of this
prioritization of ontological considerations of aesthetics are the works of Augustine,5 Anselm,6
and Hans Urs von Balthasar.7 These are simply three among many. Few theological luminaries in
philosophy were found to demonstrate a preference for the epistemological considerations of
aesthetics. Of these few are Richard Swinburne, F. R. Tennant and Keith Ward.8
Without diminishing the praiseworthiness of ontological approaches to the study of
aesthetics, this study chooses, contra stated ontological trends, to execute an epistemological
approach. The following study gives great attention to man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value. Specifically, it gives significant consideration to several explanations for how man is able
to apprehend and appreciate aesthetic value. Discussions regarding the consistent presence of
man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value are not abundant. Yet, as this study reveals, they
merit consideration.9 The following study demonstrates a significant effort to compensate for this
lack of consideration and the worthiness of the effort.

4

Williams, Quodlibet, Vol. 3 No. 3, 1.

5

Augustine, The Complete Works of Saint Augustine, (Amazon: Kindle Edition, 2011), loc..9865-9880,

6

Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1938), 26–28.

Kindle.

Von Balthasar’s Series is titled: The Glory of the Lord, A Theological Aesthetics Vol’s I-VII. (San
Francisco: CA, Ignatius Press, 1989). Several of these volumes were reviewed in the research for this study. They
are thoughtful presentations of the awe and wonder humanity should have for their Creator from multiple
perspectives. He encourages a theology which reflects the view that all ideas of God, creation, and life should be
comprehended with aesthetic value in mind. Yet, in spite of the value of this contribution, its existential thinking and
highly liturgical nature makes for little contribution to this project, which is focused on man’s ability to apprehend
beauty or aesthetic value rather than on God’s aesthetic nature.
7

8

Williams, Quodlibet, Vol. 3 No. 3, 1.

9

George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory, (New York, Charles
Scribner Sons, 1896), loc. 148 Kindle. In his introduction to this work, Santayana states: “There must therefore be in
our nature a very radical and wide-spread tendency to observe beauty, and to value it. No account of the principles

2

Several preliminary issues, discovered in the research of this project, deserve mention.
First, it is difficult if not impossible to argue against the presence of man’s ability to apprehend
aesthetic value. No philosopher of any merit was found to challenge this notion. Second, among
biological organisms, the consensus seems to be that the ability to apprehend aesthetic value is
unique to man.10 There is little evidence for claiming other biological life forms possess the
capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.11 Third, two explanations for the cause of man’s capacity
to apprehend aesthetic values are offered by naturalism. These two explanations, identified and
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, fail to meet reasonable standards indicative of adequate
explanations. Finally, research ultimately reveals that the best explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value is supernatural causation. The recognition of supernatural causation
provides a strong basis for theism. The discussion of these issues and their implications
constitute the bulk of the following study. Ultimately, the research confirms theistic causation for
man’ capacity to apprehend aesthetic value while demonstrating the potential benefits of further
consideration of aesthetic relationships to both theological and apologetic disciplines.

of the mind can be at all adequate that passes over so conspicuous a faculty.” This indicates his assumption that
humanity’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is wide-spread, prevalent, and conspicuous in spite of its failure to
gain much attention.
10
Throughout this study, when referring to the capacity to apprehend aesthetic value as being unique to
man, it should be understood that that this uniqueness refers to man as one of God’s created biological life forms.
and not God or other supernatural entities. This study assumes that God, as Creator, is able to apprehend aesthetic
value and it is arguable that angels and other supernatural entities do as well. Yet, supernatural, non-biological
beings are not the focus of this reference. As is stated later, this study contrasts the claims of naturalism and
supernaturalism. Naturalists do not recognize the existence of the supernatural. Hence, objecting to man’s ability to
apprehend aesthetic value as unique because it excludes supernatural entities is irrelevant to the thesis of this study.
The discussion of divine entities’ ability to apprehend aesthetic value is limited to supernaturalists. Naturalists
would not consider the question. Hence, the term “unique,” in this context, applies only to the human race as being
unique from other biological life forms.
11

Some may question this statement by citing animals which can distinguish color and their mating rituals.
Yet, in spite of these supposed examples, there is no existing evidence suggesting that any animal has the capacity to
apprehend the beauty of color or the beauty of the ritual they perform. This capacity remains unique to man.

3

Three words of clarification are in order. First, it is necessary to reveal that this study
reflects an evangelical viewpoint. There is no need to offer disclaimers for this fact, but it is
appropriate to mention it for the sake of honesty. In spite of the admitted bias, an accurate,
academically just presentation of relevant information is a fundamental priority. Second, it is
important to reiterate that the following pages do not primarily focus on the nature of aesthetic
value. A succinct review of the nature of aesthetics is necessary, as it is critical to identify clearly
the nature of that which man has the capacity to apprehend, but identifying the nature of
aesthetics is not the primary focus. Instead, the focus is on man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value and the best explanation of its cause. In so doing, the study affirms that the best
explanation for this cause is supernatural. Recognizing how that affirmation leads to theistic
implications is then apparent. Third, these theistic implications are identified and reviewed.12
These two factors, the question of the cause of man’s capacity of man to apprehend aesthetic
value and the theistic implications resulting in the determination of the best explanation of that
cause, formulate this study’s primary intent.
Achievement of these objectives begins with a review of relevant introductory material.
The review of material which follows includes: clarifying the role of aesthetic arguments, the
relevance of the thesis, the argument and reasoning method, the vital relationship between
theology and apologetics, the place for this study in apologetics, and the plan for the study.
Supplementary information, for those readers interested in additional information, is found in

Honesty acknowledges a potential criticism in appealing to God’s existence as the source of man’s ability
to apprehend aesthetic value. Some might think this could make this study more ontological than epistemological,
contrary to what was stated. While this criticism might arise, the fact is that this study focuses primarily on man’s
consistent ability to know or apprehend aesthetic value. Focusing on the cause of this ability to apprehend of
aesthetic value, and the theistic implications resulting from the identification of that cause, not the nature of
aesthetics, makes the study more epistemological than ontological.
12

4

three attached appendices. The review of this material results in the proposal and defense of a
theistic argument based on man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.
An objection could be made as to whether another theistic argument is warranted in light
of the time-tested theistic arguments presently existing. An adequate response to this concern is
in the realization of this argument’s uniqueness. Instead of basing the argument used by
ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, the aesthetic theistic argument identifies
more with the moral theistic argument. As with the moral argument, the nature of the aesthetic
argument is uniquely values oriented. Man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value, as with
man’s capacity to acknowledge certain moral boundaries, demonstrates a values based focus.
Like the moral argument, the aesthetic theistic argument is based on values which are essentially
intangible. They are intangible not because they cannot be experienced but because specifically
defining morality or goodness, especially aesthetic value, is controversial. In this regard, the
aesthetic theistic argument is even more unique than the moral argument. For instance, there are
few if any cultures which would accept the moral notion that it is acceptable to torture babies for
one’s amusement. This knowledge is properly basic. This dramatic example illustrates the
certainty that all cultures share some level of ethical value. In regard to aesthetics, on the other
hand, debate continues as to whether aesthetics is a matter of taste driven by culture or whether
its recognition is innate to man’s nature. There is little challenge to the notion that all human
cultures apprehend aesthetic value. Yet, there is not unanimous consent regarding the nature of
aesthetic value itself. This discussion will be taken up further in chapter 2. The reason for
mentioning it now is that it demonstrates the uniqueness of this argument as two-fold. The
argument is unique from the ontological, cosmological and teleological in that it is, like the
moral argument, values based. Its uniqueness is also demonstrated in that it is arguably properly

5

basic knowledge that all human cultures share some ethical standards. Yet, in the case of
aesthetics, there is continuing discussion as to whether aesthetic apprehension is culturally
determined or inherent to man’s nature.
Finally, William Lane Craig,13 prefers the moral argument in deductive form. David
Baggett14 and Jerry L. Walls,15 contra Craig, argue that abductive reasoning is a superior method
for values based theistic arguments, particularly the moral argument. As recognized above, the
aesthetic theistic argument, as presented by this study, like the moral argument, is a values based
theistic argument. Baggett and Walls’ preference for abduction for the moral argument,
therefore, strongly argues for the presentation of the aesthetic theistic argument to also be in
abductive form. A fuller explanation of the rationale in justifying this is the focus of Chapter 1.
Again, its mention here is to ratify further the argument’s uniqueness.
This study identifies the best explanation for the cause of man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value. This unique capacity offers an excellent and effective basis for an argument for
theism. The following study verbalizes and defends that assertion. The specific thesis of this
study, therefore, is to identify, define and justify an effective theistic argument based on man’s
capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.

Clarifying the Role of Theistic Arguments
Clarifying the role of theistic arguments involves some disclaimers and specificity of
expectation. For example, if one expects this project to provide an argument for claiming the

13

William Lane Craig is the Research Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology.

14

David Baggett is Professor of Philosophy and Apologetics at Rawlings School of Divinity, Liberty

University.
15

Jerry L. Walls is Professor of Philosophy: Scholar in Residence, Houston Baptist University.
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validity of Christianity prior to all other worldviews,16 that expectation will be unsatisfied.
Though the supremacy of the Christian worldview is definitely implied, it could surprise some
that attributing such certainty to the claims of Christianity is not the goal of any theistic argument
nor is it the objective of this study. Gordon R. Lewis explains, “The question of Christianity’s
truth is not a psychological question calling for the biographical description of believers, but is a
philosophical question calling for a meaningful justification of beliefs.”17 Lewis correctly states
that theistic arguments provide a meaningful justification for theistic belief and this is not
equivalent to demonstrating the certainty of the Christian worldview. Neither is meaningful
justification for belief equivalent to the proof of God’s existence. Lewis further observes that
Christian truth is not a “psychological question” nor is it a demonstration of the proof of
Christian truth claims. Instead, theistic arguments present a meaningful justification for belief in
those claims. Hence, theistic arguments provide a meaningful justification for the belief that God
exists. The goal is not to prove such claims. Craig affirms, “It is the broader task of Christian
apologetics to help create and sustain a cultural milieu in which the gospel can be heard as an
intellectually viable option for thinking men and women.”18 This project, therefore, only
demonstrates that a meaningful basis for justifying one’s faith in God’s existence is intellectually
viable.

The term “worldview” is exceedingly broad. An excellent presentation of what this study accepts as the
meaning of this term is provided in the following: (Ed Hindson and Ergun Caner Gen, Eds. The Popular
Encyclopedia of Apologetics: Surveying the Evidence for the Truth of Christianity, (Eugene, OR: Harvest House
Publishers, 2008), 498.
16

17
Gordon R Lewis, Testing Christianity’s Truth Claims: Approaches to Christian Apologetics, (Lanham,
Maryland: University Press of America, 1990). 23.
18

William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3d ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway
Books, 2008), 15.

7

Theistic arguments are intended neither to demonstrate the certainty of Christianity nor
prove the existence of God. Their intent is to justify rationally the wisdom in surrendering to
belief in God’s existence. Reverent awareness of Christian truth claims includes the belief that
only God’s Spirit can change the heart of anyone (Zechariah 4:6). One cannot reason one’s self
to faith (Romans 2:14). C. S. Lewis’s life illustrates that the rationale of appropriate theistic
philosophy can be used by the Spirit to awaken a heart to the reality of God,19 but no matter what
method He may use, only God’s Spirit brings a person to faith. Theistic arguments are tools God
uses to help man see the need to surrender themselves to faith in Christ. It is the one wielding the
tool who brings man to Himself, not the tool alone. Extensively pressing this point may seem
unnecessary, but its mention precludes the criticism of those who cite, as a justification for
disclaiming apologetics, Colossians 2:8, “See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy
and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world,
and not according to Christ.” 20 Craig affirms the need to respond to this disclaimer for
apologetics in general and theistic arguments in particular, “Some people depreciate the
importance of apologetics as a theoretical discipline. ‘Nobody comes to Christ through
arguments,’ they’ll tell you. ‘People aren’t interested in what’s true, but in what works for them.
They don’t want intellectual answers; they want to see Christianity lived out.’ I believe that the
attitude expressed in these statements is both shortsighted and mistaken.”21 Craig’s observation
underscores the importance of precluding such objections by making the goal of this study clear.

19

C. S. Lewis, (1966-03-23). Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 1966), 210. This quote is toward the end of Chapter 13. Chapter 14 describes how Lewis progressed from
Idealism to embrace theism. Demonstrating that his journey to faith was deeply influenced by philosophy as well as
friendships made at Oxford.
20

Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture references are to the English Standard Version.

21

Craig, Reasonable Faith, 17.

8

To that end, the goal of the following pages is to present a rational case for justifying the
deserved preference of theism over atheism, and supernaturalism over naturalism. It is then the
responsibility of the reader to choose to surrender to, or reject, those implications. Accepting
theistic arguments to be both true and valuable in defending the faith should be the position of
the supernaturalist. Rejecting these arguments as true and valid reflects agreement with the
naturalist. Naturalism more often identifies with atheism. Supernaturalism identifies with theism.
Unfortunately, naturalism is the present popular position among many academics today.22
Making the intent of this project clear precludes short-sighted or mistaken objections and assures
its intent remains the defense of theism and exposing the fallacies of naturalism and atheism.
It is thus established that both critical thinking (reason) and faith are needed to recognize
the intellectual viability of belief in Christian truth claims and defend them against the
naturalistic propositions prevalent in the present culture. By recognizing that belief in God’s
existence is both intellectually viable and justified, an honest person should then be more
inclined to consider yielding to faith in the Christian truth claims regarding the person and work
of Christ. Evangelical teaching underscores the belief that without the work of the Lord Jesus
nothing is possible (John 15:5). Hence, there is no intent to claim that arguing for the existence
of God proves His existence. Instead, theistic arguments can bring a person to justifying a belief
in God’s existence, and a surrender to Christian truth claims. Thus, theistic arguments are
primarily meant to present intellectually viable alternatives to the claims of naturalism and
atheism.

22

The validity of the claim that naturalism is prevalent in today’s culture is demonstrated later in this study.

9

Theistic arguments not only defend theistic belief, they confront contrary claims.23 When
encouraging someone toward faith in Christ, the increasing influence of the post-Christian,
naturalistic worldview could make it necessary to confront the belief that there is no God as well
as defend the belief that there is, before Christian truth claims can be considered. Belief in
supernaturalism, or God’s existence, is essential in accepting Christian truth claims (Hebrews
11:6). Arguing for supernaturalism and the existence of God by refuting claims which question
His existence can encourage a non-believer to see the need to be more open to the gospel. This is
the role of both Christian apologetics and this study.24

The Relevance of the Thesis
At the heart of biblical Christianity is the belief that there is a God and He wants man to
know Him (Philippians 3:8-10). This belief leads to the recognition that God has revealed
Himself, His purposes, and His ways through multiple agencies.25 These agencies include the
person of Jesus (John 1:1. 14), the written Word (1 Timothy 3:16) and the very existence of
nature with all its intricacies and beauty (Psalm 19:1; Romans 1:19-20; Colossians 1:23).
Rationally justifying belief in the existence of God and the validity of his message, while
challenging the claims of atheism, is the multi-faceted task of Christian apologetics. The theistic

Craig identifies two types of apologetics. Offensive apologetics which seems to present “a positive case
for Christian truth claims,” and defensive apologetics which seek to “nullify objections to those claims” (Craig,
Reasonable Faith, 23.). Since theistic arguments are central to classical apologetic methodology, (see Appendix 1) it
is reasonable to state that theistic arguments are intended to both defend theistic belief and confront claims which
are contrary to those beliefs.
23

24

A defense of this claim is made in the succinct overview of the different theistic arguments located in
Appendix 1.
The reader is encouraged to read C. F. H. Henry, “Chapter 1: The Awesome Disclosure of God,” God
Revelation and Authority Vol II (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1999), 17. This chapter begins his presentation of
15 theses which make up the majority of Volumes I and II. In these theses, Henry demonstrates God’s intent is and
has always been to reveal Himself to man.
25

10

argument being proposed in this study is an augmentation of long-recognized theistic arguments
which share that multi-faceted purpose. Without discounting God’s divine revelations, God has
given man a mind by which he is expected to reason (Leviticus 19:17; Romans 1:19-20; Daniel
4:34; Luke 9:47; Acts 17:2; Acts 18:4, 19, 19:8, 24:25).
It is justifiable to assume that mankind’s innate desire to identify and affirm a reasonable
and rational basis for his existence and behavior, is an objective of every worldview. The
Christian worldview is not an exception to this. In fact, theistic arguments demonstrate that
theism is the most reasonable and rational basis for a worldview. The relevance of this project is
established by its intent to augment and affirm these long-recognized theistic arguments and their
purpose in defending Christian truth claims and their reasoned confutation of alternate beliefs.
This study demonstrates how the aesthetic argument affirms and appends other theistic
arguments. This is accomplished by identifying God’s existence as the best explanation for
man’s capacity to aesthetic value. In short, demonstrating God’s existence as the best
explanation of this phenomenon demonstrates a meaningful justification for belief in God. Such
a belief in God’s existence is a good place to begin the faith journey toward belief in Christian
truth claims. These observations identify and establish the relevance of this study.

The Argument and Reasoning Method
This presentation of the aesthetic theistic argument is stated in the form of abductive
reasoning. This is contrary to the deductive reasoning common to other theistic arguments,
excepting the moral argument as mentioned above.26 The decision to use abductive reasoning in
presenting the aesthetic theistic argument requires explanation. That explanation is the purpose
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of Chapter 1. A brief word of appreciation to David Baggett and Jerry Walls for their volumes
Good God and God and Cosmos is in order. Included is the masterful defense of abductive
reasoning offered by Douglas Walton in Abductive Reasoning. These affirmations of abductive
reasoning, especially in Chapter 2 of God and Cosmos, are the principal stimuli for this study’s
preference for abductive reasoning in stating the aesthetic theistic argument.27 That argument, the
presentation and defense of which is the thesis of this study, is expressed as follows:
(P1) All human beings can apprehend aesthetic value.
(P2) The best explanation for this human capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is
supernatural causation.
(C) God’s existence is the cause of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.
Having identified the argument central to the thesis of this study, and the reasoning method
preferred in its presentation, a review of the vital relationship between theology and apologetics
appears as follows.

The Vital Relationship between Theology and Apologetics
In spite of the varied opinions which have been labeled “Christian theology,” one
reassuring fact remains consistent: Christian theology is primarily focused on the goal of
identifying what Christians should believe. In spite of the disagreements over church polity and
Christian practices, liturgical styles, etc., this primary focus remains consistent. All true
Christians understandably want to know and identify with what Christians should believe. In
searching for this knowledge, inevitable questions arise regarding the role and relationship
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David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations for Morality, (Oxford, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2011). 100. Baggett and Walls state, “We can, however shift gears a bit and couch the argument in
abductive terms, an inference to the best explanation, arguing that theism explains commonly accepted features of
morality better than atheism does.” This study reflects an identification with that statement and subsequently
engages the abductive form in presenting the aesthetic theistic argument. Note also: Baggett and Walls, God and
Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016) 54ff.
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reason has with faith in affirming what those beliefs should be. Both history and Scripture
indicate that reason and faith play shared roles in knowing and experiencing what God has
revealed of Himself, His purposes and His ways through His multiple means of revelation.28
Faced with the multiple choices of worldviews, as is the case in the present cultural milieu, it is
vital that the Church be able to accurately proclaim both what should be believed and why it
should be believed. Hence, it is reasonable to claim that sound theology requires divine
revelation, and reasonable faith.29
According to E. J. Carnell, whom George Marsden described as one of the great
theological intellectuals of the 20th Century,30 within the scope of Christian theology is a
discipline which has been practiced since Paul.31 Yet, it enjoys increased interest, since Charles
Darwin’s work, On the Origin of Species.32 This discipline is Christian Apologetics and its intent
is to answer the question, “Why should Christians believe what they believe.”33 Assuming
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Carnell is correct in asserting apologetics as a vital factor in sound theological development, a
case can be made for claiming an adequate theologian should also be well versed in apologetics.
This is due to the need for him to be able to give justified reasons for his belief. While agreement
with that notion is only assumed, the following study confidently stands on the belief that
Carnell’s view is worthy. In so doing, an essential relationship surfaces between the two
disciplines. Apologetics becomes helpful, if not necessary, in making theological views more
compelling. Apologetics assists both the unbeliever and believer to comprehend a justifiable
reason for belief.
Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser affirm this claim, “Cognitively rational belief in God is
not simply a matter of pragmatic, psychological, or prudential considerations. Belief in God is
not cognitively justified simply because it ‘works’ or fills one with a sense of peace or security.
Cognitively justified belief in God aims at truth, as an accurate portrayal of reality.”34 Copan and
Moser’s statement signifies that the goal of both theologians and apologists must be an accurate
and justified portrayal of reality. To this end, when one personally encounters God’s divine
revelation, working in, on, and through man’s capacity for reason and faith, God reveals what
should be believed. Then, guided by the Holy Spirit, using reason and faith, man understands
why that revelation is worthy of belief. The order is debatable, but the point is in realizing both
are necessary to the other.
Surprisingly, due to the popularity of naturalism today, it is actually more justifiable to
believe theism than atheism. The boldness of this claim becomes more sustainable as this study
progresses. At present, however, it is sufficiently forthright to state that valid reasonable
arguments for the existence of God are more defensible than those who argue the non-existence
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of God.35 Thus, the obligation, of those aware of the value of theistic arguments, is to identify,
comprehend, proclaim, and explain them, especially in light of the popularity of the less worthy
claims of naturalism. This obligation includes identifying the relationship of theology to
apologetics, identifying the relevance of Christian apologetics in general, and this study in
particular. While some Christian scholars may take issue with the claim that cognitively justified
belief is warranted, as depicted by Copan and Moser. Refusing to recognize the responsibility of
theologians and apologists to meet that need, especially within the present culture, could cause
the desire for increase of the consideration of Christian truth claims to be compromised.

The Place for This Study in Apologetics
Recalling the purpose of theology as the identification of what Christians believe, the
purpose of apologetics is to identify why Christians hold those beliefs, and why belief in God’s
existence is both reasonable and necessary to all Christian theists. This understanding now makes
it possible to identify the place for this study in apologetics and why the identification of that
place has relevance to its purpose. Since the argument being presented has already been
identified as a theistic argument and since the presentation of any theistic argument is going to
identify with the classical method of apologetics, which primarily exhibits the utilization of
theistic arguments, it is accurate to assume this study’s place in apologetics is within the classical
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Alistair McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion: Atheist Fundamentalism and
the Denial of the Divine, (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2007), 96. This work is by a former atheist and
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Dawkins’ atheistic assertions in The God Delusion, McGrath writes, “It is this deep and unsettling anxiety about the
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methodology of apologetics. In recognizing this, the question of relevance is answered, in part,
by determining whether an additional theistic argument is worthwhile.
Justifying this study’s worthiness begins with Craig’s observation that belief is something
which is properly supported.36 Specifically, he demonstrates that an identified viable belief
which is rationally justified, is “reasonable faith.”37 By identifying the place of this study in
apologetics, and remembering that theology focuses on what Christians believe and apologetics
focuses on why they believe it,38 the place of this study within the discipline of apologetics
become apparent. Namely, since justifying belief is the role of apologetics, and since this study
offers a basis for justifiable belief in God’s existence, and this study identifies with theistic
arguments, it thus has a place in apologetics. To answer more specifically the question of why
this argument is helpful or needed, in light of the time-tested theistic arguments already existing,
one need only to recall the “leaky bucket” objection offered by Antony Flew in his debate with
Basil Mitchell.39 The parallel is obvious. Popular religious beliefs today range from Karl Marx’s
belief that religion is an “opiate”40 to the irrational fideism which rejects the need for
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apologetics.41 In the face of this, Christian apologetics rightly demonstrate the justifiable belief
that there are viable Christian truth claims and among those claims is God’s existence. This
present post-Christian culture largely rejects, questions or hesitates to accept these claims due to
its propensity to accept the claims of naturalism.42
Christian apologetics, executed skillfully, offers defense of Christian truth claims with
compelling cogency. This does not suggest that apologetics answers every query or doubt to the
satisfaction of all. Unfortunately, man’s limitations of ignorance and prejudice can sometimes
prevent that. Yet, it is to say that while reasoning alone cannot lead a person to faith, wellexecuted Christian apologetics can give the honest seeker a meaningful justification for
surrendering to belief in the truth claims of Christianity and the rejection of naturalism prevalent
in today’s culture. Christians who are limited in their critical thinking so that they can only state
what they believe, but are unable to give rational reasons for why they believe it, have little
reason to expect anyone in today’s post-Christian culture43 to consider their message. As it is the
purpose of this project to address these concerns, its place is clearly within the discipline of
apologetics.
So as to preclude another potential objection by those who are mindful of Augustine’s
contribution to Christian orthodoxy and his proposal that one needs to believe in order to
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Boa and Bowman Faith Has Its Reasons, 337ff. Boa and Bowman identify fideism as those who utterly
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understand,44 Augustine seems to suggest that faith has superiority over reason. This study does
not intend to enter any debate which questions Augustine. However, one cannot deny that his
view affirms both believing and understanding are required of the believer.45 Therefore, this
study affirms that whether one understands and then believes or whether one believes and then
understands does not alter the fact that there must be both faith and reason (understanding) to
adequately defend Christian truth claims and offer justifiable alternatives to opposing views. To
put it another way, it is essential to have some measure of faith in order to become a Christian
and it is not necessary to comprehend all there is to know about the Gospel in order to do this.
However, if one cannot explain why he believes the Gospel is true or worthy of belief, or why
one has come to believe Jesus is Lord, or why one should rationally believe, the claim that He
rose again, or that there even is a God, if he only has a measure of faith and no measure of
justification for that faith, his potential for effective Christian ministry is limited. First, Gordon
Lewis affirms this, “Apologetic argument may not create belief, but it creates the atmosphere in
which faith can come to life.”46 Second, faith devoid of any rational reason is irrational fideism.
Such fideism is generally recognized as a weak defense against the critics of Christian truth
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claims as it is properly identified as circular reasoning. Since the irrational fideist has no course
but to state his belief in what the Bible states is merely because the Bible states it, he is claiming
as the basis of his argument the point being argued. This is circular reasoning and is logically
unsound. Most logicians seek to avoid circular reasoning as it does not demonstrate a sufficient
basis for an argument. Evangelicals, such as Carnell, Henry and others, recognized this and
sought to avoid it. Evangelicals believe the Bible is accurate and trustworthy, but their belief is
not usually based on circular reasoning. Instead they express their belief in an inerrant Scripture
with a meaningful, reasoned justification for that belief. Proclaiming to an atheist that he ought
to believe the Bible, because the Bible says so, likely results in a scoffing atheist. On the other
hand, when one is able to present a reasonable, rational argument for why the Bible is to be
trusted, his impact on the atheist has greater potential. Gordon Lewis again posits, “Anyone who
aspires to Christian service must be a defender of the Christian faith, or he fails to meet a
fundamental scriptural condition for the ministry.”47 Believing something to be so because one is
comfortable in believing it, but is unable to express a reasonable foundation for that belief, is not
capable of the sufficient defense to which Lewis is referring. This verifies the need of both faith
and reason in defending Christian truth claims.
Having depicted this study as being within the locus of defending Christian truth claims
and identifying this function as being apologetic in nature, the place for this study’s
categorization to be within the scope of apologetics is verified. Having dealt with the matters
related to the focus of this study, it is appropriate to return now to the presentation and defense of
the aesthetic theistic argument.
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The Plan for the Study
The following identification, explanation and justification of the aesthetic argument
requires four chapters. The first identifies the preference of abductive reasoning over deductive
and inductive reasoning in stating the argument. The chapter reflects a positive consideration of
deductive and inductive reasoning while justifying the preference for abductive reasoning in
presenting the aesthetic theistic argument. The utilization of abductive reasoning, especially in
regard to theistic arguments, is a relatively recent practice. Its objective is to infer the best
explanation for a phenomenon or question. The first chapter demonstrates abduction to be wellsuited for presenting an argument based on man’s capacity for aesthetic apprehension.
The second chapter presents and defends the first premise of the argument. The
discussion of this first premise primarily focuses on the language “apprehending aesthetic
value.” The discussion succinctly defines aesthetic value and then justifies the claim that all
human cultures demonstrate the ability to apprehend it. It demonstrates a strong argument for the
assertion “all human cultures demonstrate an ability to apprehend aesthetic value.”
The third chapter is the epicenter of the study. It reveals three known, potential
explanations for man’s ability to apprehend aesthetic value. Two of these explanations reflect the
postulations of naturalists. The third identifies the supernatural view. After reviewing these
explanations and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, the chapter concludes that
supernatural causation, specifically God’s existence, is the best explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value as it is the most justifiable. Upon achieving this conclusion, the thesis
of the study is validated.
The fourth chapter discusses several implications of the proven argument. There is
potential for this study to be of significant value when used by critically thinking Christians.
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Some of these are reviewed in this chapter. The fifth and final section summarizes and concludes
the study. It reviews how the aesthetic theistic argument, the specific thesis of this study, is
validated in the previous chapters.
For those desiring additional, relevant data regarding the issues being discussed, there are
three appendices. Appendix 1 lists and succinctly describes four of the more popular theistic
arguments. Appendix 2 offers similar description of five of the most familiar apologetic
methods. Reviewing these methods helps to explain why the aesthetic theistic argument
identifies best with classical apologetic methodology. Appendix 3 offers additional thoughts on
how the thesis of this study potentially impacts naturalism. Primarily, it recognizes the impact
naturalism has had on education, and the hostile environment Christian students face in secular
schools. The intent of this discussion is to affirm the need to prioritize critical thinking among
Christian students, particularly as it regards theistic arguments, so as to better equip them for
their encounter with this antagonistic environment.
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Chapter 1
A Defense of Abductive Reasoning
in Light of Other Reasoning Methods

Unlike arguments between two neighborhood baseball teams disagreeing over which
team is going to bat first, formal arguments of logic are supposed to be more sophisticated,
intellectual and less dependent on physical or emotional resources. Formal arguments present a
logical justification for belief in a stated truth or conclusion. Informal arguments, such as the
sandlot example, can be resolved by one team acquiescing to the other so that the arguing can
stop and the playing can begin. Acquiescence, merely for the sake of convenience, is not
consistent with good formal argumentation. Instead, logical arguments generally focus on
justifying belief in a conclusion, no matter how convenient or inconvenient the conclusion.
Dependence on superior volume, force of personality or physical strength are unacceptable bases
for justifying belief. Similarly, mumpsimus has no place in formal arguments like that which
may sometimes be present in informal, dogmatic differences of opinion. Participation in logical
argumentation must rise above such prejudice to seek the honest justification of a conclusion.
Instead of oppressing the opposing interlocutor to concession, resorting to volume instead of
content, or obstinacy instead of honesty, formal argumentation uses coherence, cogency,
consistency and the conclusiveness of argument to validate a conclusion.48
James D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer instruct that formal arguments require one or
more premises (P1, P2, etc.) followed by a conclusion (C).49 The truth of the conclusion is
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dependent upon the truth of the premises. In spite of negative connotations popular use of the
word argument engenders, arguments of logic, especially theistic arguments, are not comparable
to what takes place between two individuals hurling base language at one another. The actual
opponent in formal, logical argumentation is ignorance, not the interlocutor with which one is
verbally engaged. Despite the common negative feelings resulting when opinions are challenged,
formal arguments do not focus on the negation of individuals but in justifying truth claims by
demonstrating the truth of a conclusion is sound. If the argument is presented in a way that is
logically defensible, only ignorance loses. To exemplify these assertions, a formal argument
which fails to meet the standards of good logical argumentation follows:
(P1) All politicians are liars
(P2) Frank is a politician
(C) Frank is a liar
While the form of this argument appears appropriate, in that it has two clearly stated premises
and a conclusion, careful reflection reveals that the argument itself is not consistent with truth
and is, therefore, not sound. It is incorrect to assume, despite one’s opinion of politicians, that all
of them are liars. The existence of even one honest politician makes the first premise untrue.
Additionally, one cannot assume that inherent to all politicians is the requirement that he/she lie.
Hence the truth of first premise is not provable. If premises cannot be established as true, the
conclusion is unsound and the argument fails. For this reason, formal arguments can and should
require extensive research to establish premises upon which the verity of the conclusion is based.
In the example above, were research to reveal the discovery of even one honest politician, the
premise is proven untrue which makes the conclusion untrue. Since such research is not
presented to verify the premises, the premises cannot be demonstrated as true. Though the form

23

or presentation of the argument may be correct, it still fails. When the premises are consistent
with truth, as in the next example, the result is different:
(P1) All working lightbulbs are able to produce light when properly connected to
electricity.50
(P2) This object is a working light bulb connected to electricity.
(C) This object is able to produce light.
In this argument, the truth of each premise can be substantiated. Hence, it is rational or
justifiable, according to this argument, to believe that the object in question (P2) is a working
light bulb when, upon connecting it to electricity, as it was designed, it produces light (C). Since
this is verifiable, the object referenced, meets the qualifications of the premises proving the
argument sound.
According to Carney and Scheer, logic is the study of the definition and methodologies
used in presenting formal arguments as these examples demonstrate.51 The purpose of logic is to
“determine whether arguments are correct or incorrect.”52 In the light bulb example, logic
assures that all truth claims of the premises are valid, establishing the truth of the conclusion.
While acknowledging, for review purposes, the extremely simplistic examples above, logical
argumentation can be very complex when formulated by skilled logicians or philosophers.
Adding to this complexity, there are several forms and methods by which arguments can be
stated. Investigating some of these various forms is relevant to the presentation of the aesthetic
argument, particularly in regard to the form of reasoning used in verbalizing that argument which
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is the focus of this study. Such a review of these methods is found in Appendix 2. Reviewing this
data is further complicated in realizing not all philosophers or logicians agree on the number or
types of logical expression. For instance, Carney and Scheer primarily discuss two basic kinds of
arguments: deductive and inductive. Abductive reasoning, or reasoning according to the best
explanation, is a third form of argumentation which they do not specifically discuss. Douglas
Walton53 is the primary source for the following review of abductive argumentation. Reviewing
these three kinds of argumentation comprise the content of this chapter. After reviewing each of
these argumentation forms, the preference for abductive reasoning over the other two, is
defended.

Deductive Reasoning
As demonstrated above by the light bulb example, deductive reasoning establishes that
any alternative to the conclusion is impossible. A deductive argument is sound if, and only if, the
trueness of the premises makes it impossible for the conclusion to be false.54 If the premises are
true, the conclusion is true, assuming the conclusion is a natural, accurate reflection of the
premises. Walton, confirms this in his definition of deductive reasoning: “if the premises are
true, then necessarily the conclusion is true, where the adverb “necessarily” applies to the
inferential link between the premises and the conclusion.”55 Patrick Hurley, whose work is
described as “one of the most widely used logic textbooks,”56 similarly describes the deductive
argument as “an argument in which the premises are claimed to support the conclusion in such a
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way that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.”57 Another example
of deductive argumentation based on these descriptions appears as follows:
(P1) George Washington was the first to be inaugurated as president
(P2) All presidents must be inaugurated
(C) George Washington was the first president.
Because the conclusion cannot be true unless all the premises are true, this form of reasoning is a
verifiable, absolute claim. Anthony Weston58 agrees, “If its premises are true, the conclusion is
true too.”59 Hence, the claim of absolutism is reasonable: premises must always be true for the
conclusion to be true.60 Since the premises are true in the example just given, the conclusion is
true as it correctly reflects the trueness of the premises, and this deductive argument is sound.

Hesitancy in Using Deductive Reasoning
Since deductive reasoning demonstrates a solid, popular method for presenting verifiable
arguments, a legitimate query surfaces as to why the aesthetic argument is stated abductively.
The deductive form of reasoning is the most common form used in logical argumentation due, in
part, to its significant use in history. This usage, for instance, can be traced back to Anselm and
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his presentation of the ontological argument.61 The legendary example of Anselm’s ontological
argument illustrates this point:
(P1) A being whose non-existence is inconceivable is greater than a being whose nonexistence is conceivable
(P2) God is the greatest conceivable being
(C) God’s Non-existence must be inconceivable.62
According to Craig, this form of argumentation has been used by Scotus, Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibniz.63 In his review of this argument, Craig observes, “There is no contradiction involved in
this notion. Therefore, God must exist.”64 This argument helps to demonstrate that deductive
reasoning, especially in classical theistic arguments, is not only well known, but is an effective
method for presenting the logic of certain theistic arguments.
Recognizing that deductive reasoning is commonly used in theistic argumentation and is
the preferred reasoning method of several philosophical and theological luminaries, could call
into question any hesitancy in using deductive reasoning for the presentation of the aesthetic
theistic argument. The first step in precluding this question is the acknowledgment that this
hesitancy is not due to any perception of an inherent weakness in deductive reasoning.
Conceding deduction to be the strongest form of logical presentation, there are justifiable reasons
for believing certain arguments can be more persuasive when expressed in a different form of
reasoning other than deduction. In making this statement, it is obvious that an apposition is being
made between strength of argument and the persuasive force of an argument. Strength of
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argument has to do with the soundness of the logic. If the premises are sufficiently true, the
conclusion is true. That is excellent strength of logic. However, there are some arguments,
though logically sound, which are not persuasive due to differences of worldview. This will be
demonstrated more clearly as this chapter progresses but it is important to note this contrast here.
Yet, as a disclaimer, this difference between strength of logic and strength of persuasion is not
relevant to all theistic arguments. For instance, the ontological, cosmological and teleological
arguments are extremely persuasive, even most persuasive, in their current deductive form.
However, observations made by David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls in the second chapter of their
recent work, God and Cosmos65 suggest a more persuasive moral theistic argument would result
if the abductive form of reasoning is used instead of stating the moral argument deductively. This
is based on critiques of Craig’s deductive form of the moral argument which appears as follows:
(P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
(P2) Objective moral values and duties do exist.
(C) Therefore, God exists.66
While acknowledging the soundness of deductive reasoning and the strengths it presents in the
ontological, cosmological and teleological theistic arguments, Baggett and Walls offer a list of
five problems found in Craig’s deductive form of the moral argument stated in Reasonable
Faith. A review of these five concerns, justify their hesitancy in the use of deduction for the
presentation of the moral argument. Since the aesthetic argument is a values based argument
similar to the moral argument, a hesitancy in using deductive reasoning for the presentation of
the moral argument suggests an appropriate hesitancy for its use in presenting the aesthetic
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argument. To validate this hesitancy, a study of the five concerns raised by Baggett and Walls is
necessary. That list of five problems they identify as present in Craig’s use of deduction in
presenting the moral theistic argument follows:
1. It makes us say very uncomfortable and unintuitive and unnecessary things— “Rape
isn’t wrong … if God doesn’t exist,” for example. The abductive approach avoids any
need to do so.
2. TDA, 67 more than abduction, allows the atheist to reject the moral realism instead of
the naturalism— like Marks did. Abduction keeps the moral facts in question front
and center as the starting data in need of explanation.
3. TDA doesn’t allow enough room to acknowledge what would be the simply amazing
features of a world like this if it could exist without God— whereas abduction does
not deny the power of a world like this without God, per impossible, to explain some
of morality.
4. Deduction bases the moral argument on a premise involving a particularly intractable
counterpossible. Are there nontrivially true counterpossibles? Sure. But pontificating
confidently about a world in which the ground of being doesn’t exist? That is
problematic indeed— particularly synthetic claims like the famous Dostoyevskian
counterfactual.
5. TDA can sever the bridge with our naturalist interlocutors it claims to build by
focusing, and needlessly so, more on our differences than our similarities.
In order to justify the hesitancy of using deductive reasoning in expressing the aesthetic
argument deductively, a tentative example of how the aesthetic theistic argument being presented
in this study might appear, were it stated in the form of deductive reasoning, follows. Using
Craig’s moral argument as the paradigm for the tentative deductive aesthetic argument, and that
it would be incongruous to compare the abductive form of the aesthetic argument to the
deductive form of the moral argument, a tentative example of the aesthetic argument follows:
(P1) If God did not exist, there would be no capacity for man to apprehend aesthetic
value.
(P2) Man does possess the capacity for apprehending aesthetic value

TDA is an acrostic for The Deductive Argument and refers to Craig’s deductive form of the moral
argument stated above.
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(C) Therefore, God exists.
This is a viable presentation of the aesthetic argument. Yet, since problems with the
persuasiveness of the deductive moral argument, presented by Craig, are identified by Baggett
and Walls, similar concerns for the aesthetic argument are justified were it to be presented
deductively, using Craig’s paradigm. Therefore, identifying the hesitation for using deduction to
express Craig’s moral argument, justifies hesitancy for the use of Craig’s paradigm in expressing
the aesthetic argument. To ratify this assertion, each of the problems Baggett and Walls
identified in Craig’s deductive example is listed and reviewed.

Problem 1: Uncomfortable Implications
The first problem states, “It [the deductive argument] makes us say very uncomfortable
and unintuitive and unnecessary things— ‘Rape isn’t wrong … if God doesn’t exist,’ for
example.” This serious assertion is based on the first premise of Craig’s deductive moral
argument. The premise begins with an atheistic assumption, “if God did not exist.” Reason
would suggest that if God does not exist, nothing would exist. Even allowing that existence of
human life could emerge without God’s causation, Baggett and Walls note that His lack of
existence would also require no moral values at all as He is the source of goodness and
morality.68 Yet, these observations are true only from a theist’s perspective. While Craig’s
deductive moral argument is perfectly arguable and logically sound, it is not persuasive to an
atheist comfortable in his belief that there is no God. His explanation for the source of morality
could be cultural influences or the recognition that without some measure of morality society
falls into chaos. This would be consistent with naturalism’s belief that survival of the species is
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the primary description of evolution. Hence, the naturalistic atheist might claim, society has
survived by recognizing certain moral boundaries. Baggett and Walls observe several potential
sources for naturalists to claim as the origins of morality which would not require the existence
of God, “human nature, social harmony, interpersonal interactions, the deliverances of various
hypothetical imperatives whose goals are practically universal, a wide variety and assortment of
physical, psychological, metaphysical, aesthetic, practical, and epistemic features . . .”69 The
point they make is that the deductive form of the moral argument though logically sound, is not
persuasive for atheists who accept the atheistic counterfactual that God does not exist. In using
Craig’s paradigm for the tentative form of the aesthetic argument, the same concern would exist
in the deductive form of the aesthetic argument. Beginning with this atheistic premise, atheists
are not inclined to be persuaded as they both assume God’s non-existence and assume another
basis for morality exists. The same could be true were the aesthetic argument to be expressed
deductively. It does not recognize that atheists are comfortable in the idea that God’s nonexistence requires alternative causes to be identified for both morality and aesthetic value. Thus,
the two arguments expressed deductively are not, according to Baggett and Walls, as persuasive
as desired.

Problem 2: Potential Rejection of Moral Theism
The second problem Baggett and Walls observe is stated as follows, “The Deductive
argument . . . allows the atheist to reject the moral realism instead of the naturalism.” Since
Craig’s deductive moral argument requires concession to the fallacies of naturalism, Baggett and
Walls posit that instead of renouncing naturalism, atheists would use the moral argument, as
stated in the deductive format, to reject moral realism. This is stated in the following quote which
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refers to naturalists who recognize “moral indicators around them.”70 In this regard Baggett and
Walls testify, “we don’t want them to do as this former Kantian Marks did, that Craig quoted, in
abandoning not his atheism, but his moral realism, after thinking about the implications and
deficiencies of his naturalism.”71 The stated concern references the “dogmatic secularists”72 who,
if given a world without God would be willing to abandon the concept of moral realism rather
than abandon atheism and naturalism.73 Instead, they suggest, the non-theist is receptive to the
concept of moral values, but is unwilling to concede to the notion that God is the only source of
those values.74 Since the atheist draws this distinction, Baggett and Walls believe the naturalist
would abandon moral realism before abandoning naturalism. That result would exacerbate the
conflict between naturalism and supernaturalism, weakening hope for persuading naturalists
toward theism. For this reason, Baggett and Walls believe the first premise of the deductive form
of Craig’s moral theistic argument is counterproductive. This raises concern regarding the use of
deduction in presenting the aesthetic theistic argument. The use of Craig’s paradigm in stating
the tentative deductive form of the aesthetic argument reflects this same atheistic formula in its
first premise. It is reasonable to assume a similar response by atheists. Such concerns cause a
certain hesitancy in using deduction in presenting the aesthetic theistic argument.
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Problem 3: Insufficient Room for Consideration of Non-Theism
The third problem identified by Baggett and Walls asserts, “The deductive argument
doesn’t allow enough room to acknowledge what would be the simply amazing features of a
world like this if it could exist without God.” This concern is based on the truth that a “clear
apprehension of moral truth is a feature of this world.”75 The rationale for this concern reflects
the authors’ belief that allowing some sense of morality’s origin, apart from God, might be
possible.76 Baggett and Walls reveal that Craig came to agree with this possibility.77 In so doing
they suggest the reader “take a look at this world and see what you can do by way of explaining
morality and its distinctive features, and don’t be surprised if you find that you can make some
progress.”78 The authors make a salient argument for the possibility of demonstrating openness
to the idea of a moral non-theistic basis. Such consideration persuades an atheist to consider an
argument for theism “without having to argue that secular ethics is impotent.”79 The apparent
implication is that by allowing the possibility of secular ethics a, better opportunity to engage the
atheist in a discussion toward the best explanation for the source of man’s apprehension of moral
value (including a theistic one) is possible. Theists know that the best explanation of morality’s
causation is God’s existence. Yet, Baggett and Walls suggest a failure to acknowledge the
potentially amazing features of a world without God does not compromise theism but offers a
better arena for persuading theism to be the better explanation. Again, because of its inherent
rigidity, a deductive argument based on man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value would
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obviously not offer similar opportunity. The non-theistic element of the first premise of the
deductive form of the moral does not encourage a persuasive interaction.80 As the first premise of
the deductive form of the aesthetic theistic argument is also non-theistic, it too would be
similarly problematic in not encouraging persuasive interaction. This causes hesitancy in the use
of deductive reasoning in presenting the aesthetic argument.

Problem 4: Based on a Counterpossible
Baggett and Walls’ fourth problem with the deductive form of the moral argument, which
contributes to the hesitation of its use in stating the aesthetic theistic argument, is as follows:
“Deduction bases the moral argument on a premise involving a particularly intractable
counterpossible. Are there nontrivially true counterpossibles? Sure. But pontificating confidently
about a world in which the ground of being doesn’t exist? That is problematic indeed.” This
concern suggests a certain obstinacy is present in Craig’s deductive example of the moral theistic
argument. Baggett and Walls attribute a certain pontification quality to the use of its
counterpossibles. They suggest the first premise assumes that no possibilities exist for moral
values apart from God’s existence. Atheistic naturalists would not agree as they are comfortable
in accepting God’s non-existence while also claiming moral values do exist. Baggett and Walls
suggest Craig’s deductive moral argument exacerbates this disagreement with an unnecessary
level of pontification. According to Baggett and Walls, this might not provide the best
intellectual atmosphere for an exchange of different viewpoints. Additionally, the world in which
the argument is referring doesn’t exist. There is no world in which God does not exist. Hence,
the level of pontification about this counterpossible is described by the authors as problematic.
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Again, since the paradigm used in formulating the tentative deductive form of the aesthetic
argument, reflects the same obstinate pontification of counterfactuals, it is reasonable to assume
the same problem would exist were the same deductive form of reasoning used in the
presentation of the aesthetic argument. This adds to the hesitancy of using deductive reasoning in
presenting the aesthetic argument

Problem 5: Severs Rather than Builds Bridges with Interlocutors
The last of the problems Baggett and Walls identified in Craig’s deductive moral
argument appears as follows, “The deductive argument can sever the bridge with our naturalist
interlocutors it claims to build by focusing, and needlessly so, more on our differences than our
similarities.” This final concern is based on the supposition that apologetics and thus, theistic
arguments, are intended to engage atheists in meaningful exchange of ideas. This cannot be
done, as this concern implies, when bridges allowing this engagement are severed rather than
built. At the root of this concern is the question of whether or not apologetics are meant to
present arguments for the purpose of persuading others to consider a more justifiable worldview.
Assuming this to be priority of Christian apologetics, it is likely that this influence toward a more
justifiable worldview is less productive when bridges of communication are severed rather than
built. The concern the authors demonstrate reflects the suspicion that Craig’s deductive form of
the moral argument is more inclined to sever.
Again, finally, since Craig’s paradigm is used to formulate the tentative deductive form
of the aesthetic theistic argument, the same concern is present.
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Deciding Against the Use of Deduction
A sense of urgency encourages the reiteration that inherent weakness in deductive
reasoning is not being suggested. What is revealed in the previous discussion is that it may not
always be the best way to express theistic arguments. Craig’s preference for the moral argument
expressed deductively is justifiable in that it is a very strong and logically sound argument.
However, Baggett and Walls raise compelling concerns about its persuasiveness when used in a
debate environment with atheistic philosophers. Determining how to choose between deductive
and abductive reasoning requires a review of the very purpose of apologetics which is
laboriously spelled out in the introduction of this study. Fundamentally two purposes for
Christian apologetics exist, according to Craig: 1) to defend the truth claims of Christianity and
2) to oppose counterclaims to Christianity. It seems Baggett and Walls are suggesting something
else should also be considered. Perhaps they see the role of apologetics, especially as it pertains
to the moral theistic argument, to play more of a mentoring or discovery role. It seems these
authors desire to engage those of different views with meaningful, respectful debate so as to
determine together, the best explanation for the existence of moral values present in every
culture. This suggests their objective is persuasion not just confrontation. Clearly, their
understanding, that the purpose of apologetics to include persuasion, is better suited to abductive
reasoning then deductive reasoning. While deductive reasoning may represent a greater strength
of logic, abduction reflects a greater potential for persuasion. Their claims are summarized by the
following review.
In regard to Problem 1, Craig’s deductive model is built upon an atheistic non-factual
assuming God’s non-existence. Such a world, assuming it could exist as nothing would exist if
God did not exist, requires there to be no theistic basis for morality and as such the lack of
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morality would not exclude such behaviors as rape and torturing children for the fun of it.
Defending the possibility of such a counterfactual would not cause the atheist to be persuaded as
they not only envision the possibility of existence apart from God, they also accept the
possibility of moral grounding without God. Abductive reasoning would remove this atheistic
counterfactual and would thus remove the need to argue for a morality apart from God. Instead,
it would argue for the best explanation for morality’s existence. This “best explanation”
approach allows, for the sake of conversation, the possibility of non-theistic origins of morality.
Thus it meets the atheist where he is. Then, as it is presently understood, abductive reasoning
would engage the theist in reviewing all possible explanations for the purpose of determining the
best. Theists believe, and are capable of justifying the belief, in the notion that God is the best
explanation of the cause of morality. Since the same formula is present in the tentative deductive
aesthetic argument, it is reasonable to assume that the same problem would exist. It is also
assumed that abduction would similarly address that concern.
In problem 2, the concern was the possibility that the deductive argument would force the
atheist to reject moral realism as he would be unlikely, if challenged directly, to reject
naturalism. Abduction, according to Baggett and Walls, would prevent the need for moral
realism’s rejection by “keeping moral facts in question front and center as starting data in need of
explanation.”81 Abductive reasoning, focusing on the best explanation, resolves this concern.
This observation is not lost on the presentation of the aesthetic argument nor is the fact that
abduction resolves this concern for the potential rejection of moral realism.
In problem 3, the concern was that the deductive form of the moral argument doesn’t
allow enough room to consider the possibility of morality existing in a world without the
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existence of God. Instead of formulating the argument in terms of the impossibility of a world
without God, which would not persuade the atheist who believes such a world exists. The
abductive approach would be to acknowledge the possibility but to search for the best
explanation of those possibilities available. Such an approach engages rather than confronts the
atheist. That this would also be the case in the deductive form of the aesthetic argument,
hesitation of its use in presenting the aesthetic theistic argument results.
Problem 4 is based on the observation that the deductive argument projects “intractable
counterpossibles.” Abduction would preclude the obstinacy of such counterpossibles.
Additionally, it would reject the notion that counterpossibles were trivial. Instead, the abductive
argument engages the atheist in the pursuit of all recognized possibilities for the purpose of
determining the best of those explanations. This allows for greater potential for engaging the
atheist, improving the potential of persuasion. This adds to the hesitancy of using deduction in
presenting a values based theistic argument which could involve a discussion about personal
taste in defining aesthetic value.
Problem 5 summarizes the previous four in the sense that it raises the question of
purpose. Is the intent of the interaction with naturalists to build or sever any possible bridge of
engagement with the atheist? Abduction, though weaker logically, offers less hesitancy of its use
as it seems to offer more potential for persuasion through engagement. These five observations
result in a greater comfort in the use of abductive reasoning rather than deductive reasoning in
stating the aesthetic theistic argument.

Inductive Reasoning
Before a final decision to use abductive reasoning, a consideration of inductive reasoning
is necessary. While deductive reasoning requires alternative explanations to be impossible,
38

inductive reasoning requires alternate explanations to be improbable. Carnes and Scheer state,
“The study of deductive logic is the study of rules and methods to determine the validity of
deductive arguments. . . . . The study of inductive logic is the study of rules and methods for
assigning probabilities to the conclusions of inductive arguments when the premises are assumed
to be true.”82 The difference between these two methods of inference, or reasoning, is clear.
When moving from deductive to inductive logic you are moving from the goal of validity to the
goal of probability. This is demonstrated by the following example:
(P1) My daughter has scored 90 or above on every test this semester.
(C) She is likely to score 90 or above on the final
Note the several obvious differences between inductive and deductive logic in these simplistic
examples. First, the inductive example has only one premise and a claim. Although it might have
many premises, only one is common to inductive arguments. Clearly, there is less rigidity in
inductive reasoning. It is intended to demonstrate the flexibility of a probability rather than the
rigidity of a certainty. Such words as “likely” or “probably” are often present in an inductive
argument. According to Carnes and Scheer, it is “the attempt to answer this question: How does
one determine how likely a conclusion is on the basis of the evidence cited in the premises?”83
Walton affirms Carnes and Scheer’s assertions with his description of inductive
reasoning, “The inferential link between the premises and the conclusion here is not one of
necessity but of probability.”84 Walton also observes that there is controversy over the exact
meaning of probability. However, to pursue that controversy in depth in this venue would
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unacceptably deter the study from its intent. Instead, it suffices to note that “probability” is the
key word in inductive inference. The question this raises, however, is whether or not inductive
reasoning has a significant role in theistic arguments.

The Inductive Nature of the Evidential Apologetic Method
Gary Habermas85 effectively demonstrates the value of inductive reasoning in the
evidential methodology of his writing. Dr. Habermas is a proponent of evidential methodology in
apologetics.86 His method presents such a preponderance of evidence, supporting the justified
belief in the resurrection and the existence of miracles, etc., that the probability for their
existence becomes too high to ignore. One example of this is found in Did the Resurrection
Happen, which contains an accurate accounting of his debate with well-known atheistic
philosopher Antony Flew. In his response to Flew’s counterclaims, Habermas consistently
appealed to his vast reservoir of evidence which contradicted Flew’s assertions. He presented
abundant data to argue effectively the high probability for the resurrection occurrence, as
recorded in Scripture.87 The results he achieves using this method are impressive. The sheer
amount of evidence, for the resurrection and miracles he has collected, is staggering and leaves
little doubt of their historicity. Yet, despite his impressive evidence, there are both strengths and
weaknesses present in the use of inductive reasoning when considering its use in presenting a
formal argument. These were taken into account in making the decision to use abductive
reasoning over inductive reasoning to present the aesthetic theistic argument.
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Hesitations in the Use of Induction
Charles S. Peirce88 states, “Induction consists in starting from a theory, deducing from it
predictions of phenomena, and observing those phenomena in order to see how nearly they agree
with the theory.”89 Walton remarks that Peirce was so critical of inductive reasoning used by
John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism that he declared, “It would be a waste of time to discuss such a
theory.”90 Peirce’s major complaint was that instead of making an argument, inductive reasoning
was “making a prediction which then matches that prediction to an observation.”91 His point
seems to be that there is a difference between making a statement of fact and making an
evidenced based prediction about the facts. To Peirce, an argument should reflect the first, not
the second. Peirce’s reservations about this form of argument gives cause to be hesitant in using
it for presenting the aesthetic theistic argument.
Though both theology and science has significant use for inductive reasoning, it does not
present as the preferred approach within the discipline of apologetics, with the exception of what
has already been observed of the evidential apologetic methodology of Habermas. Even then,
there is a difference between the gathering of prolific information which validates a view and
formally verbalizing the process as a formal argument which reflect that view. Deductive
reasoning remains the favorite form for expressing formal arguments. When faced with a
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mountain of data supporting supernaturalism, induction remains a powerful tool. Yet, the end
result of inductive reasoning can at best be a high probability. No matter how strong the evidence
or the vast amount of it, and no matter how high the level of probability it attains, inductive
reasoning can only present a probability or a high level of likelihood.92
This limitation, by itself, however, is not sufficient cause for hesitation of its use in
presenting the aesthetic theistic argument. As induction is perceived to be logically stronger than
the plausibility of abduction. Yet, one must still recognize that of the ontological, cosmological,
teleological and moral theistic arguments, none of them are presented in the form of inductive
reasoning. Wondering why this is so presents cause for hesitation. While its limitation to present
only a probability may not be sufficient cause for hesitation, combined with the fact that no other
theistic argument is expressed in theistic arguments, there is sufficient cause for hesitation in
using it to present the aesthetic theistic argument.
Since apologetics is intended to defend the truth, it is clear that something stated as true is
much more appealing than stating something as probably true.93 That is not to say that
probability has a weak role in apologetics. Craig Keener, demonstrates the great strength of using
evidence in establishing a high probability for the miraculous. He also provides a plethora of data
chronicling scores of medically affirmed healings which are unexplained by natural causes.94
The volume of evidence he presents, supporting the miraculous, raises a very high probability
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that miracles both occurred and occur. Yet, no matter how high the probability, inductive
reasoning does not move beyond the probability status. This does not imply that this form of
inference is insufficient or irrelevant. Stating that there is a high probability that miracles yet
occur today is clearly staggering and potentially life-changing. Instead, the point is that inductive
reasoning does not rise above probabilistic conclusion. Though it may be very impressive,
especially as it applies to the magnitude of data Habermas and Keener provide. Still, it does not
reflect the notion that it is impossible for the conclusion not to be true as deductive reasoning
does. A point might be made for suggesting induction is better suited for affirming a particular
premise or a particular point of view rather than the presentation of formal argumentation.
Assuming this to be possible, such an explanation would justify its value as an apologetic
method without diminishing its worth because of its lack of use in stating classical theistic
argumentation. Taken together, these observations cause hesitancy for the use of induction in the
presentation of the aesthetic theistic argument.
To again affirm the value of evidential reasoning, one should note that apologetics is not
the only discipline wherein the use of inductive reasoning is successfully used, Sports
statisticians are constantly using the inductive method. It is common for football coaches or
analysts to posit, “Since they used this play 56% of the time it is likely that they will use it
frequently when we play them next time.” This is inductive reasoning. Physicians treating a
patient may often go through an inductive thought process such as, “We tried the statin drugs
with no effect so it is likely that we need to administer another type.” These examples ascribe
high value for the use of inductive inference. Yet again, there are reasons for hesitancy in using
this form of reasoning when verbalizing the aesthetic argument. Another example for justifying
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this hesitancy is found in the following examples of the aesthetic argument stated in the form of
inductive reasoning.
Example 1
(P1) God is described as the cause for the existence of all things.
(C) God is the likely cause of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value
Example 2
(P1) God is responsible for the beauty of nature
(C) It is probable that God created man with the ability to apprehend nature’s beauty
Though these statements argue well logically, when used with values based arguments such as
these, induction reveals a weakness in persuasion. In each case, affirming the truth of either
premise or either conclusion would require voluminous evidence and even then, at best, it would
result in a probability rather than an assertion or even the best explanation. This weakness in
persuasion in the formal verbal formula of inductive reasoning adds to the justification of
hesitancy in using this form to present the aesthetic theistic argument.

Abductive Reasoning
Having identified deductive and inductive reasoning and considered both their
advantages and disadvantages in presenting value based theistic arguments, the discussion now
turns to that method chosen to formulate the aesthetic argument within this study. Deductive
reasoning makes the alternative to the claim impossible. Inductive reasoning makes the
alternative to the claim improbable. Abductive reasoning makes an alternative to the conclusion
implausible. Baggett and Walls have already demonstrated that though abduction may be the
weakest in its strength of logic, it is preferred because of its strength of persuasion. Abductive
reasoning offers a solution that is the best answer to a particular question. Though similar to
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induction, it differs in that induction presents information which establishes the likelihood of the
conclusion being considered. In abduction, all possible explanations are considered for the
purposes of determining the best explanation available. In this regard inductive reasoning, as
with deductive reasoning, is potentially stronger in logic, but it is not as persuasive as abduction
in affirming the conclusion. In abduction, the goal is to consider all possible conclusions so as to
determine the best explanation of the phenomenon or event. To demonstrate the best explanation
approach is more persuasive, a clear understanding of abduction is necessary. Demonstrating the
soundness of this claim begins with some history and definition.
Walton cites Norwood Russel Hanson who points to “convincing examples of abductive
reasoning in physics and other sciences.”95 Walton states that only recently has Hanson been
recognized as an icon of the philosophy of science and argumentation.96 John R. Josephson97
observes that abduction has been “largely overlooked and under-analyzed by almost 2400 years
of formal logic and philosophy.”98 Walton refers to the importance of abductive inference in the
use of scientific discovery, legal reasoning, everyday argumentation and goal-directed
reasoning.99 Walton additionally asserts that the commonality of abductive reasoning is what
makes it of such interest to those concerned with the pursuit of achieving artificial
intelligence.100 Carnes and Scheer, on the other hand, do not even mention abductive reasoning
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in their textbook.101 This demonstrates the likelihood that Josephson is correct in asserting
abductive reasoning has been overlooked and under-analyzed. Impressive as its history is, its
present lack of popularity requires that it be carefully defined.

Defining Abductive Reasoning
Walton, offers the following description, “Abduction is the process of forming an
explanatory hypothesis.”102 He further describes abduction as “prior to induction and deduction
in the process of scientific argumentation.”103 He adds, “Every single item of scientific theory
which stands established today has been due to abduction”104 Finally, Walton proposes his own
formal definition of abduction:
First, it is a technique used to narrow down the number of alternatives by picking out one
or a few hypotheses from a much larger number of them that are available. Second, it is a
process of guessing, or picking the right guess, and thus it is clear that it is a fallible
process that can lead to wrong hypotheses as well as to right ones. Third, it comes into
play when a new phenomenon is observed, in other words, a phenomenon that has not yet
been explained, or explained well enough, in science.105
Understanding abduction and validating its use for presenting the aesthetic theistic argument
requires some discussion of the three observations made here by Walton. First, abduction
recognizes multiple alternatives and seeks to pick one of those alternatives. For instance, in the
case of this project, there are two alternatives offered by naturalism and one by supernaturalism
as possible explanations for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. Instead of making a
declaration, as deductive argumentation does, or propose the likelihood of one of those
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alternatives, as inductive reasoning would posit, abductive reasoning seeks to recognize all the
reasonable alternatives, and even non-reasonable ones, and sets about picking one that is the
preferred or best explanation. The process by which the best explanation is determined in this
study is a focus of chapter 3.
Second, this selection is described as a guessing, or “picking the right guess.” This may
be logically weaker than deduction or induction, but the use of appropriate scholarship should
result in picking the “best” of the alternatives, or, to use the language above, make the most
informed guess among the alternatives present. Since every scientific theory which stands today
is the result of abduction, as Walton states, the concern for its logical weakness seems to be
countered. Third, abductive reasoning leaves open the possibility that if a better guess, or a more
informed “guess” is made in the future, its intent to recognize the best of the alternatives would
require deference to the new explanation, assuming it is determined a better explanation. This
suggests abductive reasoning requires sufficient research for identifying the best explanation on
the basis of the facts being presented. This research offers better potential for engaging those
with opposing views in assuring the best explanation is determined. Hence, abduction has a
better potential for persuasion.
While this process may sound strange to theologians, it is not new to those in the medical
field. For instance, if a physician sees a young patient with multiple red spots, which are familiar
to the doctor, and the parents of the child inform him that he first had a fever before the
blemishes erupted, the doctor, having been presented with these multiple symptoms, executes his
duties by making the most informed diagnosis (guess) as to the cause. Having been trained well
and having had some experience, he is aware of several maladies which cause fever and red
spots. Yet, these particular spots he knows to be unique to measles. Adding to this awareness the
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evidential data that an outbreak of measles has occurred in the child’s school, the doctor is
comfortable in diagnosing the malady as measles. He affirms the best explanation for the malady
is measles. This process of diagnosis is abductive reasoning. The formal argument would appear
as follows:
(P1) The child has presented with red spots having broken out after a fever.
(P2) The best diagnosis, given all the data presented, is that this child has measles
(C) This child has the measles.
A brief overview of this argument reveals that the first premise is close to, if not actually, an
absolute statement. There is little doubt that what is presented to the doctor is a patient with red
spots which broke out after a fever. There is no room for arguing against this premise. What is
unique about abduction, which sets it apart from deduction and induction, is premise two. In the
second premise many things are assumed: First, there is an assumed collection of data which
offers some measure of reasonable explanation for the conditions of the first premise. Second,
there is careful evaluation of all possibilities so that the best, or most defendable explanation, is
identified. Third, having made that determination, the unchosen are rejected and the resulting
diagnosis identifies the cause for the symptoms presented. The conclusion (diagnosis) is
determined based on evidence presented, and the informed choice of the best explanation. This
exemplifies a workable understanding of abductive reasoning.

Affirming Abductive Reasoning
To affirm further the choice of using abductive reasoning for this study over deductive
and inductive reasoning, it would be helpful to apply this same process to the aesthetic argument
stated in the introduction.
(P1) Every human culture demonstrates a capacity to apprehend aesthetic value
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(P2) The best explanation for this capacity is supernatural causation.
(C) God’s existence is the supernatural cause of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value
In the above argument, the first premise is stated as an absolute. This study provides sufficient
data to justify the claim of the first premise in chapter 2. Second, premise two reflects three
assumptions: First, there is an assumption that there is data demonstrating the soundness of the
first premise. Second, there is an assumption of adequate effort to review all relevant
explanations for the declaration presented in the second premise. third, that examination actually
reveals the best explanation for the conditions presented in the second premise. Demonstrating
an adequate effort has been made to review all relevant explanations for affirming the soundness
of the second premise of the aesthetic theistic argument is presented in the third chapter. Third,
after considering all relevant explanations, those not chosen are rejected and the best explanation
is identified. The conclusion is sound based on the soundness of the process just described. The
result of the process is a conclusion, the contradiction of which is implausible.

Summary and Conclusion of the Case for Use of Abduction
Before a summary of the reasons why abduction is preferred in the presentation of this
project, it is reiterated that all classical arguments do not require retooling to reflect the abductive
form. As was demonstrated in the discussion above, however, deductive reasoning is not always
best suited for every form of theistic argument. Clearly neither is abductive reasoning best suited
for all theistic arguments. Instead, by following the research of abductive reasoning by Baggett
and Walls, theistic apologists and philosophers should more carefully consider using abduction
so as to assure a greater potential for persuasion. The following briefly summarizes why future
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consideration of abduction is warranted and why it is preferred in this presentation of the
aesthetic theistic argument.
As Baggett and Walls have sufficiently argued, especially in the case of values based
theistic arguments such as the moral and aesthetic theistic arguments, deductive reasoning may
not be the most persuasive form of presentation. Baggett and Walls’ discussion of deductive
reasoning justifies hesitancy in its use in some cases, especially, it seems, in the case of values
based theistic arguments. Likewise, neither is induction the preferred reasoning method for
stating the aesthetic theistic argument. As it is common knowledge that no present formal
argument is stated inductively. Formally stating inductive arguments can appear clumsy.
Induction is not the preferred form of the aesthetic argument’s presentation. Despite the certainty
that these reasoning methods are logically stronger than abduction, they do not always present a
better potential for persuasion. Since apologetic practices include the desire to persuade, this
must be taken into account.
Second, it is appealing to realize that abduction puts the onus of responsibility on the
naturalist or non-theist to find a better explanation. If, for example, after theism identifies, and
adequately defends, the best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is
divine causation, the naturalist can only counter by producing a better explanation. The naturalist
is not free to simply recede to his belief that God and/or supernaturalism do not exist. He must
argue why naturalism is a better explanation than supernatural causation. In chapters 2 and 3 of
this work the best explanation is identified and justified. Why naturalistic explanations are not
the best explanations is carefully explained. An argument, stated abductively, justifies the belief
that God’s existence is the best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. The
task of the naturalist can no longer be the mere presentation of an alternative view. He must now
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offer evidence that demonstrates his explanation is better. When theists present an argument
stating that theism is the best explanation for the aesthetic apprehension, the onus is then on the
atheist not only to offer an alternative, but to offer a better alternative and a justification for why
that naturalistic alternative is better.
Third, which is similar though not exact to the first, abduction flexes with its contrainterlocutor. To explain, in deductive reasoning the rigidity of the argument is such that it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. In spite of this, Baggett and
Walls demonstrate that it is less persuasive to the atheist or naturalist who is comfortable with
non-theism. In inductive reasoning, it is improbable that the premise is true and the claim be
false. This probability reasoning is powerful when presenting evidence, but, as has been
presented, it is clumsy in presenting values based arguments such as the moral or aesthetic
theistic argument. Though it has a better potential for flexibility and engagement then deduction,
there is a reason why no formal theistic argument is presented inductively. Stating theistic
arguments in probabilistic terminology is awkward. Yet, induction is extremely powerful when
used to confirm an historical event or the existence of the miracles. Hence, induction was not the
preferred method for presenting the aesthetic theistic argument. In abductive inference, inference
to the best explanation, there is a recognized possibility for alternatives, which makes this type of
reasoning the most flexible and potentially the most persuasive of the three. It offers this strength
of persuasion by creating the best environment for engaging contra-interlocutors for the purpose
of identifying the best explanation. This environment offers greater possibility for persuasion
than simple confrontation to alternate postulations, as does the deductive form of reasoning. It is
true that abductive reasoning is an intelligent guess based on research.106 It is also true that of the
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three forms of reasoning discussed, it is the weakest in strength of logic. However, it is
additionally true that it provides the greatest potential for persuasion as it requires a certain
engagement of mutual research between opposing views in order to identify the best explanation
for the conditions stated in the premises. A sound abductive argument presents, assuming
sufficient research, any claim other than that which is identified as the best explanation is
implausible. The abductive form presents the possibility of multiple alternatives and thus
demonstrates a greater flexibility for engaging contra-interlocutors in the process. Its researched
conclusion presents in such a way that any alternative is implausible.
Fourth, building on the previous thought, while deductive reasoning offers more
opportunity for confrontation than engagement, as described earlier in this chapter, and inductive
reasoning presents a likelihood, however high, that the conclusion is probable, abductive
reasoning offers a greater motivation for research, instruction and common intellectual exercise
between contra-interlocutors for determining the best of all recognized explanations. One must
consider each proposed explanation in the goal of finding the best. Clearly, the standard or
criterion for identifying what is best or better must be discerned. But these are teachable and
instructive opportunities for open minds to engage. The aesthetic argument, expressed in an
abductive form, tells young minds, for example, that they are not merely being fed data for them
to retain. Nor is a probability being suggested, even a high probability. Instead, they each must
investigate, and then investigate the investigation, so as to insure the claim being presented is
indeed the best explanation. To again reiterate, this exercise is not meant to imply replacing
deductive and inductive reasoning, as they are formidable forms of reasoning and clearly the
preferred in certain forms of argumentation. Instead, this discussion suggests that deductive and
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inductive forms of reasoning, which are logically stronger than abduction, may not always the
best environment for persuading opposing interlocutors.
Craig is correct when he observes that faith is not something one obtains only by
reason.107 He has pointedly and admirably distinguished between a magisterial role of reason and
a ministerial role of reason.108 In other words, reason should be a tool of, not a master over, faith.
Even in the case of abductive reasoning, faith is not the result of research but the result of the
work of the Spirit of God who can, and often does, use research, knowledge and reason to bring
someone to faith. Deductive reasoning makes a declaration. Inductive reasoning offers a high
probability. Abductive reasoning invites the consideration of the best explanation. All three of
these are potential tools for formal argumentation. Only the Spirit of God can use these tools to
lead a person to faith. Yet, it seems obvious that the form of inference which provides
meaningful interaction between interlocutors would be preferred to those which simply declare
and opposing view.
Finally, to conclude this chapter of the discussion, abductive reasoning provides the
greatest possibility for truth to be acknowledged continually. When a person is told that this
explanation is “the best” it is assumed that if a better explanation comes, it will then take the
place of the previous for the best explanation is required in abductive reasoning not merely a
good one. Thus, a greater potential for consistent, reasoned pursuit of truth is necessary. Best
over good is always better. The abductive form forces the continued pursuit of the best
explanation. This encourages constant vigilance of study and sound reasoning. What seems too
obvious to even mention, is that the very term “best” is a superlative and as such, it implies that
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there is none better. If naturalism cannot provide a better explanation, the best will stand, (and
vice versa) even if it is a supernatural explanation. This is perhaps the primary motivation for
employing abductive reasoning. Once the best is established, the goal is reached. The only room
for more discussion is in the constant vigilance to affirm that the best explanation has been
found, whatever that explanation might be. The truths of theism should not fear honest,
consistent review.

Addendum to Chapter 1
It is apparent that this project possesses both a primary and a secondary objective, though
this was not its original goal. The primary objective remains the offering of a theistic argument
for the existence of God based on the reality that man has the ability to apprehend aesthetic
value. Like the moral argument, the cause of this uniquely human characteristic deserves to be
identified. The primary goal of this study is to argue that the best explanation for the origin of
this characteristic is supernatural causation. The secondary objective, which is more accidental
than intentional, offers the merits of presenting this theistic argument in the form of abductive
reasoning. This chapter affirms abductive reasoning to be the most reasonable and defendable
form of argument in presenting the aesthetic theistic argument. The best explanation for the
cause of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is God’s existence.
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Chapter 2
The First Premise
Every human culture demonstrates a capacity to apprehend aesthetic value

Having justified the method of presentation, attention can now be fully directed toward
the aesthetic theological argument. The goal of this chapter is to define and determine the
soundness of the first premise of that argument. The first step toward this goal focuses on the
terminology of the premise. Precise understanding of the terminology is necessary if the
conclusion of the argument is to be adequately persuasive.
This objective requires several stages. The first is to explicate the locution “apprehension
of aesthetic value” as it formulates the essence of the first premise. The second stage focuses
more narrowly on identifying the definition of “aesthetic value.” Since several volumes have
been dedicated to the defining of aesthetics, there must be both succinctness and sufficiency in
its defining so as to prevent this study from wandering into interesting deliberations which are
not pertinent to the study’s thesis. Yet, the need to have at least a minimal but sufficient
comprehension of that which is being apprehended by all human cultures is evident if this first
premise is to be adequately affirmed. The third stage in achieving a precise understanding of the
first premise, so as to justify the claim that aesthetic apprehension is common to all human
cultures, involves the consensus of its validity by both naturalists and supernaturalists. Because
the execution of this third stage is limited to the empirical data of this consensus, there is little
need for extensive evidential research. Little evidence exists to question man’s capacity for
aesthetic apprehension as present in all known human cultures. Successful execution of these
stages adequately defends the first premise. Each stage of the discussion listed above is briefly
summarized. The summary of the entire discussion concludes the chapter.
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Ascertaining the Ability to Apprehend Aesthetic Value
Three realizations are necessary to determine what is meant by “the ability to apprehend
aesthetic value.” The first of these is the realization of the specific definition of apprehending.
The second involves a review of four features inherent in the act of apprehending aesthetic value.
The third realization is found in the presentation of a list of categories by which apprehension of
aesthetics is demonstrated. This listing reveals the complexities of the act of apprehending
aesthetic value, bringing it into sharper focus. A summary of this information concludes this
section of the discussion.

The Definition of Apprehending
Webster defines apprehend as, “1. To arrest or seize, 2. To become aware of, 3. To grasp
with the understanding: recognize the meaning.”109 This primary understanding implies that,
whatever aesthetic value is, man’s apprehension of it includes a grasping and or understanding of
its presence or meaning. This reveals that the apprehension of aesthetic value occurs when one
“becomes aware” that the object or event (whatever the stimulus) before him has aesthetic value.
Once aware of the presence of something, someone, or some experience possessing aesthetic
value, the grasping or understanding of that awareness is the apprehension of its aesthetic nature.
The grasping of the perception that the stimulus has aesthetic value, or the perception of it, is the
apprehending of its aesthetic value. Thus, it is obvious that apprehending aesthetic value is to
grasp or discern some measure of a stimulus’ aesthetic worth.
Alvin Plantinga offers a principle which provides basic insight into the complexity of this
seemingly simple act, “To see that a proposition p is true—in the way in which we see that a

109

Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. “apprehend.”

56

priori truths are true—is to apprehend not only that things are a certain way but that they must be
that way.”110 To demonstrate how this applies to the understanding of aesthetic apprehension,
assuming one subscribes to the truth that p has aesthetic value, the apprehension of that value
requires that p must have, by its very nature, aesthetic value. That is, according to Plantinga, it
must be that way. He further explains, “Reason is the faculty whereby we learn of what is
possible and necessary.”111 Plantinga establishes that, in the process of apprehending aesthetic
value, it first requires comprehending that it is necessary for the nature of p to be aesthetic. Using
this principle as a basis for understanding the apprehension of aesthetic value, Plantinga is
asserting that the apprehension of aesthetics does not originate in man’s ascribing aesthetic value
to “X” (X being the aesthetic stimulus). Instead, he posits that the apprehension of aesthetic
value begins with the realization that X possesses, within its nature, an aesthetic value. This
value, such as beauty, magnificence or even hideousness must be perceived as being essential to
the nature of X before apprehending it can take place. Contra Kant, as will be demonstrated later,
Plantinga ascribes to the view that apprehending the aesthetic value of X requires that X possess
aesthetic value. Apprehension, therefore, according to Plantinga, is not the assigning of aesthetic
value to X by perception, but is the recognition that aesthetic value is present in the very nature
of the stimulus. All of this apprehending requires sufficient intellect, reasoning, etc., to discern
the nature of the stimulus. Hence, the apprehension of aesthetic value is the grasping or
understanding that the thing being experienced is by nature necessarily aesthetic in value.
Assuming Plantinga’s assertions are correct and it is required that the nature of the
stimulus has aesthetic value, in order for aesthetic value to be perceived. This requires that the
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apprehension of aesthetic value begins with the perception that the stimulus, by its very nature,
possesses aesthetic value. Though the conclusion is apparently lucid, it is yet the case that a
satisfactory explanation for the apprehension of the aesthetic experience has not really been
established. Authur Shimmamura and Stephen Palmer comment on this frustration, “The flip side
of defining art in terms of aesthetic response is the need to understand aesthetic response as
suitable to define art.”112 This circular account suggests that apprehending aesthetic value
requires ability to apprehend aesthetic value. This is further exacerbated by an equally circular
question, “Is beauty perceived because the nature of the thing experienced necessarily possesses
beauty, or is it beautiful because it is perceived as having beauty by the one having the
experience?” Plantinga’s view as presented above, resolves the circularity concern by asserting
aesthetic value must be within the nature of the aesthetic stimulus before aesthetic value can be
perceived. Succinctly, he posits that the perception of aesthetic value is rooted in the nature of
the stimulus, not solely in the perception of the observer or one being stimulated?
Kant, on the other hand, when speaking of apprehending aesthetic value, re-introduces to
the circularity question when he states, “Every reference of representations, even that of
sensations, may be objective (and then it signifies the real in an empirical representation); save
only the reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in the object is signified,
but through which there is a feeling in the subject, as it is affected by the representation.”113
Herein, Kant asserts his views on the judgment of personal opinion. He claims that feelings,
which would include one’s reaction to aesthetic stimuli, is based on one’s taste, preferences or
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perception.114 While Plantinga places the locus of aesthetic value in the nature of the stimulus,
Kant places that locus in the perception of the one stimulated. The disagreements held between
these two luminaries demonstrate the quagmire involved in an attempt to define aesthetic value
fully.
Potentially endless debate of the matter is avoided by reviewing the purpose of this study.
The goal of this study is to propose and defend a theistic argument for the existence of God
based on man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. Since this study has already been
identified as one built upon evangelical beliefs, it is appropriate to note that Scriptures represent
God as the Creator of all things. It seems reasonable to assume that aesthetic value is included
among those things which God created. He, therefore, is the source of the beauty of creation. By
this act of creation, he gave man the capacity to apprehend that beauty. Thus, aesthetic value
probably resides in the thing being perceived and the apprehension of that value is the
recognition of that aesthetic value in agreement with Plantinga. Additionally, God himself is
described as a being of aesthetic value. Repeatedly there is biblical mention of the glory of God.
The Greek term doxa, which is the term primarily translated “glory,” is defined as a reference to
something or someone as having a “regal, magnificent, majestic or awe-inspiring”115 These
qualities are aesthetic and as such ascribe God’s glory, i.e., his aesthetic value, as an essential
aspect of his nature. God is not glorious because man perceives Him as such, He is glorious
because aesthetic value is essential to his nature. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that his
aesthetic value existed before man could perceive it which seems to prove that aesthetic value is
innate within the thing being apprehended and not dependent on man’s perception.
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Taking this a step further, since nature’s beauty is meant to encourage man to consider
the beauty of God (Psalm 19:5), then it is equally reasonable to hold that his creation is by nature
beautiful whether man perceives that beauty or not. Hence, beauty is not dependent on
perception. This affirms Plantinga’s view over Kant’s.
On the other hand, not all are theists and thus not all accept the theistic explanation for
the origins the universe nor of the origins of aesthetic value being theistic causation. What will
be demonstrated, especially in chapter 3, is that non-theistic explanations for the origins of
aesthetic value, as the origins of man’s capacity to apprehend those values, are weak. Yet, even
so, one cannot deny the obvious influence of culture in at least partly determining what does and
does not have aesthetic value, especially the aesthetic value of physical beauty. Not all cultures
agree, for instance, on what is and is not beautiful.116 In this sense Kant’s observations have
some degree of merit. The acknowledgment of a beautiful man or woman in one culture is not a
guarantee that people of another culture would agree with that perception. In short, when it
comes to theism, there is a strong argument that beauty is inherent to the nature of creation even
before man was granted the capacity to apprehend that beauty. Non-theists, on the other hand
correctly observe that culture influences the standards of what is and is not beautiful. An attempt
to conclude this debate for now places the locus of beauty in the stimulus and cultural
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perceptions of beauty can influence man’s innate capacity to apprehend that beauty. Clearly,
both views have some merit, but for the sake of this work, Plantinga’s view is prior to Kant’s.
What the preceding affirms is the potential quagmire in debating the locus of aesthetic
beauty. The only appropriate response seems to be that the apprehension of aesthetic value can
be a response to either the recognition the aesthetic value which is inherent to the nature of the
thing being perceived, and this recognition can be impacted by the perception of aesthetic value
due to the influences of personal or cultural taste. It is the recognition of this ongoing debate
which requires the focus of the aesthetic theistic argument to rest on the commonality of man’s
apprehending aesthetics rather than the nature of aesthetics itself. As will be demonstrated
shortly, it is basic knowledge that whatever it is, or whatever its origins, aesthetic value is
apprehended by all human cultures. Basing the argument on man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value, therefore, is not weakened by the intangibility of the origins of that aesthetic
value being apprehended. There might be disagreement regarding the locus of aesthetic value,
but there is little disagreement regarding the existence of aesthetic value. Hence, the basis of this
theistic argument is found in the act of apprehending aesthetic value. A review of this act, which
is the basis of the first two premises, begins with identifying a list of features inherent to this
phenomenon.

Features of Apprehending Aesthetic Value
Four features inherent in the phenomenon of apprehending aesthetic value are considered.
A fifth is then separately considered with the understanding that this fifth feature is not always
present, as is the case with the first four, but its review is pertinent to the presentation of the
argument. The first four for are, knowledge, experience, choice and sentience. The fifth is a
sense of the supernatural. First, this singling out of the fifth feature is explained.
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As mentioned earlier, the Kingdom of Heaven, as God himself, is biblically described as
beautiful (Psalm 96:6, 27:4). Yet, it is unsupportable to claim that all men accept the notion of
God’s beauty, or that of his kingdom, as not all have accepted the possibility of the supernatural
or metaphysical in which God and his Kingdom exist. Yet, as is soon demonstrated, all men have
the capacity to apprehend beauty. Thus, claiming a sense of the supernatural as a necessary
feature for experiencing beauty would be unjustifiable. However, those who affirm
supernaturalism, particularly those who accept the existence of the God of Scripture, can affirm
the sense of the supernatural as a feature of apprehending beauty. This fact should not be
ignored. Thus, these features will be reviewed as two groups. The first four are common to both
naturalism and supernaturalism. The fifth is only common to supernaturalists.

Cognition
Cognition is the first of the four features which are common to both naturalists and
supernaturalists. This is understood to mean “the activities of thinking, understanding, learning,
and remembering.”117 Cognition also implies the possession of intelligence. To exemplify this
relevance, Jonathan Edwards wrote significantly of the beauty of nature. In his discussion of the
nature of man, he makes this observation, “But the beauty of God’s constitution of the world,
consists mainly, without doubt, in the intelligent part of the world. . .”118 Edwards asserts in this
statement that apprehending the beauty of nature requires cognition, intelligence, or knowledge.
Again, elsewhere in that same work, he writes, “God has given man a nature, which, if it be
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under the influence of true virtue, desires above all things to behold this kind of order and
beauty.”119 The nature to which Edwards refers here, requires an intellectual capacity to
recognize order and comprehend beauty. Edwards affirms that in order for man to apprehend
aesthetic beauty, he must have a measure of cognition and intelligence to recognize it. He also
asserts that the source of this cognition is within the nature God has given to man. C. F. H. Henry
likewise posits intelligence as necessary for verbal communication to take place between men.120
Recognizing that the language of poetry or prose portrays aesthetic value, Henry describes that
portrayal as a testimony not only of intelligence but is an “extreme example” of aesthetic
expression.121 Henry and Edwards affirm that a measure of cognition is necessary for man to
perceive the linguistic portrayal of the aesthetic value of literature.
Immanuel Kant adds support to the necessity of cognition for aesthetic apprehension
when he posits, “[I]n a judgment of taste, understanding is always involved.”122 He has already
defined “judgment of taste” as “aesthetical”123 since understanding is synonymous with
cognition. Scruton echoes Kant in his observation, “In referring to so many types of things as
blue, we are using a metaphor—one that requires a leap of the imagination if it is to be rightly
understood.”124 Since intelligence and cognition are pre-requisites for imagination, his statement
adds to the affirmation that cognition is a feature of aesthetic apprehension.
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Allen Carlson offers a study of the relationship between aesthetic apprehension and
knowledge. He does so by contrasting the views of two philosophers: Noel Carroll and Stan
Godlovitch. 125 He reports that Carroll offers two suggested models by which man appreciates the
aesthetic value of nature. The first model is something he describes as “the arousal model” which
is nothing more than “being moved or emotionally aroused by nature.”126 The second model
requires some knowledge of that which is being appreciated or apprehended. In this model the
intellect is more involved. This model would refer to such examples as apprehending the beauty
of a violin concerto by one who has some knowledge of the discipline and talent necessary to
demonstrate an excellent performance. This is both intellectual and emotional but it requires
knowledge just the same.127 The sum of this evidence affirms there is no real apprehension of
aesthetic value apart from some measure of intelligence or cognition.
It would be difficult to offer examples of apprehension of aesthetic value which did not
include some measure of cognition on the part of the one apprehending. Though it has not yet
been made fully clear what apprehension of aesthetic value actually is, what seems certain, so
far, is that a measure of intelligence or a cognitive ability is required for such an apprehension to
take place. It is also appropriate to assume that cognition is unique to humanity. This uniqueness
will be discussed in more detail later. At present, it is clear that there is a necessary feature of
cognition or intelligence and the apprehension of aesthetic value.
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Experience
The second feature of the apprehension of aesthetic value is the encountering or
experiencing of something which has aesthetic value. Apprehension itself is an act and that
action is an experience. Hence, for apprehension to take place is to engage in an experience.
Experience is therefore an unavoidable feature in the apprehending of aesthetic value. Edwards
mentions this when he observes that man’s experience of God’s works is meant to provoke a
person to see beauty in them:
For the beauty of God’s works consists a thousand times more in this, than in the other. It
is reasonable to suppose, that these will be as publicly visible as the brightness and
beautiful order and motions of the heavenly bodies, and the regular successions of the
various seasons of the year, and the beauties of nature128
The envisioning of God’s works is to have a visual experience of those works. Though
experiencing aesthetics is clearly not limited to visibility. For instance, the apprehension of the
aesthetic value or beauty of a symphonic work requires the audible experience of the
performance of that work. The beauty ascertained in the architecture of a Cathedral is a visual
and/or proximate experience of that architecture. This affirms the claim that the apprehension of
aesthetic value cannot be divorced from experience because it is an experience.
This feature expresses theologically as well. To apprehend the beauty of God’s grace
requires an experience of that grace. The apprehension of the beauty or aesthetic nature of God
himself requires some kind of experience wherein God reveals Himself to that person. Aesthetics
may be in a measurable sense an intangible thing because there is not an absolute standard for
what is aesthetical. However, the apprehension of aesthetic value requires an experience and that
experience is tangible. The point remains that the precise definition of aesthetics can still be
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undiscerned while the fact of man’s ability to apprehend or experience it is discernable. Whether
the writer is Plato, Keats or Lewis. It is inconceivable that they would be able to describe the
beauty of love, if they had not experienced its beauty. It is reasonable to posit that the feature of
experience in the apprehension of aesthetic values is a properly basic notion. The apprehension
of aesthetic value is an experience which makes experience one of its inherent features.

Choice
It is also true that this experience is not automatic or mechanical. In other words, not only
is it an experience which involves cognition, it can also require an act of the will. The
apprehension of aesthetics can be the result of a choice that is made. For example, one may
attend the performance of an opera but even in the presence of what the rest of the audience
might claim as an aesthetic experience, if a person’s focus is on the events of the previous day or
the conversation he had with his supervisor that morning, or the attire of the woman or man
sitting next to them, and not on the performance, he may be in the presence of aesthetic beauty
but his apprehension of that aesthetic value may not be taking place. He must choose to
participate in the experience before he can apprehend its aesthetic value. Another example,
especially relevant to Christianity, could be the attendance of a performance of a church choral
presentation wherein most in the audience is caught up in the beauty and majesty of the
performance. Yet, if one individual is so focused on how much the event cost, or his jealousy in
not being asked to sing with the choir, it produces a distraction, while he may be in the presence
of aesthetic value, he is not apprehending it. He chose not to participate in the experience
available to him.
While on the surface such considerations may seem mundane, their relevance will be
more clearly understood when academic discipline called evolutionary psychology is reviewed in
66

chapter 3.129 For now, however, it is helpful to convey that evolutionary psychology asserts that
values as morals, love and aesthetic perception are the result of psychological, deterministic
mechanisms which have been developed within the human psyche through the process of natural
selection. As such they are inevitable, inbred behaviors which result from mechanistic
psychological development rather than an act of free cognizant will. At this point it would be
inappropriate to get too far ahead in the discussion.130 In summary, the apprehending of aesthetic
values demonstrates the features of cognition, experience and choice. To argue otherwise would
be problematic.

Sentience
The fourth feature of aesthetic apprehension is a state of sentience. Merriam Webster
Dictionary records, “A sentient being is one who perceives and responds to sensations of
whatever kind - sight, hearing, touch, taste, or smell.”131 It seems obvious that in order to
apprehend aesthetic value, one must have the capacity to react to aesthetic stimuli. This requires
a demonstration of sentience such as sight, hearing, touch, taste or smell. Such a demonstration
would require a certain self-awareness so as to be able to discern the relationship of the aesthetic
stimulus to his person via his feeling or reaction to it. Godlovitch offers additional insight as he
speaks of man’s sensation of nature, it is “not that we are impressed or overwhelmed by nature.”
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Instead, he observes that it has to do more with our recognition of the way “we belong to
nature.”132 Godlovitch goes on to describe apprehension of aesthetics as “a sense of being
outside, of not belonging.”133 These sensations demonstrate the feature of sentience as a
necessity for aesthetic apprehension. Godlovitch affirms that the apprehension of the aesthetic
value of nature requires this feature. Clearly, one cannot sense the grandeur of nature as being
beyond one’s self if that person is not first able to sense both nature and one’s self. Godlovitch
correctly recognizes that the grandeur of nature is overwhelming when one compares it to the
relative insignificance of self. One would have to be sentient in order to be able to ascribe
himself such relative insignificance. Hence, Godlovitch affirms sentience as a necessary feature
in apprehending aesthetic value.
In Scruton’s work mentioned earlier, the author pens the following: “Human beings are
alone among the animals in revealing their individuality in their faces. The mouth that speaks,
the eyes that gaze, the skin that blushes, all are signs of freedom, character and judgement, and
all give concrete expression to the uniqueness of the self within.”134 While this statement also
affirms the first premise of the aesthetic theistic argument that all human cultures have the
capacity to apprehend aesthetic value, it additionally speaks to the present issue of sentience. For
example, Scruton asserts that in the realm of biological life, the sensing of self-awareness is
unique to human beings. Demonstrating the relationship between a sense of self and a sense of
awe or beauty as present in the aesthetic experiencing of nature, requires the feature of sentience
be present within the human being.

132

Carlson, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 53, No. 4, 394.

133

Ibid.

134

Roger Scruton, Beauty: A Very Short Introduction, 148.

.

68

To further affirm this claim, David Bentley Hart, in his epic work, The Beauty of the
Infinite, pens the following with his typical linguistic artistry:
Hence beauty's only "truth" is the truth of a certain power of judgment, while everything of
graver import dwells beyond the aesthetic altogether. The beautiful adumbrates nothing
beyond the self, and thought must traverse it, even transgress it, to escape either triviality or
illusion: the beautiful leaves off where the sublime begins, and the sublime itself falls away
when it has sufficiently suggested to reason the formless power of the infinite.135
Since to adumbrate is to report or give witness, Hart is positing that beauty gives no report to
“anything beyond self.” Hence, he affirms that a sensing of self or self-awareness, an expression
of sentience, is a necessary feature to the apprehension of aesthetic value.
Given the sum of the evidence presented, it is concluded that sentience, is a necessary
feature of aesthetic apprehension. Having successfully argued cognition, experience, choice and
sentience as features of the act of apprehending aesthetic value, attention now turns to the fifth
feature.

Awareness of Supernaturalism
As previously stated, this feature is unique to those who accept the notion of the
supernatural. The necessity of the previous four features find consensus among both naturalism
and supernaturalism Yet, because this project is the proposal of a theistic argument, and by
necessity a rejection of non-theism, a review of this feature, which is unique to supernaturalists,
is in order. Scripture describes God as a being of beauty, “One thing have I asked of the LORD,
that will I seek after: that I may dwell in the house of the LORD all the days of my life, to gaze
upon the beauty of the LORD and to inquire in his temple (Psalm 27:4).” Scripture also ascribes
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to man a desire to know God, his purposes and his ways (Phil. 3:10). C. F. H. Henry affirms that
God reveals himself as knowable.136 Since it is God’s purpose to give man this unique
opportunity to know him, since God is knowable, and since it is clear that he is beautiful, it
justifiable to conclude that man has been given the opportunity to apprehend his beauty, which,
by the very fact that God is supernatural, requires an acceptance of the supernatural.
Karl Barth speaks to this wonder, “It belongs to the nature of the subject that the real
proof of our statement that God is beautiful can be provided neither by few nor by many words
about this beauty, but only by this beauty itself.”137 The wonder to which Barth is referring is
only possible for those who are open to the notion of supernaturalism generally and theism
specifically. F. Duane Lindsey in the first of a three-part submission to Bibliotheca Sacra, titled,
“Essays Toward a Theology of Beauty,” cited Jürgen Moltmann’s reference to Karl Barth’s
statement above. Moltmann described Barth as “the only theologian in the continental Protestant
tradition who has dared to call God ‘beautiful.’”138 Those of this generation might be surprised
by such a claim. While it may have been outside the parameters of acceptable practice, during
the days of Moltmann to speak of God as beautiful, the church today is replete with those who
have grown up hearing songs and choruses about the beauty of God and His love.139 Lindsey
again surprises the Christian reader when he states, “Theologians have delighted in declaring that
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“God is true” and “God is good,” but have usually hesitated to confess that “God is beautiful.”140
In commenting on these statements, it might be that since God desires to reveal himself to man,
and since it is clear that God’s nature is beautiful, it is reasonable to state that God has enabled
men to apprehend beauty. That apprehension should be expressed in declaration. Scriptures
makes it clear that not all have come to know God (1 John 4:7-8). Scripture makes it equally
clear that God desires to be known (John 1:10-13). Carefully pondering these revelations leads to
the implication that such hesitancy to acknowledge God’s beauty, as described by Moltmann and
Lindsey is counter to God’s intent. It is justifiable to assert that God gave man the capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value, in part, so that man would be able to know His majesty and beauty. It
is equally obvious that to know the beauty of God, one must accept supernaturalism. This
identifies the reasoning for separating this feature from the others when identifying the features
of aesthetic apprehension.

Why Awareness of the Supernatural is Relevant
Hesitancy to recognize God as beautiful might make little sense to those today who
accept the contents of Scripture as true. In recognizing this, one might question the relevance of
including it in the discussion of identifying inherent features of apprehending aesthetic value. To
respond, there is more than opinion or theological bias being demonstrated in the discussion of
this last feature of apprehension. Since Scripture clearly reveals God’s desire for man to know
him, especially when considering the purpose of the Passion of Christ, and since the Bible
affirms one cannot know him apart from a surrender to him and his will (1 John 5:20), it is clear,
from a rational point of view, that those who do not accept or acknowledge this supernatural
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feature of aesthetic apprehension reflect a conflict with their intended purpose. This is as rational
as it is biblical. Man was created to know God and those who do not know him are frustrating
God’s design and desire for them. In short, they are not functioning as God intends man to
function. God desires men to know him and when men choose not to acknowledge this desire,
their function, according to God’s design, is impaired. Specifically, this is realized in their
capacity to apprehend the beauty of the supernatural. Plantinga affirms this, “A belief has
warrant for you only if your cognitive apparatus is functioning properly, working the way it
ought to work, in producing and sustaining it.”141 Simply stated, according to Plantinga’s
reasoning, the reason all people cannot accept supernaturalism as a feature of aesthetic
apprehension is their rejection of the supernatural and, by default, God, but the rejection of God
is contrary to the intent of God’s design. Those who reject the supernatural, according to
Plantinga and Henry, are not exhibiting the cognitive function for which they were designed.
Taking the matter further, one might return to Psalm 27:4 wherein the psalmist pleads for
God to help him see “the beauty of the LORD,” and to Psalm 96:6 where he describes the
sanctuary of God as possessing “strength and beauty.” Likewise, he might consider the prophet
Isaiah and his description of the “day of the Lord.” In that day, God is described as a “diadem of
beauty for the remnant of his people.” These passages demonstrate and declare God’s inherent
beauty. God’s revelation of himself include references to his beauty. God designed man to know
Him and this necessarily includes the enjoyment of His beauty. That enjoyment requires, at the
very least, an acceptance of the supernatural. It also requires a capacity to apprehend that beauty.
Refusing to accept the supernatural, frustrates this intent. It would not be rational for God to
reveal himself as beautiful, express a desire to be known by men, express the extreme of this
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desire in the Passion of Christ, and not give man the capacity to apprehend Him and His beauty.
Those who believe in God’s existence, and thus the supernatural, are able to recognize that while
all men are given the capacity to apprehend the aesthetic value of God, not all men apprehend it.
Furthermore, those who do not choose to accept supernaturalism as a feature of aesthetic
apprehension are not expressing the intentions for which they were designed. Thus, only those
who have accepted the reality of the supernatural accept this feature as of the apprehension of
aesthetic value. This is the rationale behind distinguishing it from the previous four features.
Having identified features present in the apprehension of aesthetic value and how they
assist in understanding what is meant by the verbal formula “apprehending aesthetic value,” the
study now continues the pursuit of comprehending the apprehension of aesthetic value by listing
the different categories of apprehension.

Categories of Apprehension
That there are multiple categories of apprehension is, perhaps, revelatory. However, it has
been a focus of interest for several decades. In 1981, for instance, in the journal Psychology of
Music, two authors, Andrew Coleman and David J. Hargreaves referenced a study made by
Britain’s leading psychologists”142 The study, conducted in the early 20th Century, involved
“experimental aesthetics.”143 A reference to the work of psychologist E. Bullogh144 was reviewed
in their study and conclusions drawn partly from his efforts were published. Within Bullogh’s
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article, Coleman and Hargreaves identify “four types of apperception in his research on the
appreciation of single colors and simple color combinations, and modified this to take reactions
to music into account.”145 Bullogh states these four types of aesthetic apprehension as:
“objective, intra-subjective, associative and character.”146 Since the goal of this section is an
improved understanding of what aesthetic apprehension is, a review of Bullogh’s categorization
and the conclusions Coleman and Hargreaves glean from it, seems appropriate. Each of
Bullogh’s categories are listed and briefly described.

Objective
The first of Bullogh’s categories is the objective. He described it as an “impersonal
view.” It is identified as apprehension which focuses on the “properties of the stimulus itself.”147
An example of this could occur in an encounter with an architectural stimulus. In demonstrating
this category of apprehension, the observer would focus on the intricacies of the design or the
materials used by the architect or the tools required by the craftsman for the building of the
structure. Instead of considering the impact of the total structure, this person focuses on the
minutia such as materials, design or construction methods rather than the architecture as a whole.
Musically, an example of this category presents in one focusing on the way in which the
composer contrasted the horns with the strings or a diagnosis of which instruments were used in
the composition to achieve a particular effect, instead of apprehending the composition as a
whole or how these particular effects contribute toward the value of the whole composition. Such
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focus on the parts rather than the whole is a more impersonal process of how the composer
structured the piece instead of the aesthetic value present in the whole composition.
Another interesting example of the objective category of apprehension of aesthetics is
demonstrated by those physicists who have postulated something called “the Golden Ratio.” This
is a mathematical formula which can be used in diagnosing art geometrically by identifying data
present and required to achieve symmetry. This mathematical approach to aesthetics has the
potential of reducing an intended work of art into an impersonal series of geometric formulas.
This discipline is new to many but is an excellent example of the focus on the “properties of the
stimulus” rather than the stimulus itself.
To further consider this mathematical approach to aesthetics, two authors, Posamentier
and Lehman, published a work discussing this Golden Ratio concept. They define it as follows:
“In the simplest form, the golden ratio refers to the division of a given line segment into a unique
ratio that gives us an aesthetically pleasing proportion.”148 Throughout the work, which is
difficult for a non-physicist to manage, the recurring theme seems to be that even in the
construction of the pyramids, there was a mathematical formula used in its development and
design to assure aesthetic value. This is their explanation for the presence of the pyramid’s
symmetry. This assumes, of course, that symmetry is an essential quality of beauty. They
establish that this symmetry can be defined as a quantity, represented by the symbol For those
with a passion for physics, the specific formula, in its simplest form, is the result of a straight
line being divided into three parts. The first two of those parts are combined and their sum is
called L. The third part is called S. There is a mathematical ratio which exists between L and S
which, when understood and more fully extrapolated, can result in greater potential for symmetry
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in things like construction and other visually aesthetic stimuli. This formula, which will not be
explained further as this study is not an exercise in physics, centers on a unique ratio which
exists between L and S. This ratio is present in both the line example, called the Golden Ratio, a
Triangle, called the Golden Triangle, a rectangle, called the Golden Rectangle, etc. Interestingly,
application of the formula to the Golden Rectangle can result in construction of a perfectly
proportioned spiral. What is more impressive is that their research demonstrates the use of this
formula in both the construction of the Egyptians pyramids, the Greek Parthenon and even the
drawing of DaVinci’s Vitruvian Man. The relevance of this mathematical approach to aesthetics
is that by it. the often intangible element of aesthetics is potentially tangible or objective when
viewed as a result of a mathematical formula. Interestingly, it offers no application to the
apprehension of beauty found in nature or the auditory arts, and certainly has no application for
the apprehension of the beauty of God. The Golden Ratio is, however, an excellent example of
an objective category of aesthetic apprehension.

Intra-Subjective
The intra-Subjective category of aesthetic apprehension, according to Bullogh, focuses on
the moods and impressions which can be evoked by an encounter with an aesthetic stimulus.149
He makes a point to use the term “idiosyncratic” to describe the moods to which he refers. This
leads his reader to believe that he focused on the mood of an individual, not so much on an
audience as a unit. The term also leaves the door open for these moods to be unrestricted as the
term suggests his focus was on the uniqueness of each individual’s mood which could be almost
anything. Since the article deals primarily with musical aesthetic stimuli, one can see the
obviousness of his recognition when considering the fact that when one hears a funeral dirge, the
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chances are high that the hearer is going to be somber. When one hears a march, the chances are
good he is going to feel inspiration. When one hears a lullaby, one is likely to sense a sweet,
restful mood. Clearly, this concept is not lost on the musical scores which are used in cinema or
television ranging from movies to commercials or even documentaries. Behind the acting or
narrator, audible and visual aesthetic stimuli are used in an attempt to set the desired emotional
response of the viewer. This category of aesthetic apprehension is the influence on mood when
experiencing the aesthetic stimuli.
Examples of this category’s aesthetic stimuli are not limited to music. Some architecture,
especially ancient architecture might demonstrate moods which range from the depression
caused by the darkness within it or exuberance because of how much natural light enters the
building. One has only to review the many periods of classical art to recognize that moods are
often effected by aesthetic stimuli. It is this mood change or mood stimulus to which Bullogh is
referring as this category of aesthetic apprehension.

Associative
Perhaps the most familiar category of aesthetic apprehension is the associative category.
Bullogh exemplifies this category’s depiction as when one hears a music selection on the radio
which initiates the recall of an event, usually of some importance to the person, which associates
that song an event remembered, causing an associative response to the aesthetic stimuli.150 A
work of art can similarly cause someone to remember a person or circumstance with which the
stimuli associates with that memory. A piece of architecture can similarly be associated with a
positive or negative memory in a person’s life.
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Again, the advertising industry often demonstrates the associative category of aesthetic
apprehension. Over the counter drugs are designed to address clinical needs. Yet, were those
tasked to advertise the drug to limit that advertisement to information about its clinical benefits,
the chances are good that the advertisement would not be very effective. People cannot normally
comprehend the technical formulas or processes which go into making and distributing them.
They are primarily concerned about what they do and the safety in which they do it. To compel
the viewer to purchase their product, the advertiser associates the use of the drug with preserving
family or with achieving a better golf score. The increase in interest of the potential purchaser
may not be due to the drug itself, but an aesthetic association which is pleasant or appealing.
Associating the use of the drug with something aesthetically pleasurable increases the likelihood
of the future purchase of that drug. This associative category of apprehending aesthetics is at the
heart of a journal article by Antony Aumann. His study leads to the conclusion, “The intuitive
view that aesthetic value has nothing to do with philosophical value is mistaken.”151 Though his
article focuses on prose and works of philosophy, the point he makes is still valid. There is often
an associative relationship between man’s idiosyncratic philosophical value identified with an
experience and the aesthetic value apprehended in that experience.

Character
The final category of aesthetic apprehensions, according to Bullogh, is demonstrated in
those apprehensions which “attributes a mood, emotional character or temperament to a
stimulus.” 152 The difference between this category and the previous category is that associative
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aesthetic apprehensions draw from an emotion, mood or interest, which one has had or presently
possesses. The character category is comprised of those aesthetic apprehensions, which, when
stimulated, result in a mood, emotion or temperament assigned to the stimulus. For instance, if
the works of Edgar Allan Poe, are viewed as emotionally dark at times, that assessment of
darkness assigns an aesthetic value to that work of Poe. Perhaps, one of the most famous
demonstrations of this category comes in the writings of Neitzsche whose unique view of
aesthetics is seen in the following:
Biological value of the beautiful and the ugly. — That which is instinctively repugnant to
us, aesthetically, is proved by mankind’s longest experience to be harmful, dangerous,
worthy of suspicion: the suddenly vocal aesthetic instinct (e.g., in disgust) contains a
judgment. To this extent the beautiful stands within the general category of the biological
values of what is useful, beneficent, life-enhancing— but in such a way that a host of
stimuli that are only distantly associated with, and remind us only faintly of, useful things
and states give us the feeling of the beautiful, i.e., of the increase of the feeling of power
(— not merely things, therefore, but also the sensations that accompany such things, or
symbols of them).153
Aside from the obvious pessimism and totalitarianism indicative of Neitzsche’s work, he is
assigning harm, danger and suspicion to that which is perceived as aesthetically ugly. That which
is useful, beneficial and positively life-enhancing is assigned a character which is aesthetically
beautiful. This assigning of value to aesthetics based on perception of character is an extreme
example of this last category of aesthetic apprehensions.
In contrast to the extreme example of Nietzsche, another example of the character
category of aesthetic apprehension is the biblical use of the term “glory” especially in reference
to God mentioned earlier. That the Scriptures specifically describe God as beautiful has already
been established. Yet the Bible more frequently ascribes the quality of glory, which includes
God’s inherent nature of beauty, majesty and wonder which are all aesthetic values. To better
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demonstrate how this ascription exemplifies the character category of aesthetic apprehension, a
definition of the term glory is needed. Baker’s Encyclopedia of the Bible reveals that the term is
used two ways when it is referring to God. First, it describes it as an attribute of God referring to
his “beauty and splendor.”154 Second, the use of the term is also a reference to God’s presence.155
This is meant as a reference to “particular historical manifestations of his presence.” These
manifestations include the “image of light, of fire or a pillar of smoke.”156 Rabbinical references
to the glory of God speak of the Shekinah glory which means a “dwelling glory” of God. 157
These definitions are consistent in their understanding of glory to be a term which ascribes a
character of beauty and splendor to the God of Scriptures.

Summary of the Ability to Apprehend Aesthetic Value
It is tempting to yield to the pursuit of endless potential possibilities raised by the
previous discussions which could result in further study of the concept of aesthetic apprehension.
However, this section of the study has sufficiently established that there are multiple features
present in the phenomenon of aesthetic apprehension as well as multiple categories with which
one can identify aesthetic apprehension. This section of this chapter reviewed and defined, the
first premise of the aesthetic argument. The next section validates it. A cursory look at what has
been stated to this point reveals that there has been no evidence suggesting that the premise is not
valid. The next section offers further, more specific insight as to the nature of aesthetic value.
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Ascertaining Aesthetic Value
The first premise of the aesthetic argument asserts the capacity of every human culture to
apprehend aesthetic value. This chapter reviews, explains and defends this premise’s claim that
the capacity to apprehend is in every human culture. Having ascertained the apprehension of
aesthetic value in the previous section of this chapter, this section focuses on identifying a
workable understanding of what this first premise actually states. The comprehension and
validation of this premise involves not only an understanding of the features and categories of
the act of apprehending, it likewise requires a sufficient understanding of that which is being
apprehended. Hence the question being answered in this section is: What is a reasonable
ascertainment of aesthetic value? The path toward that end will include a review of the varied
definition of aesthetic value, a proposed resolution to conflicting definitions and a review of
three theories for ascertaining aesthetic value. A summary of these thoughts and how they relate
to the aesthetic theistic argument will conclude this section of the chapter.

Definitions of Aesthetic Value
A good place to begin the intent of this section is with definition. Webster defines
“aesthetics” as a “branch of philosophy dealing with the nature of beauty.”158 While this only
provides minimal assistance to the understanding of aesthetics, it does point to a significant
relationship between beauty and aesthetics. Particularly, the obviousness of synonymous
examples of beauty and aesthetic value. The relationship of these two words becomes more
evident as the following discussion proceeds, but it is important to recognize that aesthetic value
and beauty, though similar, are not equivalent. While anyone who studies aesthetics or aesthetic
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philosophy quickly recognizes, the terms are often used interchangeably. Yet, technically, the
two words are not interchangeable. Beauty is an aesthetic value, the same can be said of ugliness,
repulsiveness or magnificence and wonder. Hence, the relationship between beauty and aesthetic
value can be stated: beauty is an aesthetic value but not all aesthetic value is beautiful. It is also
clear that beauty and aesthetic value are inseparable. For instance, one finds it difficult to locate
any discussion of aesthetics which does not use the term beauty as a reference to it.
The pursuit of a succinct definition of aesthetic value, is frustrated by the consideration of
Kant’s The Critique of Judgment. Parenthetically, Vanhoozer describes this work as the “first
major work of aesthetics.”159 In The Critique of Judgment Kant offers the following, “The
beautiful,” he muses, “is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally.”160 Later he
expands this thought, “[T]he beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this light .
. . does it give us pleasure with an attendant claim to the agreement of everyone else, whereupon
the mind becomes conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere sensibility to
pleasure from impressions of sense.” 161 Herein, Kant reveals thoughts intended to assist in the
task of ascertaining aesthetic value. Yet, one should notice his ascription to beauty the perception
of something which involves an “agreement of everyone else” is a “symbol of the morally good,”
One finds it difficult to consider a rational understanding of beauty which reflects both an
agreement with everyone else, and common understanding of what is morally good having its
locus in individual perception which is where Kant was quoted earlier. It suggests that Kant
considers the locus of beauty to be both in the stimulus which is universally recognized and the
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individual’s taste.162 The quandary in which this information leaves the reader is obvious. One is
left to believe that Kant intends his readers to perceive that he is intentionally contradicting
himself or that he means to imply that both are possibilities. Welchel’s explanation of Kant’s
position doesn’t resolve the quandary either:
Kant’s intention was not to drain aesthetic judgment of validity claims, but to point out the
intermediate role aesthetic judgment has between the pure reason (science) and practical
reason (ethics) which allows for, in fact points to, the existence of God and the
universality of morality. One judge’s natural beauty to be beautiful without cognitive
reflection because of a certain groundedness of man in nature. For this reason Kant even
sought to demonstrate that the beautiful in nature was superior to beauty in art, and that
the beauty of art was dependent on nature to have made the production of art possible
through the natural genius of the artist.163
Where does one go to find some succinct definition of aesthetic value which does not requires
discerning between Plantiga’s locus of beauty being in the stimulus, which is extremely
attractive, and Kant’s view that it is both, “grounded in man’s nature,” and is located in the
perception of individual taste?
The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides some insight in its
description of beauty, “Theorists generally agree only on rudimentary points about the term: that
it commends on aesthetic grounds, has absolute comparative forms, and so forth (emphasis
mine).”164 These additional comments imply that there is no universal agreement regarding the
definition of aesthetic value beyond “rudimentary points.” With the assistance of Roger Scruton,
Vanhoozer points back to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, for additional insight, “Aesthetic
judgments are not theoretical; they do not contribute to our stock of knowledge about the world.
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Rather, aesthetic judgments go beyond the limits of our actual experience of the world and see it
‘as if’ it had purpose, so much so that one philosopher comments that in Kant’s aesthetics we
have a “premonition of theology.”165 One wonders if Scruton is lifting his hands in surrender and
suggesting that when it comes to a workable definition of beauty, this ascription of it being a
“premonition of theology” sounds as if he is suggesting only God knows the answer.

A Proposed Definition of Aesthetic Value
Perhaps this lack of certainty regarding the nature of aesthetics, along with the
preoccupation with science pervading present day thinking, partly explains the attrition taking
place in the study of aesthetics, philosophy and art today.166 The tediousness of this labor in
identifying a workable definition of aesthetic value leads one to wonder if there is any value in
ascertaining it.
In response, one needs to recognize the properly basic notion that there are at least three
capacities which separate humanity from the rest of the animal kingdom. These are: man’s
capacity to recognize and seek truth, man’s capacity for comprehending and desiring good
(ethics) and man’s capacity for apprehending aesthetic value.167 Since the ability to apprehend
aesthetic value helps identify our humanity, failure to seek sufficient comprehension of it
diminishes the potential of one’s humanity. To describe aesthetic value, with any degree of
precision, is to enter into the void described in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy quote
above. Yet, it is into this void one must venture if he is to hope for fully comprehending what it
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means to be human. It is, therefore, valuable when attention is given to the comprehension of
what man apprehends when he apprehends aesthetic value. To this end, three theories for
comprehending aesthetic value are considered.

Three Theories for Comprehending Aesthetic Value
Traversing the path toward a more sufficient comprehension of aesthetic value presently
occupies the attention of notables such as F. Duane Lindsey of Dallas Theological Seminary. His
study identifies three basic theories regarding the nature of beauty, or aesthetic value, “The first
is the formal theory, which locates beauty in certain qualities inherent in realities. In contrast, the
second view adopts the idea that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder;’ this is the emotional or
psychological theory which locates beauty in the response of the perceiver. The third view, the
relational theory, locates beauty in the relationship of the objective qualities to the subjective
response.” 168 The investigation into the meaning of aesthetic value in this study follows
Lindsey’s structure. The need for this exercise is justified by the fact that if one is going to argue
for the existence of God using the apprehension of aesthetic value as the basis of that argument,
it is not only reasonable to make an effort to grasp what is specifically meant by apprehending,
as was demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, but one should at least attempt to
identify that which is being apprehended. Using Lindsey’s structure, the following offers a
succinct attempt to accomplish this by offering three theoretic descriptions of aesthetic value.

The Formal Theory of Aesthetic Value
Lindsey describes the Formal Theory as locating beauty in the nature of the thing being
perceived. This is the view verbalized by Plantinga earlier. In this view an objective stimulus is
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required to initiate recognition of the beauty located in the nature of that stimulus. An example
might be the beauty of nature which is located in nature itself not in the perception of the
individual experiencing nature. Another example might be a work of art, the beauty of which is
inherent and not dependent on a perception for its beauty. According to this theory, beauty, or
aesthetic value is in the object itself rather than a perception attributing beauty to it. In this
theory, a universal acknowledgment of the object’s beauty is required for it to be ascribed
inherently beauty as its aesthetic value. A supernatural example of this theory would be in
recognizing beauty in the majesty of God and His glory. God’s aesthetic value, in the form of
glory or beauty, is present whether it is perceived or not. These examples demonstrate the formal
theory of aesthetic value.
The Emotional or Psychological Theory of Aesthetic Value
This theory reflects the common belief that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. That is to
say that this theory proposes that the locus of aesthetic value is not innate within the stimulus but
its locus is in the perception of that stimulus. In the same paragraph of Kant’s work Critique of
Judgment quoted above, Kant asserts aesthetic value to be subjective. He proceeds to say, “This
[ascertaining aesthetic value] denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the subject has
of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by the representation.” 169 By this statement,
Kant is defining the emotional or psychological theory for ascertaining aesthetic value. The
result is the belief that beauty is in the perception of the observer and is based on personal or
cultural taste rather than an innate quality of the stimulus. More will be said about this theory
later but in an effort to achieve some measure of comprehension now, one might consider C. F.
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H. Henry’s propositions stated in God Revelation and Authority. In the second volume of this
magus opus, Henry proposes fifteen theses upon which he asserted evangelical Christianity is
built. The first of these had to do with God’s revelation of himself to man, “Revelation is a
divinely initiated activity, God’s free communications by which he alone turns his personal
privacy into a deliberate disclosure of his reality.”170 This forces the reader to consider the notion
that the locus of God’s reality, which would include his aesthetic value, is not in the perception
of man but is in the nature of God. It is this reality that God seeks to reveal to man. If this second
theory is tenable, there is a conflict between it and God’s intent to reveal himself to man as stated
by Henry. Hence, there is some serious question regarding the validity of this theory.

The Relational Theory of Aesthetic Value
In this third theory, beauty is located in “the relationship of the objective qualities to the
subjective response.” This theory is exemplified by those who see beauty in an object because of
how it might remind them of an event or person who is considered precious to the observer. This
is different than the psychological view because beauty is located in the relationship between the
stimulus and the observer not in the specific perception of the observer. When a work of art, for
example, makes a person think of someone or something precious to them, the locus of beauty is
not in the art, nor in the perception of the viewer, but in the relationship that work of art has to
what the observer might consider precious. A marching band playing a Sousa march down the
main street of a small town might have some appreciating the beauty of the composition, others
might be enjoying how the march makes them feel patriotic. But the relational theory would see
the locus of beauty in how that old veteran is caused to remember or relate to the day that he and
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his victorious fellow soldiers marched into the city of Paris as a testimony of its liberation in the
Second World War. His perception of the beauty of that march is related to his special, personal
memories.

Summary of the Ascertaining of Aesthetic Value
An adequate summary of this section of the chapter concedes that not much has been
distinctly determined. The concept of aesthetic value has been argued since Plato171 and is not
going to be fully resolved here. Instead, a reasonable attempt includes some observations helpful
in justifying the soundness of the first premise. Though aesthetic value has the potential for being
both objective and subjective, tangible and intangible, located in the nature of the stimulus as
well as in the perception of the one stimulated, it is clearly a reality that cannot be responsibly
denied. Scruton affirms this succinctly:
What matters, first and foremost, is a certain kind of judgement, for which the technical
term ‘aesthetic’ is now in common use. The suggestion that there might be a supreme
aesthetic value, for which the term ‘beauty’ should be more properly reserved, is one that
we must bear in mind. For the moment, however, it is more important to understand
beauty in its general sense, as the subject-matter of aesthetic judgement.172
The primary question seems to be where one wishes to recognize the locus of beauty or aesthetic
value. Is it in the stimulus itself, the perception of the one being stimulated or is it in the memory
or association one has when encountering the stimulus? Wherever one places the locus, the fact
remains that whether aesthetic value is objective, subjective, tangible or intangible does not deny
the reality of its existence. No research revealed any claim which denies its potential presence.
While it is far from settled as to what it is, where it comes from, and how it might be
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apprehended, there is no question of its existence and man’s ability to apprehend it. As Scruton
states, “The judgement of taste is a genuine judgement, one that is supported by reasons.”173
For the Christian theist, however, there is more clarity. Since God has chosen to reveal
himself to mankind and since it is true that God’s nature includes the quality of beauty, majesty,
magnificence and other aesthetic values wrapped up in the term glory, God’s beauty is not
located in the perception of man, but in the nature of God. Perhaps this is what Kant had in mind
when he stated beauty to be a “premonition of theology.”174 What is clear is that the Christian
theist is able to see beauty differently. That is, he sees it as a reflection of the beauty of God’s
nature. This suggests that Christian theists can perceive aesthetic value differently when they
come to recognize that the source of all that is true beauty is the nature of God.
This is not to suggest that atheists or naturalists cannot apprehend beauty. There is
Scriptural evidence that God has enabled the hearts of all men to perceive His glory (Romans
1:20). This could explain why secular philosophy has such a difficult time agreeing on the locus
for beauty. As Kant says, it is a premonition of theology. Atheism and naturalism will reject
supernatural causation of anything. This results in their disagreeing among themselves as to the
locus of aesthetic value. It is the role of the theist, particularly the role of this aesthetic theistic
argument, to affirm that whatever aesthetic value is, man’s capacity to apprehend it is universal
and that capacity is partly what separates man from the rest of the animal kingdom.

Ascertaining the Universality of Aesthetic Apprehension
Having reviewed both the act of aesthetic apprehension and the meaning(s) of aesthetic
value, the final section of this chapter ascertains the universality of the first premise of the
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aesthetic theistic argument. As with the previous two sections of this chapter, the third is also
essential for validating the first premise of the argument. Before a proper commencing can be
made into this section of the study, it is important to clarify the term universal. It is the
apprehension of aesthetic value which is universal and not the definition of aesthetic value itself.
Secondly, the use of the term universal in this context is meant only to apply to all known human
cultures and not the entirety of the universe, nor does it apply to supernatural entities as no man
has the experience to validate such a claim. Hence, the claim that the capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value is universal conveys the idea that all known human cultures display a capacity to
apprehend value.
Also, though some measure of understanding of what it is that is being apprehended is
clearly appropriate, the focus of this theistic argument is on the universality of man’s ability to
apprehend aesthetic value, not on the basis a universal agreement regarding the nature of or locus
of aesthetic value. While it is enigmatic that every culture apprehends aesthetic value but not all
cultures agree to what aesthetic value is, one cannot deny that aesthetic value exists as it is easily
discernable when it is absent. Instead, this first premise confirms the apprehension of aesthetic
value to be universal.
The evidence which validates this universality as defined is presented in three categories
of evidence. The first of these present evidence which is historical in nature. The second will
include evidence of a more philosophical nature. The third includes evidence of a theological or
biblical nature. A summary concludes this section and this chapter.

Historical Evidence
A list of evidences indicating that there was once a culture that did not have an ability to
apprehend aesthetic value would be either blank or very short. Since before the ancient Egyptian
90

cultures there is evidence of aesthetic apprehension. The sophistication of the statues,
architecture and hieroglyphs which have been unearthed by archaeologists to support this claim
is staggering. This observation establishes that the apprehension of aesthetics significantly predates Egyptian dynasties.
Ancient technology and ancient æsthetic, considered specially, occupy their own domain
apart. But there are few, if any, religions which have not prompted the production of
monuments, ornaments, utensils, and other ritual accessories; or affected the form and
decoration of the instruments of daily life. And as these material expressions of religious
ideas, once produced, are capable of preservation independently of their makers, they
may be, and often are, the only evidence which has been preserved of the religion of an
extinct people, whose beliefs and traditions have perished with it.175
Archaeologists report of examples of poetry and literature traceable to the 35th Century BC.176
Mention has already been made to Vanhoozer’s claim that Plato (4th Century BC) was the first
(at least in Western culture) to propose a philosophy of aesthetics. Chinese history is aware of
much of its ancient culture not only by writings and architecture but in paintings and sculptures.
A capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is historically documented as far back as documentation
of human cultures exist. One conclusion among archaeologists seems to be that there is no
culture which did not have some form of religious expression and in all of these expressions
there was some kind of aesthetic display.177 Historical evidence of man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value is abundant and convincing.
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Philosophical Evidence
Philosophical evidence for aesthetic apprehension rightly begins with Plato who many
recognize to be a key figure in the formalization of what is now called philosophy. Throughout
his works he comments on the beauty of a person or his behavior and the significance of beauty
in and of one’s life.178 Hence, from the dawn of formal philosophical endeavors, beauty,
including its apprehension, has not only recognized but was a frequent topic of inquiry.
Augustine, one of the foundational figures responsible for the formalization of theology,
recognized the aesthetic value of God. In so doing, he described God as unseen, unchanging,
pervasive and supreme to whom all that is beautiful in creation owes its beauty.179 From those
days until the present, the recognition of man’s universal capacity to apprehend beauty has been
affirmed by such philosophical luminaries such as Anselm, Descartes, Kant, Edwards, Lewis,
Plantinga and many others. Rene Descartes represents what many philosophers have asserted,
But before I examine this with more attention, and pass on to the consideration of
other truths that may be evolved out of it, I think it proper to remain here for some
time in the contemplation of God himself— that I may ponder at leisure his
marvelous attributes— and behold, admire, and adore the beauty of this light so
unspeakably great, as far, at least, as the strength of my mind, which is to some
degree dazzled by the sight, will permit. For just as we learn by faith that the supreme
felicity of another life consists in the contemplation of the Divine majesty alone, so
even now we learn from experience that a like meditation, though incomparably less
perfect, is the source of the highest satisfaction of which we are susceptible in this
life.180
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Yet, one might point to such evidence and suggest that it is heavily favored by those who are
described as supernaturalists. Their question would be, “What is the view of naturalists in regard
to the capacity of man to apprehend aesthetic value?”
It is significant to note that today’s highly secular society also recognizes the universal
capacity of man to apprehend aesthetic value. Julian Huxley, for example, writes:
The important ends of man's life include the creation and enjoyment of beauty, both
natural and man-made; increased comprehension and a more assured sense of
significance; the preservation of all sources of pure wonder and delight, like fine scenery,
wild animals in freedom, or unspoiled nature; the attainment of inner peace and harmony;
the feeling of active participation in embracing and enduring projects, including the
cosmic project of evolution.181
Though theists would obviously take issue with the claim that the apprehension of beauty is for
the purpose of participating in the “cosmic project of evolution,” the salient point is that Huxley
embraces the purpose of man to be the creation and enjoyment of beauty. Thus validating the
claim that there is widespread philosophical acknowledgment that aesthetic apprehension is
universal. The stimuli for that apprehension is not the issue. The universal capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value is the point Huxley is making.

Theological Evidence
In spite of the fact that using theological evidence which assumes the existence of God
might appear to be someone circular in this context, it would be unfortunate not to regard the
reasoning of theologians and the message of Scripture as evidence for universal aesthetic
apprehension. Carl F. H. Henry, as has already been noted, for instance, rationally concludes that
God’s desire is to reveal himself to man. Since Scripture declares God to be many things,
including beautiful and abundant in glory, one can justly assume, accepting the possibility that
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there is a God for a moment, that God designed man to be able to apprehend his beauty and
glory. Thus, there is a rational and reasonable argument from theology and Scripture for the
universality of aesthetic apprehension.
As indicated, this evidence trail provided by Henry identifies 15 theses which identify
Christianity. The Scriptures’ and God’s intent to have a relationship with man, the first of these,
has to do with God taking the initiative in establishing this relationship:
Christ’s confident declaration to his disciples that the Holy Spirit would lead them into all
truth (John 14:26) mirrors his conviction that God himself stands at the center of divine
revelation and voluntarily steps out of the otherwise hidden supernatural in order to
confront man with the erstwhile unknown and impenetrable. 182
This initial action taken by the Father has the goal of making it possible for man to have a
relationship with Him. God wants man to know him. Since it is God’s desire for man to know
him and since God’s revelation includes the heavens. It is reasonable to conclude that man has
from the very beginning of time been given the capacity to know that beauty. Theology affirms
that the capacity for man to apprehend beauty is universal.

Summary of Chapter 2
Several important concepts have been established in this chapter. To begin, the first
premise of the aesthetic theistic argument declares man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value
to be universal. Second, affirming this declaration requires have a working knowledge of what
apprehension is. It is now established that there are several obvious features inherent within this
apprehension. These are: cognition, experience, choice, sentience, and for the theist, an
awareness of the supernatural. Similarly, there are four distinct categories by which a taxonomy
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of apprehension can be organized: objective, intra-subjective, associative and character. The
identification and explanation of these features and categories have helped to identify the
concept of apprehension clearly. Validating the first premise also required a review of several
ascribed meanings of aesthetic value. Three theories were presented offering further insight into
the difficult task of describing aesthetic value. It is arguable that the best of these is that the locus
of beauty rests inherently in the aesthetic stimulus. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting
significant evidence for the universality of this apprehension of aesthetic value. A careful review
of this data results is a strong validation of the first premise to the point that it might be properly
considered a properly basic notion.
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Chapter Three
The Second Premise
The best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is divine causation.

This chapter gets to the heart of the aesthetic theistic argument. Having validated the first
premise: “Every human culture demonstrates a capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.”, the study
is now tasked to identify the best explanation for man’s ability to apprehend aesthetic value.
Before undertaking this objective in earnest, it is important to note that the second premise is a
reflection of the essential contrast between naturalism and supernaturalism. Naturalism holds that
all life has come about by the process of random mutation and natural selection, or evolution, as
proposed by Darwin. The modern derivation of Darwinism entitled “neo-Darwinian evolution,”
reflects adjustments of Darwinism as scientific data and naturalistic doctrines bring more to bear
on the original Darwinian theory. As Mendelian genetics demonstrated challenges to the original
Darwinian theory, Neo-Darwinism synthesizes the two.183 Subsequently, naturalists usually
assume there is no God, nor do they accept the possibility of supernaturalism. Naturalists see no
need of a Creator since they believe all life has come about by natural processes. The idea that
God does not nor cannot exist not only defines naturalism but demonstrates its weakness. To
explain, for naturalists to concede even the possibility of God’s role in Creation would make the
claims of naturalism untenable.184 Hence, most, if not all, true naturalists are atheists. If it can
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then be demonstrated that there is even the possibility of the supernatural, naturalism fails.
Naturalistic dogma is clearly presented in the writings of Hume, Huxley, and Dawkins, which
will be examined later. The point is the fact that the very essence of naturalism requires a denial
of even the possibility of the supernatural. This makes it untenable for naturalists to accept
anything as supernatural, much less that a god of any kind had a role in creation.
In contrast to naturalism, theists argue from their belief in the supernatural generally and
the existence of God particularly. They accept that science contributes to the furthering of man’s
understanding of the cosmos, but their recognition of such contributions do not require the
acceptance of naturalistic dogma. Theists are necessarily supernaturalists and while they take
exception to many of the views of naturalists, their supernaturalism is not negated by the
existence of naturalism in spite of the often critical rhetoric of supernaturalism by naturalists.
It is also true that not all supernaturalists are Christian. One can be Jewish or Muslim and
be a theist, and thus a supernaturalist. Thus, unless one believes deity to be superhuman not
supernatural, he is a supernaturalist. Accepting the existence of a supernatural entity
distinguishes supernaturalists from naturalists. Though most Christian theists recognize those
who reject the God of Scripture to be in error, they still recognize supernaturalists as those who
believe in some kind of divine entity as the cause and/or sustainer of all that exists. Hence, any
proposed aesthetic theistic argument, such as this study, necessarily conflicts with the claims of
atheistic naturalism. For this reason, the second premise of the aesthetic theistic argument, which
seeks the best explanation for man’s aesthetic apprehension, necessarily conflicts with naturalist
explanations.

argue that any presence of divine causation results in an abandonment of naturalism. Whether that abandonment is
to a hybrid or synthetic position or to supernaturalism, it is still an abandonment of naturalism.
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Recognizing that this aesthetic theistic argument unavoidably requires a naturalism vs.
supernaturalism debate, this chapter exposes and analyzes that debate, particularly in regard to
the explanations both sides offer for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. At the core of
this analysis is the realization that this investigation must result in a claim that either ratifies
atheism or ratifies theism. Consequently, the validation of this second premise has significant
relevance and potential ramifications.
Identifying “Explanations”
Preparation for entering this debate requires several steps. First, an essential review of the
wording of the second premise defines the specific objectives. Specifically, two words require
conscientious examination: “best” and “explanation.” Since the validity of the second premise of
the proposed argument rests on the seeking of an explanation, prudence requires a precise
identification of what the term signifies. Additionally, a suitable criterion is required to serve as a
standard by which the best explanation can be identified. By using this criterion and applying the
new understanding of the term explanation, those explanations proposed by both naturalists and
supernaturalitsts can then be adequately reviewed. The explanations offered by both of these
parties will be subjected to the same standard.
There are two naturalistic explanations of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value to
be considered. The first is the view of naturalism held from the time of Darwin and is still
reflected in Neo-Darwinism, which offers the random biological mutation and natural selection
explanation for man’s cognitive abilities. These cognitive abilities would include aesthetic
apprehension. The first of these naturalistic explanations is labeled the classical naturalistic
explanation. The second explanation is a derivation of a discipline first called sociobiology and
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now labeled evolutionary psychology.185 This view suggests that the ability to apprehend
aesthetics is more than biological but is the result of psychological mutation which is initiated by
biological mutation. This second naturalistic explanation will likewise be submitted to review by
the same criterion mentioned earlier. After considering each naturalistic explanation, a brief
review of their weaknesses is presented. This presentation will be followed by a review of how
they measure up to the standards of explanation and the criterion for the best explanation.
Following the discussion of the two naturalistic explanations, a presentation of the
supernatural explanation, or the divine cause for aesthetic apprehension, is reviewed. This
explanation will be similarly scrutinized with the same standards of explanation and criterion just
mentioned. After reviewing all three explanations, an account of why the divine cause
(supernaturalism) is the best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is
presented. Upon affirming the supremacy of supernaturalism’s explanation, the second premise
is established as sound.
Relevance of “Explanations”
In order to be sufficiently precise when arguing for this second premise, it is necessary to
identify what an explanation really is. Common human experience reveals that words, without an
adequate understanding of what those words imply, are often used in attempts to communicate.
Few people have not had an occasion to witness a failure to receive an intended communication
because words used in the communication connoted something different to the hearer than that of
the transmitter. Since this study’s primary intent is to identify the best explanation for man’s
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capacity to apprehend aesthetic value, it is only prudent that a clear understanding be established
for what an explanation is.
So as to achieve this objective, the study returns to the work of Douglas Walton and his
research in argumentation, specifically, as that research pertains to the concept of explanation.
The justification for this use of Walton is the realization that he is considered an expert not only
in the discipline of argumentation, but his skills are of such a level that he is involved with those
who are attempting the highly technical objective of producing artificial intelligence. 186 Also,
since his work refers neither to naturalism nor supernaturalism as it is focused on the notion of
argumentation in general and abductive inference in particular, it maintains a beneficial
objectivity. Hence, there is no basis to claim any bias for or against supernaturalism or
naturalism in regard to his assertions. Thus, deferring to his expertise should remove any
concerns about inadequate, inaccurate or biased standards.
Walton begins his discussion of explanations by referring to a statement made by Peter
Lipton, to whom Walton often refers. Lipton is a fellow expert on logic and argumentation,
particularly in the field of abductive inference. Lipton raises the question of why “inference to
the best explanation,” another way of referring to abductive reasoning, has been “so little
developed as a theoretical model of reasoning, given its evident importance and popularity in so
many fields.” 187 Lipton offers an answer to his own question by observing, “The [abductive]
model is an attempt to account for inference in terms of explanation, but our understanding of
explanation is so patchy that the model seems to account for the obscure in terms of the equally
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obscure.”188 Clearly, by sharing Lipton’s view, Walton points out that the lack of comprehension
and present use of abductive reasoning is due to the lack of understanding of what explanations
are. Lipton observes, as apparent, that no formal theory identifying explanations has been
recognized. Walton, agreeing with this assertion, appeals to Jakko Hintikka’s affirmation of
Lipton’s observation. Hintikka states, “[I]n reality, the nature of explanation is scarcely any
clearer than the nature of abduction.”189 At least two things become apparent in reviewing these
statements. First, abduction is not widely understood or appreciated for its potential use in
scholastic contribution. Second, this may be due to the surprising fact that explanation has never
been formalized for review.
Since abduction is essentially the affirmation of the best explanation, these two matters
(abduction and explanation) are integrally linked. Thus the lack of appreciation for one will
result in a lack of appreciation for the other. Hence, the need to standardize formally the term
‘explanation” is vital to the validation of abduction and the clarity of the meaning of explanation.
To address this need, Walton cites three sources from which he proposes a new theory of
explanation. The proposal of this new theory is his effort to resolve the concerns just mentioned
by Lipton and Hintikka. He identifies several sources used in his formulating this new theory.
First, he mentions “work in AI (artificial intelligence) on explanation patterns . . . plan
recognition and explanatory dialogue.” Second, he cites “work on simulative reasoning in
cognitive science stemming from the experimental findings.” Third, he refers to “recent work on
argumentation.”190 This research results in his proposal of for the standardization of the concept
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of explanation. Walton clarifies, “An account of what explanation is, has to be a vitally important
first step of any analysis of abductive reasoning as inference to the best explanation.”191
Since clear comprehension of the concept of explanation is central to abductive
reasoning, and since the theistic argument being presented in this study is stated with abductive
inference, it is reasonable to assume that before any just and valid attempt to determine the best
explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetics, a clear understanding of what is meant
by explanation as well as a reasonable criterion for determining the best of those explanations
must be determined. For the sake of assuring validity of the second premise and the validity of
the whole study, a new theory of explanation, as developed and presented by Walton, and the use
of a sensible criterion provides assurance that the results established in the review of these three
explanations is equitably and accurately attained.
Walton’s new theory for standardizing the concept of explanation and his criterion for
establishing that theory, now becomes the immediate focus of this study. By it, an understanding
of explanation can be formalized. The following is his new theory:
The new theory of explanation . . . models an explanation as a dialogue between two
agents. In the model, one agent is presumed by the other to understand something, and the
other agent asks a question meant to enable him to understand it as well. An explanation is
successful if it communicates understanding of a sort needed to enable the questioner to
make sense of the thing questioned. This model is based on the concept of an agent having
understanding of something, meaning that he can make sense of it.192
First, it is essential to note that this clarifying of explanation requires that the first agent seeking
to execute explanation must understand something the second agent does not. Second, the first
agent must communicate that understanding in such a way that the second agent is able to
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understand equally, that which is being communicated. Only then is explanation truly taking
place. Further, a successful explanation requires that the questioner or second agent, is able to
make sense of the answer being presented. Thirdly, it is required that the first agent who offers
the explanation must first possess an understanding which makes sense to him before any
attempt at explaining to the second agent can occur.
Walton continues his exposé of this theory by acknowledging that explanations come in
several categories. The first is described as “empathetic” type of explanation in which one person
tries to explain the actions of another person by attributing goals, motives, beliefs, or other kinds
of internal states to the other person.”193 The second is a “scientific explanation in which a
scientist tries to explain some phenomenon by reducing it to entities and relationships accepted
as fundamental in a science.”194 The third category of explanation is explanation “by
definition.”195 This is demonstrated by identifying the meaning of words or concepts in such a
manner that the hearer can understand the explanation through clarifying the terms used in its
presentation.
Walton explains the empathetic type as that which is the result of appealing to a “beliefgoal-plan-action”196 sequence. He notes that this is common in the disciplines of history and law.
He explains the second “scientific” type as that which attempts to explain a phenomenon by
breaking it down into “entities and relationships accepted as fundamental to science.”197 The
third type is characterized by an attempt to use explanation to persuade by using definitions,
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scientific knowledge and exploration or medical and legal knowledge.198 Whatever the category
of explanation used by the first agent, communicating information to the second agent in a way
that results in his understanding of that which is being communicated is an explanation.
It is the position of this study that using Walton’s model for explanation just described
will be a sufficient basis for determining which is the best explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value. Before that step is taken, however, a specific criterion for identifying
the best explanation must be considered. To know what an explanation is does not of itself
achieve the goal of identifying the best explanation. For the best explanation to be determined, a
sufficient criterion is utilized.

A Proposed Criterion for the Best Explanation
As with the case of identifying the nature of explanations, it is similarly necessary to
identify a criterion for determining the best explanation. What has just been revealed in the
explaining of explanations is relevant to this goal but other matters must be considered. For
instance, in spite of the fact that this project is a presentation of a theistic argument, it is
necessary, for the sake of being prudently respectful of all views, to evaluate the theistic and
atheistic arguments with the same standard. The proposed criterion establishes that standard. Its
purpose is to identify qualities necessary for an explanation or argument to be considered
superior. That explanation which best meets that criteria is the best explanation. Once the best
explanation is identified, the soundness of the second premise of the aesthetic theistic argument
has a sufficient basis for its claim.
Before actually presenting more elements of that criterion, it is appropriate to note that
Craig gives sage advice to anyone seeking to use arguments to confront atheism. He warns,
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“[P]ersons are rational; arguments are sound. We’re interested in whether there are sound
arguments for God’s existence based on premises which are more plausible than their denials.
We don’t need to make a personal judgment on the rationality or irrationality of non-theists.”199
With Craig’s position in mind, a responsible criterion will not use verbiage that refers to atheist’s
rationality or the lack thereof. Instead, it must focus solely on answering the question: What
determines the best or soundest explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value? For
the purposes of this study, based on research and rationale, it is proposed that four qualities
comprise the ideal criterion for determining the best explanation or argument. These are: clarity,
consistency, cogency, and conclusiveness. These four qualities identify necessary elements of
excellent explanations or arguments. They are now explained so as to assure both their
comprehension and their justification as elements of a sufficient criterion for determining the
best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.

The Need for Clarity
It is obvious that in order for an argument or a proposed explanation to be sound, it must
be clear enough to comprehend. Terms must be clearly defined. Premises must be clearly stated.
All data and defenses must be clearly stated in such a way that is both consistent with the claim
and comprehendible by those who wish to consider the merits of the information. This seems to
be such a basic notion that it is not necessary to affirm it with exemplification. This statement is
basic: if the explanation is not clear enough to understand, it is not the best explanation. This
standard for the criterion is as necessary for good explanations as it is for good speech. Since
most if not all arguments are expressed in written arguments, it is necessary for those who
receive the argument to be able to comprehend what is being argued. Hence, clarity of language
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and the thoughts carried by that language is an essential quality for any explanation to be sound.
That explanation which has the most clarity is superior in this regard.

The Need for Consistency
It is possible that consistency is the most significant quality necessary for a sound
explanation. To demonstrate what is meant by consistency, it is important that the explanation
being presented not conflict with known facts. Secondly, logical consistency of thought must
also be present in the best explanation or argument. That is, there needs to be a logical flow from
one premise to the next and to the claim. Explanations should be logically consistent from one
premise to the next as well as with other established explanations. If a premise of an argument or
the explanation of something is to be sound, the procedure by which the argument or explanation
is presented must not only be consistent with the known data, it must also be logically consistent
so that the premises of the argument, or the progression of the explanation, is clearly toward a
common purpose or logically relates to it. For example, premises must be logically consistent
with the conclusion of the argument.200 In the case of the explanation, it must be logically
demonstrated as the best resolution of the question being asked and not logically detached or
irrelevant. If the second premise of an argument does not logically proceed from the first, or if
the conclusion of an argument is not logically consistent with the premises, that argument fails.
Likewise, explanations should be consistent with facts and should logically relate to the matter
they intend to explain. For them to be sound, both arguments and explanations should be
factually and logically consistent.
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The Need for Cogency
The concept of cogency has to do with the notion of being forceful, convincing, or
persuasive. A good explanation or a sound argument should not only be clear and consistent with
facts and logic, it should be convincing or persuasive. Such an explanation should not be
expressed in subjunctive language or in a hope that future data will make it sound. A good
explanation, as a good argument, is stated declaratively in such a way that it persuades the hearer
of the explanation toward comprehension. Otherwise, it amounts to a proposal rather than an
explanation. An explanation needs to use declarative verbiage based on factual data sufficient to
persuade. As will be demonstrated later, it is possible to present factual data in a way which is
not persuasive. However, the best explanation demonstrates cogency through well-thought out,
clear and consistent data in such a way that it persuades the hearer to comprehend the need to
accept the explanation. An argument or an explanation should reflect sufficient grounds for
viable, valid certainty or cogency in order to be sound.

The Need for Conclusiveness
For the purposes of this criterion, the quality of conclusiveness refers to the expectation
that a good explanation is not vulnerable to refutation. If an explanation is refutable it does not
sufficiently explain. There is a noteworthy difference between recognizing the possibility of
additional understanding and the refutation of the present explanation. The first is in reference to
a proposal. The second is in reference to an explanation. To claim an explanation as refutable,
requires sufficient evidence to question its veracity. Hence, it must be demonstrated as refutable
in order to be labeled unsound. If an explanation or argument is sufficiently demonstrated to be
refutable in such a manner, it is not the best explanation. The same is true in logical
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argumentation. If the argument is refutable, it is not sound. A note of clarification here is helpful.
These elements of criterion do not make it necessary for an explanation to be absolute in its
conclusiveness. In the case of abduction, or induction, it must only meet the standard of best
explanation (abduction) or high probability (inductive). In the case of abduction, the sound
argument or explanation is sufficient enough in its conclusiveness to establish the implausibility
of a better explanation. Once a better explanation is revealed, the previous explanation is no
longer conclusive nor sound and thus no longer the best. Abduction requires the best explanation.
The best explanation will be the most conclusive or the least refutable.
It is possible that a better criterion may one day be presented. Yet, it is presently
doubtless that these four qualities are necessary to identify the best explanation as far as the
concept of explanation presently exists. What is clear is that if any of these four elements of
criterion, as explained, are weak or not present in an explanation, that explanation may not be the
best. Hence, this four-part criterion is presently sufficient for the task at hand. This conclusion is
demonstrated in the discussion which follows. These four elements or qualities identify the
criterion by which the following explanations and arguments are measured. By them a
determination is made as to which is the best of the explanations which follow. In addition, the
following explanations will be judged by the standards of Walton’s proposed explanation theory.
Using his theory and this criterion, determining the best explanation or argument for man’s
capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is now possible. The specific determination of which of the
following explanation best meets these criteria is presented in the summary at the end of this
chapter.

108

Naturalism’s Explanations for the Apprehension of Aesthetic Value
Having established the criterion by which the best explanation can be determined,
attention now turns toward the proposed explanations themselves. To this end, study reveals that
there are basically two explanations for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value offered by
naturalistic ideology. These two explanations are notably similar, but are distinct enough to be
managed one at a time without a great deal of repetition. The first is identified as the classic
natural selection explanation. The second is an extension of the first and is rather recent in its
development. It is called the evolutionary psychology explanation. A review of each of these is
followed by some observations regarding their strengths or weaknesses as an explanation. After
the discussion of both, the standard for explanation and the criterion just presented which
determines the best explanation, is objectively applied to both.

Classical Natural Selection Explanation
Every student in public schools has been or will be exposed to the claims of Charles
Darwin and his work The Origins of Species and/or, its more contemporary version, NeoDarwinism. Usually, this exposure occurs in middle or high school biology classes. The National
Association of Biology Teachers (primarily K-12 teachers), the organization that publishes the
peer-reviewed American Biology Teacher journal, has a relevant article posted on its official
website. On this site they post their Position Statement on Teaching Evolution.201 In that
statement appears the following:
Science teachers must reject calls to account for the diversity of life or describe the
mechanisms of evolution by invoking non-naturalistic or supernatural notions, whether
called “creation science,” “scientific creationism,” “intelligent design theory,” or similar
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designations. Ideas such as these are outside the scope of science and should not be
presented as part of the science curriculum.202
Obviously, one of the primary teacher organizations, made up largely of public school biology
teachers, openly states for the record, that evolution, or natural selction, is to be taught as the
only possible explanation for the origins of life. The teaching of creation or even intelligent
design is to be rejected, in their view, because it is supernatural in its philosophy and
supernaturalism is simply to be “rejected.”
This insistence to refuse the possibility of supernaturalism makes a telling characteristic
of naturalism. Namely, to be a naturalist, or at least a supporting member of the National
Association of Biology Teachers, one must reject the possibility of supernaturalism. To even
consider the possibility of the supernatural, as characteristic of Intelligent Design, is to reject the
naturalist position. Since science and naturalism are to be considered synonymous in this regard;
anything other than naturalism is simply not scientific in their estimation.
Reviewing how this estimation came to be is not the focus of this chapter. Instead, it is
mentioned because it helps to identify the basic rationale behind naturalism’s explanation for the
apprehension of aesthetic value. Put simply, naturalism begins its explanation for man’s capacity
to apprehend aesthetic value by committing first to the presupposition that there is no
supernatural explanation because there is no such thing as the supernatural. Their position about
anything having to do with the nature of man or the uniqueness of man’s capacities begins with
this presupposition. Hence, whatever their explanation for the phenomenon of man’s capacity for
aesthetic apprehension, their response begins with “It can’t be God!”
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If one suffers under the notion that science is committed to considering all options for the
sake of finding the best explanation, then it would seem rational to assume that the true scientists
are those who consider all possibilities, even the supernatural ones. Today, however, science,
especially biological science, seems to be entrenched with an obvious bias. It is as though
science, especially naturalistic science, has become the new savior and lord of mankind. C. F. H.
Henry comments: “Today, however, many accept not the Spirit-breathed Word of God but the
experimentally based pronouncements of science as the one and only avenue to truth and life” 203
Elsewhere, in the same discussion, Henry writes, “By their worldwide coverage of breakthrough
events, the mass media lend to the scientist a cloak of omnicompetence and latent
omniscience.”204 In short, naturalism and the science which drives that worldview have
convinced modern man that natural selection, science and technology is the answer for every
legitimate question in life. The result of this perception is a growing secularism prevalent in
academia today. Academic theists who offer alternative explanations are being increasingly
marginalized. Politicians who question a scientific claim, do so at political peril. Students in
public school who seek to defend their faith in God, especially the Christian God of Scripture,
literally endanger themselves. This is validated by the media’s coverage of recent tragedies
involving Christian persecution and rejection. One is forced to ask if it might not be wise to just
accept the naturalistic position, due to the level of this oppression. Henry objects to this retreat.
Instead he warns that the continuing secularization of mankind will end with tragic results, “The
final choice for modern man is between Christianity and nihilism, between the Logos of God and
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the ultimate meaninglessness of life and the world.”205 It takes little effort to realize that the
relevance of the argument, which is the focus of this study, could not be greater.
Despite efforts to confront this travesty, science still rules in the value system of modern
man and when science warns that creation teaching and supernaturalism is to be shunned or
rejected, that is too often what happens. An explanation for this mumpsimus is the circular
reasoning that supernaturalism is not valid. For example, what could be more circular than the
argument: science does not recognize the truth of supernaturalism because only naturalistic
theory is true? If naturalists are going to provide an explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetics, it is going to be one which stands on the principles of naturalism. It is going to be an
explanation which has nothing to do with a creator or the divine.
David Hume is often identified as one of the leading early naturalist philosophers. He
associates intellectual progress with the rejection of the supernatural, “[A]s we advance nearer
the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case,
but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvelous, and that,
though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be
thoroughly extirpated from human nature.”206 In the introduction of Julian Huxley’s work
Evolutionary Humanism, J. James Birx makes a similar observation, “Scientific naturalism and
secular humanism continue to challenge entrenched but outmoded beliefs, values, and
worldviews. With confidence, Huxley maintains that evolutionary humanism will become our
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dominant idea-system of the future.”207 For the true naturalist, it has been established that
naturalism challenges and refutes the “outmoded” belief in the supernatural. The unasked but
obvious questions are: On what basis have the naturalists established this certainty? Has it been
proven that supernaturalism is outdated and no longer valid? Careful consideration of arguments
they offer reveal that there is no solid basis as their logic is flawed and their claims
unsubstantiated. Yet, it remains that much of academia considers naturalistic claims of science to
be irrefutable and absolute. It seems, according to the obvious, that mankind is expected to trade
in the God of Scripture for the god of science. All of this comes to bear on the present study
because this study forces naturalists to offer a naturalistic cause for several unique qualities of
man. Particularly, these qualities include man’s capacity and longing for truth, a universal
concept that there is good, and, in reference to this study, an explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value.
In The God Delusion, author Richard Dawkins, appeals to a well-written atheist Julian
Baggini. Baggini states, “What most atheists do believe is that although there is only one kind of
stuff in the universe and it is physical, out of this stuff come minds, beauty, emotions, moral
values— in short the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to human life.”208 It is in this
quote that one can begin to see the naturalists’ specific response to man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value. Their answer is that there is only one “stuff” in the universe and it is physical.
Hence, all that is not physical, such as mind, beauty, emotions, and moral value, begins with this
stuff and develops through the processes of natural selection. Note that this is a huge assumption
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with no real offer of proof. There is no effort to explain how this transition occurred. There is no
description of observed data from which such a conclusion is drawn. The whole of the matter is
built on the presupposition that there cannot be anything but the natural. There is no
supernatural; hence, intelligence, morals, the concept of truth, morality, and beauty must have all
come from some evolutionary process which begins with “stuff.”
Returning to Huxley, one can almost feel the antipathy toward anything supernatural
when he pens:
Evolutionary man can no longer take refuge from his loneliness by creeping for shelter
into the arms of a divinized father-figure whom he has himself created, nor escape from
the responsibility of making decisions by sheltering under the umbrella of Divine
Authority, nor absolve himself from the hard task of meeting his present problems and
planning his future by relying on the will of an omniscient but unfortunately inscrutable
Providence. 209
Clearly, Huxley conforms to the naturalistic ideology and has no room for the possibility of the
supernatural or the divine. This is consistently the case when one becomes a true naturalist. This
being so, the classical natural selection answer, when asked to give an explanation for man’s
capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. is twofold. First, they will state that it most certainly did
not come from supernatural sources. Second, they will state that it came from the process of
natural selection which finds its origin in physical “stuff.”
The extensive referencing just completed raises questions for any honest inquisitor. For
instance, one might ask, “In light of so many claims that supernaturalism is outdated and
irrelevant because it is not scientific, is there any evidence supporting these claims?” The
response seems to be that those who think the supernatural is a possibility are thinking,
unscientifically, and by implication, incorrectly. This is clearly circular reasoning. Science has
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proclaimed that there can be no supernatural role in the process of man’s development because
there is no such thing as the supernatural. Upon this presupposition, they are forced to accept the
notion that any aspect of humanity which needs to be explained must be explained in terms of
objective physical, observable data that has no possible reference to the supernatural. The
obvious question is, “Have scientists sufficiently researched all claims for the supernatural and
has that research provided support for their claim?”
The answer to this question is found in the research provided by scholars such as Craig
Keener and Gary Habermas who provide strong and abundant evidence for the supernatural.
Naturalism seems to simply ignore such evidence. To recognize it would result in the
undermining of their presupposition, and naturalism would then be ungrounded. On the other
hand, several examples of atheistic philosophers exist who, having honestly reviewed the
evidence, and have come to renounce their atheism. One of the most notable examples of this is
Antony Flew’s renunciation of his atheism.210 First, this is not to suggest that Flew has become a
follower of Christ. Second, neither is it to suggest that there are no theists who have converted to
atheism. However, these matters of concern do not bear to the point being made. If atheistic
naturalism has seen converts to supernaturalism, even one notable example, it would seem that
naturalists would be bound by principle to allow for the possibility of the supernatural or deny
the mental capacities of men like Flew, Alistair McGrath and C. S. Lewis. All of these are
excellent examples of atheists who, after considering the facts carefully and without prejudice,
came to reject their atheism.211
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The whole of the previous discussion affirms the claim that naturalists are going to offer
explanations for the aesthetic apprehension which exclude the supernatural. This is more than an
exercise in the obvious. It is an identification of weakness. For a scientist to rule out any
possibility, because of an obstinate presupposition, is simply not acceptable scientific procedure.
Thus, the classical evolutionary humanist, naturalist, and atheist when refusing to acknowledge
the possibility of the supernatural, are being, ironically, unscientific. Yet, their answer to the
query regarding the cause of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value, the cause of man’s
capacity to apprehend beauty, is evolution, natural selection or survival of the fittest. Huxley
verbalizes as much:
The exploration of the mind has barely begun. It must be one of the main tasks of the
coming era, just as was the exploration of the world's surface a few centuries ago.
Psychological exploration will doubtless reveal as many surprises as did geographical
exploration, and will make available to our descendants all kinds of new possibilities of
full and richer living. 212
Here Huxley exemplifies the classical natural selection explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value. He concludes that the explanation for man’s capacity for aesthetic
apprehension and the apprehension of all other values such as desire for truth, goodness, and
beauty, all of which are psychological phenomena, is yet to be discovered, as they have only
barely begun the exploration of the mind. Such an answer, being properly interpreted, admits that
naturalists do not know yet. Huxley is admitting that the exploration into the human mind has not
yet been sufficient to warrant an acceptable answer. That investigation, according to Huxley’s
statement, has “barely begun.” In what scientific discipline is the answer, “we don’t know yet”
sufficient? Apparently the only thing of which they are certain is that any explanation for man’s
capacity to apprehend beauty cannot be supernaturalism.
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Weaknesses of the Classical Naturalistic Explanation
First, based on Huxley’s anticipation for the explanation, as just quoted, it is difficult to
assess the weakness of Huxley’s explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.
This is due to the fact that it is difficult to critique any view not yet asserted. “We don’t know
yet” does not engender an immediate response other than a hope that someone will eventually
inform the world when naturalism is finally able to provide an explanation. This does not mean
that they have not espoused some theories, as scientists are seemingly always offering such. The
only certainty that has been expressed for the explanation of man’s ability to apprehend
aesthetics is their absolute conviction that whatever the explanation is, it will not have any
supernatural reference.
In contemplating naturalism’s rejection of the possibility of anything supernatural, one
must eventually inquire as to how such certainty can be maintained. Henry makes a particularly
relevant point when contemplating a similar question:
The early modern mind, having forsaken the revelation of the living God, had discovered
that it could then no longer cling to supernaturalism. Now the later modern mind—the
naturalistic temper—soon discovered that it also had unwittingly borrowed more than it
dared retain from the biblical heritage. For, although it had rejected the supernatural, even
the naturalistic modern mind at the turn of the century nonetheless retained the notion
that reality is structured by rational order, by an intelligible pattern, which science
presumably could discover by empirical observation and experimentation.213
Henry is correctly observing that while naturalism soundly rejects the possibility of supernaturalism, it has not divorced itself from the notion that reality is structured with rational
intelligible patterns and intent. That is to say that since it is unlikely that order can come from
chaos, or that design can take place without a designer, or that beauty can be apprehended by
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man without being designed by a Creator Who Himself is able to apprehend aesthetic value, the
naturalist, in assuming there must be an alternative, is faced with the challenge of explaining this
order, pattern, intent and ability to apprehend morals and aesthetic value. On the other hand,
contra the view of naturalists, there is abundant evidence suggesting that God created man to
know Him. Hence, since God is inherently beautiful, man had to be given the ability to
apprehend the aesthetic value of beauty that he might apprehend any knowledge of God. While
science goes on to claim that order cannot be the result of the supernatural, and that alternative
naturalistic explanations will confirm their view, they place their faith in explanations which are
yet forthcoming.
Several questions come to mind when following Henry’s logic. First, since both
naturalists and supernaturalists agree that reality is observed to have order and pattern, how is it
possible for naturalists to explain this design apart from a superior intelligence or design?
Second, how can naturalists rationally posit that prehistoric, early universe, and early earth was
simply chaotic in its existence, and then somehow order arose from that chaos? How then do the
naturalists explain the presence of such order and pattern in light of the admitted chaos in which
life first began? Does it not take extreme faith in naturalism to believe order comes from chaos
or that life comes from nothing or cognizance comes from non-cognizance, or the psychological
is a derivative of the biological? Is this not the question being answered in the teleological
argument, as skillfully presented by luminaries such as William Dembski?214 No scientific
exploration should begin with a presupposition that excludes uncomfortable possibilities.
Plantinga is one of many who have commented on these questions.
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Now the proposed naturalistic analyses with which I am acquainted are analyses of what
it is for an organ or system to have a function; they are not analyses of what it is for an
organ or system to function properly, to work the way it ought to work. They try to tell us
what it is, for example, for it to be the case that the function of the heart is to pump blood,
and the function of the telephone is to enable rapid, convenient vocal communication.
They don’t try to tell us what it is for a heart or telephone to function properly, to work
the way it ought to. And the transition from the one to the other isn’t quite as easy as it
might seem. We can’t say, for example, that a thing is functioning properly just if it is
performing its function, whatever that is; for to be functioning properly, at least in the
fullest sense, it must be functioning in the way it was designed to.215
Plantinga correctly observes that naturalism speaks in terms of “organs or systems” having
function. It is this function which is claimed by naturalists to be the eventual catalyst for
evolutionary processes. Yet, Plantinga points out that they do not speak of these organs or
systems in terms of their proper function. He makes the difference between functioning and
functioning properly very clear. He points out that when mere functioning is being done that is
not a guarantee that the organ or organism is properly functioning as intended. Organs and
systems, in order to survive or reproduce, must function properly. This proper functionality, by
definition, only occurs when it is functioning as it was designed. It is the origin of this design
which escapes the discussion of the naturalist. If the heart is healthy, it functions as it was
designed. If the mind is healthy, it functions as it was designed. These observations are selfevident truths. Only when an organ or organism is functioning as it was designed to function is
that organism properly functioning. It is self-evident to assume that a design requires a designer,
and yet, rational naturalistic philosophy argues against a designer as that challenges their bias
and opens the possibility for the supernatural, not because it is not possible. Naturalists cannot
have it both ways. Clearly, the methodological assumptions of naturalism hinder any
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consideration of any supernatural explanation. Yet, at the same time, one cannot concede that
organs need to function as they were designed in order to function properly and then argue that it
is the mutation of this design which is the basis for the advance of the species. That would
require an organ to somehow change into something it was not designed to do so that it can then
become a new design with a new purpose and this without any intelligent oversight or cause. To
many scientists, for an organ to mutate outside the parameters of its intended function is to
present a disease or a medical malady. Yet this, for the naturalist, is the basis for progress by
claiming nature did it this way. Are they claiming that nature is sufficiently sentient to
manipulate like this? Wouldn’t doing so open the door to the possibility of the supernatural? The
truth is that no mechanism which proves chance organizes out of chaos or malady results in a
biologically altered design having new purpose has ever been demonstrated. Proper function
cannot occur outside the behavior for which that organ or organism was designed. Naturalism
considers no evidence for how design came to be other than chance. Chance has not been
demonstrated as a means to, or basis of, the necessarily intricate design which is necessary to
mutate from one species to another. It is not feasible when one realizes that mutation itself
requires an organism to act outside the function of that for which it was designed. This would
require that the organism not function properly. The naturalist’s account for different species
seems to raise more question than it answers. It seems clear that the naturalistic claim that there
cannot be any explanation which refers to the supernatural is an insufficient explanation for the
development of man, much less his universal ability to apprehend aesthetic value.
Further research reveals that not all leading scientists have the same regard for naturalism
as those who have been mentioned. For instance, Sir Francis Crick, co-discoverer of the DNA
double helix molecule has suggested the biological formation of life from inanimate material is
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so inconceivable that he posits the material had to come from outer space riding on something
like a frozen meteor.216 Michael Denton, a microbiologist and professed atheist, has described
Darwinian naturalism as “the great cosmogenic myth of the twentieth century.”217 Embryologist
Soren Lovtrup of Sweden, stated, “I believe that one day the Darwinian myth will be ranked the
greatest deceit in the history of science. When this happens many people will pose the question:
How did this ever happen?” 218 In his review of Denton’s Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, Frederic
Howe observes:
Denton actually is calling for, on strictly scientific grounds, the rejection of Darwinian
evolutionary theory, and the development of a new model or paradigm to explain the
beginning and development of life. His major conclusion is this: “Whatever view we
wish to take of the current status of Darwinian theory, whatever the reasons might be for
its undoubted appeal, whether we wish to view it as being in a classic state of crisis as
described by Kuhn, there can be no doubt that after a century of intensive effort biologists
have failed to validate it in any significant sense. 219
The reference to Crick and Denton demonstrate non-theistic rejections of Darwinism. While their
views do not argue for supernaturalism, they do argue for the weakness of naturalistic dogma
which is the present basis of naturalism.220 To that end, they argue against justifying the present
popularity of Darwinism or Neo-Darwinism. In spite of non-theistic scientist’s proposals for a
replacement to the Darwinian theory, continued commitment to Darwinian naturalistic causation
seems to remain entrenched. It could be argued that such uncertainty is a strange basis for
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demanding Darwinism be the required view of academia. At the very least, it weakens the
classical Darwinian naturalistic explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.
Despite the scientific weakness of Darwinism, as voiced by Crick and Denton, and while serious
questions are being raised regarding its scientific viability and the voicing of these questions is
getting louder, natural selection theory remains required teaching in public schools.221 The
possibility that this reflects a certain unscientific bias is difficult to deny.
Before concluding a discussion of the weaknesses of the classical naturalism explanation,
one more question should be asked. The question has to do with feasibility. Dawkins’ reference
to Baggini declares that the universe is made of some elementary common “stuff” and that from
that stuff comes minds, beauty, emotions, and moral value. If man does evolve from this stuff,
who passed on the capacity to apprehend beauty to their posterity, from what source does man
have the ability to apprehend aesthetic value? Baggini suggests that the mindless stuff from
which mind develops necessarily accounts for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. If so,
what is the evidence, rationale or feasibility behind this claim, other than the need to maintain the
Darwinian developmental theory? Commonality of man’s origin in this stuff would suggest a
non-uniformity of appearance as in each particular bird species or other animal species. Birds
may have common features but not all birds can fly. Not all birds can drive their beaks into
hardwood in search of food. All species of birds are unique in their own regard. This implies that
some races or cultures should not be able to apprehend aesthetic value as not all birds are
identical in any one characteristic. Yet, all cultures of mankind seem to be able to apprehend
aesthetic value. Surely, human races are distinct. Yet, there is a common recognition that all
races and cultures have aesthetic appreciation. Natural selection does not offer a sufficient
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explanation for this other than rejection of supernaturalism. If the different races of homo sapiens
were consistent with the evidence of the different breeds of bird, there would be some races
which could appreciate aesthetic value and some which could not. The obvious result of this
would be a non-universal capacity for apprehension. The commonality of aesthetic apprehension
has to be explained while maintaining the mutations producing different race or species. This is
not feasible unless, of course, one assumes that all the mutations of the stuff which resulted in
mind happened in such a way that all human beings are able to apprehend aesthetic value. That
would, of course, defy credulity. If multiple mutations occurred, men would not necessarily be
the same in this regard. In order to account for the similarities and differences within the human
race, naturalism’s humanity must be a derivation of a common origin. Subsequent change
occurred through natural selection. Yet, in spite of this, all cultures have some capacity for
apprehending aesthetic value. Humans have different skin color, some have greater intellect than
others, some have athletic abilities and others do not. Yet, man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value is common in every culture. There is no culture, properly functioning, which does not have
a capacity for aesthetic value. Natural selection does not sufficiently account for this consistency.
What also must be answered, and is not, is that since a mutation supposedly began the
process by which man is able to apprehend aesthetic value, where is the evidence which confirms
this? Secondly, if man’s capacity for aesthetic apprehension is a derivative of the ability of the
first pair of human beings, where did they get it? Thirdly, why, with all the differences between
human races, is there no culture which does not apprehend aesthetic value?
As this discussion shows, it is clear that there are serious problems with the classical
naturalistic explanation. Methodologically, the essential presupposition of classical naturalism
closes the door to rational possibilities inherent in a more abductive approach. It is difficult to
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argue for naturalism as the best explanation when one is being asked to accept an explanation
which is yet forthcoming. Assuming such an explanation is forthcoming, the next question is
two-fold. First, how would such an explanation be proven? Secondly, how is it that naturalists
have been able to assert dogmatic views on the basis of hoped for evidence and not be called into
question by more scientists? These questions and concerns highlight the weaknesses in the
classical naturalist’s explanation for aesthetic apprehension. By their own admission their claims
are not only unprovable, they are, apparently, yet unknown.

Evolutionary Psychology
The discipline known as evolutionary psychology is an augmentation built upon the
views of E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.222 According to Plantinga, it was
dismissed by many as it was perceived to be “deeply sexist,” because it minimized rape and
violence as simply a part of the evolutionary process.223 While Plantinga acknowledges that this
view is open to debate, he also affirms that evolutionary psychology is receiving increased
attention within the academic community.224
[E]evolutionary psychology is an attempt to explain important human traits and behaviors
in terms of the evolutionary origin of the human species. The heart and soul of this
project is the effort to explain distinctive human traits—our art, humor, play, love, sexual
behavior, poetry, sense of adventure, love of stories, our music, our morality, and our
religion itself—in terms of adaptive advantages accruing to our hunter-gatherer ancestors
back there on the plains of Serengeti.225
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The proponents of evolutionary psychology do not disagree with Plantinga’s basic definition. Of
the many articles published on this topic, one appears in the peer reviewed journal American
Psychologist published by the American Psychological Association. It is written by one of the
major proponents of evolutionary psychology, David M. Buss, Professor of Psychology at the
University of Texas at Austin. Apparently in conjunction with several of his students, Buss et.al,
published their article intending to identify “controversies, questions, prospects and limitations”
of this new discipline. They propose the following definition for evolutionary psychology:
The fundamental basis of evolutionary psychology dates back to Darwin’s (1859) theory
of natural selection. Darwin postulated that if variant traits could be inherited by
offspring from parents, then those variants that aided an organism’s survival and
reproduction would be transmitted to future generations at greater frequencies than
alternatives. Variants with less beneficial effects—such as those that hinder an
organism’s ability to survive or reproduce— would not replicate because the organisms
possessing them would transmit them at lower rates.226
It is important to note that the article identifies not only that it is an extension of Darwinian
naturalism, but that the basis of evolutionary psychology is a survival of the fittest view
described as “those variants that aided an organism’s survival and reproduction.” This seems to
affirm the definition Plantinga offers. Hence, there is little disagreement regarding the identity
and intent of evolutionary psychology. In light of this, in offering their definition, the proponents
of evolutionary psychology affirm the claim that “variants with less beneficial effects . . . would
not replicate because the organisms possessing these less beneficial effects would transmit them
at a lower rate.” 227 While this is an extension of the definition, it is a naturalistic one as it is
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logical to assume any explanation for apprehension of art based on mechanisms which have
evolved over time must also include a reference to the primary tenant of evolutionary theory. The
driving force of evolution is the desire to propagate the species as well as to preserve one’s self
in the present.
Aside from the tremendous assumptions stated in the Buss et.al article, what is not
unnoticed by Plantinga is the question of how aesthetic apprehension fits in the foundational
principles of evolution, particularly the survival of the fittest as necessary to the propagation of
the species. Correctly he observes, “It is hard to see how a capacity to find marvelous beauty . . .
would be of adaptive use to our hunter-gatherer ancestors.”228 Providing additional insight to
how evolutionary psychologists might provide the necessary enlightenment to address this
concern, Plantinga continues:
Harvard evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker once told a gathering of musicologists
why music had rated only eleven of his 660-page How the Mind Works: He told the
musicologists why the topic did not merit more attention: music was ‘useless’ in terms
of human evolution and development. He dismissed it as ‘auditory cheesecake,’ a trivial
amusement that ‘just happens to tickle several important parts of the brain in a highly
pleasurable way, as cheesecake tickles the palate.’229
Apparently, Plantinga is suggesting that the plan of some evolutionary psychologists for giving a
sufficient answer to how aesthetic apprehension fits within their theory is to allocate aesthetics to
the realm of unnecessary and therefore to make the question irrelevant to the discussion.
Assuming this to be a possible reason for Pinker’s untenable statement, one might entertain the
thought that academia can be so blinded by prejudice that it sometimes risks sacrificing integrity
to maintain denial of the possibility of supernaturalism.
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The view held by Pinker apparently reflects the notion that the universal capacity of man
to apprehend aesthetic value is not important or significant enough to warrant much attention. It
is merely “auditory cheesecake.” What seems so hard to comprehend is how Pinker justifies this
claim. Is his answer to the challenging question of how to explain man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value so meaningless that he is willing to simply relegate the question to irrelevance? Is
his explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value to rate the question so low in
importance that it need not be considered? Since aesthetic appreciation is viewed as a signal for
how the mind works, is he not also relegating understanding of how the mind works to
irrelevance? One is left to wonder on what possible basis he made this evaluation of aesthetic
value and what evidence to which he points for its justification. Since he believes naturalism,
logically, renders all of these categories irrelevant, he provides no answer. Yet, no answer is not
an adequate response to the question.
To offer a succinct alternative to his claims requires a minimal review of data which
offers sufficient evidence supporting a counter claim. For example, in an article by Saila
Nevanen published in The Arts Education Policy Review,230 the author first identifies herself as a
representative of the Centre of Expertise on Social Welfare in the Helsinki metropolitan area,
Helsinki, Finland.231 What makes this location relevant to this discussion is the fact that Finnish
students involved in that Centre “finished at the top of the rankings for the Program for
International Student Assessment (PISA) in recent years.”232 The article is a commentary on the
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principles and procedures which contributed to such a high review. Within this article a
statement is made that clearly contradicts the views held by the Harvard Professor Steve Pinker:
This article describes an arts education project for early childhood, preschool, and
elementary school pupils that began in Helsinki in 2000. It began as an arts and history
project to encourage children in making art and engaging in cultural activities. The aim of
the whole project was to increase children’s sensitivity and support their learning,
cooperation skills, and self-concept while exploring the surrounding environment and
society. The pupils were guided in concentrated and consistent long-term work and
constructive action as group members. The project was carried out as a collaboration
between teachers and artists. The cooperation between schools, day care centers, and
artists continues today, only on a smaller scale. Thus, at least some of the long-term aims
of this Finnish education program seem to have been supported.233
This account identifies the purpose of the project being reviewed in the article. The students did
well in their assessment rankings and the article offers insight on what was done to help the
students reach that high ranking. The article provides a sufficient background for how the results
of their project came to be and what those results were. One of the foundational principles upon
which the project was built was an emphasis on art education. The article makes it very clear as
to why, “In this article, arts education is seen as an area of education that promotes the manysided development of personality, increases knowledge and skills in different fields of art, and
provides possibilities for self-expression.”234 One should note that the authors of this article are
recognized as developers of a project that resulted in their students receiving highest rankings for
the Program for International Student Assessment. Then, they cite a focus on the arts as a key
factor in achieving their success. In other words, rather than postulating aesthetic appreciation as
being “auditory cheesecake,” the proof of the contrary is found in the results of this project.
Their efforts proved that among many other things, the role of the arts is essential for excellent
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childhood development. The article continues, “Arts education combines natural expression and
interaction; it stimulates a child’s own, connecting the magic of art to the logic of science.”235
This evidence contradicts the theory postulated by Pinker who is cited above. At the very least,
Professor Pinker being an evolutionary psychologist, and as such feeling justified to relegate
aesthetic appreciation to irrelevancy, there is sufficient evidence to question the validity of his
claim as well as those of evolutionary psychology.
Returning to the Buss article in American Psychologist, the authors continue their
assertion that the development of the mind and the psychological features of the mind are due to
evolutionary processes. For example, they assert, “Just as physiological adaptations solve
specific problems associated with survival and reproduction (e.g., the immune system has
evolved as a defense against disease), psychological adaptations too have evolved because they
solved problems related to survival and reproduction.”236 This is another declaration that
evolutionary processes are not only an acceptable explanation for man’s capacity for aesthetic
apprehension but claim to be the best explanation for it. After closer scrutiny, however, it is less
valid than what might first appear. Either the theory is incorrect and unfounded or there is
another better explanation for the motivation of man’s thought processes other than continuation
of the species and survival of the fittest.237 To their credit, the authors of the American
Psychology article go on to state that the advance of evolutionary psychology is limited because
of its “lack of knowledge of many selection pressures that humans faced over the millions of
years of their evolution.”238 While one must commend this honesty, it is clear that they are
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admitting that the theory is based on psychological mechanisms, the existence of which has not
been validated. Basing their theory on principles drawn from data which has not yet been found
or validated raises serious question as to whether or not the theory of evolutionary psychology is
sound, in spite of its growing popularity.
For the sake of full disclosure, it is not only theists who find evolutionary psychology to
be questionable. In the peer reviewed journal Philosophical Psychology, Paul Sheldon Davies,
professor of philosophy at the College of William and Mary writes:
If evolutionary psychology were a promising research program—if the ‘‘evolutionary
psychology paradigm’’ comprised theories and exemplars and methods that were
explanatory and predictive and fruitful1—then the world as we know it and, indeed, the
world itself would be quite different, for we would then have evidence we presently do
not have and life on earth would have evolved in ways it most probably did not evolve.
But evolutionary psychology is unpromising, leaden with promises it cannot keep.
Minimal standards of evidence go unmet in its theories and the history of life it assumes
is twisted to fit just those theories.239
Clearly, not all philosophers and psychologists share in the support of evolutionary psychology’s
rise to prominence. What is particularly relevant is how Davies affirms the concerns of
Plantinga. The result is that there are significant concerns about the validity of this theory.

Weaknesses of Evolutionary Psychology
Though some of the weaknesses of evolutionary psychology as a viable explanation for
aesthetic appreciation have already been mentioned, further discussion is warranted along with
some other weaknesses not yet mentioned. To be clear, the first weakness of this explanation has
to do with its uncertainty. That evolutionary psychology is becoming increasingly popular as
Plantinga asserts240 is a true concern in light of the fact that those who define it have to admit
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that they do not yet have the needed information to validate their claims. They are making the
claims on the basis of an assumption that they will find that validation.241
The second weakness of this view is also true of the classical naturalistic explanation
considered previously. Evolutionary Psychology requires an irrational assumption that there can
be no such thing as supernaturalism. Hence, any acceptable explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value must reflect the views of naturalism. That this negation of
supernaturalism is not only unproven but, contra to it, significant evidence is available to counter
it, exposes a significant weakness of the evolutionary psychology theory.
There is a third noteworthy weakness in that not all who are opposed to supernaturalism
are in agreement with the tenets of evolutionary psychology. Even those who are renowned
psychologists recognize the foundations upon which evolutionary psychology is based are
insecure. Davies specifically complains that evolutionary psychology is “unpromising, leaden
with promises it cannot keep. Minimal standards of evidence go unmet in its theories and the
history of life it assumes is twisted to fit just those theories.” 242 Such observations call
evolutionary psychology into serious question as a viable explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value.
A fourth weakness has to do with its foundation upon the Darwinian theory of natural
selection. Setting aside the fact that the natural selection model itself is unprovable and its
popularity is unwarranted, evolutionary psychology claims to be built on that model which is
almost completely biological in nature. Yet, evolutionary psychology claims it reasonable to
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build its theory upon a biological basis without offering explanation for how the processes of
biological evolution might somehow initiate psychological mechanisms which result in cognition
and other capacities such as aesthetic apprehension. Their answer assumes a mechanistic
explanation forthcoming, which demonstrates biological mutations as the origins of
psychological mechanism by which mind can develop. The basis of their argument on
forthcoming evidence weakens their explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.
“The proof is coming” cannot be accepted as a tenable foundation for belief.

Measuring the Naturalists Explanation
In summarizing naturalism’s proposed explanations for man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value, there is first the weakness demonstrated in the rejection of any possibility for
supernatural explanations. This is due to the supposed wisdom that whatever explanation there
might be, it has to be naturalistic because there is no such thing as the supernatural, as if by man
making up his mind makes his decision any more real. Second, despite the naturalist’s claim that
biology or psychological mechanisms are the basis for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value, there is sparsity of proof for their claim. Their hopes are weakly based on anticipated
proofs which have not yet materialized, much left been offered or proven. Thirdly, their views
are replete with examples of ignoring such evidences supporting intelligent design or miracles,
such as the resurrection, because of their admitted bias requires that any suggestion of the
supernatural be rejected. While scientists claim to be seekers of truth, they reject the possibility
of truths which do not fit this presuppositional bias. Finally, their proposed rational objections to
disciplines such as theistic arguments are inaccurate, unprincipled, and irresponsible. Arguments
they propose to the contrary, especially in the case of Richard Dawkins, are replete with error
and misstatements. Craig is to be commended for his response to Dawkins’ God Delusion. In
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Craig’s work Reasonable Faith, Craig exposes the implausibility, irrationality, falsehood, and
unnecessary skepticism of Dawkins’ claims.243 Since a reasonable claim can be made that
Dawkins, though a brilliant physicist, and one of the more popular atheists in the country, there
is apparent reason to question whether or not he is truly adequate to represent non-theistic
philosophical views. In light of the criterion established at the beginning of this chapter, how
these naturalistic explanations satisfy the requirements must now be reviewed.
Remembering Walton’s theory of explanation cited above, focus is now directed toward a
review of the explanations offered by naturalism. One must recall Walton’s theory, “An
explanation is successful if it communicates understanding of a sort needed to enable the
questioner to make sense of the thing questioned.”244 To apply this standard, it must be asked:
Do the naturalistic explanations communicate an “understanding of a sort needed to enable the
questioner to make sense of the thing questioned?” The evidence presented seems to suggest the
answer to this question is negative. How can an explanation meet this standard of explanation
when it is built on the certainty of what must yet be discovered, as claimed by Huxley? 245 How
can an explanation meet this standard if those who offer their psychological views are in conflict
with other psychologists? How can either of the naturalistic explanations meet this standard
when their bias limits them to a rejection of any answer that is not naturalistic in its viewpoint?
Does such bias represent knowledge or blind presuppositions? Do their explanations demonstrate
the needed understanding which makes its hearers understand their views? One must recognize
that there is weakness in their explanations for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.
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Applying the Criterion to Naturalistic Explanations
In addition to the definition of explanations, a proposed criterion of four very basic,
obvious, self-evident qualities an explanation must now be applied to the two naturalistic
explanations. These four qualities of this criterion being applied are: the need for clarity, the
need for consistency, the need for cogency, and the need for conclusiveness. Each of these
applications appear below.

The Need for Clarity
Applying the first element of this criterion requires a consideration of the clarity of the
naturalistic explanations. Since an explanation can be clear and still incorrect, it is only
appropriate to admit the clarity which exists in each of the two naturalistic explanations. They
both clearly state that any explanation cannot be supernatural. They both clearly state that the
explanation must be in agreement with the Darwinian natural selection theory. They both clearly
claim biological roots for the psychological traits of man. They both infer or clearly proclaim
that the evidence supporting their explanation is forthcoming. Obviously, in this regard, they are
quite clear.

The Need for Consistency
In regard to consistency, one can say they are consistent with the Darwinian claims. They
are also consistent in their rejection of supernaturalism. Yet, they are clearly not logically
consistent as any theory based on information that is admittedly not yet present nor tested is
weak at best. Clearly it is inconsistent to claim to be scientists seeking truth while at the same
time making assertions on evidence which is not yet discovered nor tested. Clearly it is
inconsistent to claim that the psychological mechanisms by which man makes decisions is the
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result of the evolving of biological “stuff” when that assertion is based on evidence not present
nor is there adequate explanation for how “stuff” evolves from one form to another. Consistency
would require factual or reasonable data which is observable and thus verifiable, so that the
conclusions could be demonstrated as consistent with other known data.

The Need for Cogency
Thirdly, is the matter of cogency. That is do these explanations sufficiently persuade
those adequately informed? Are their explanations demonstrably viable? The answer to these
questions is obviously negative. Minds of such caliber as Plantinga, Craig, Habermas et.al are
not persuaded by the evidence presented. That is not to suggest that those who hold naturalistic
views are of lesser intelligence. Instead, brilliant naturalistic minds are frustrated when they
recognize that not all academics agree with their views. They insist, that they must persuade all
academia to accept their biased explanations. Several academicians resist, however, because the
explanations being offered are not sufficiently cogent. Simply put, they are insufficiently
persuasive to any honest mind seeking meaningful justification for belief in naturalism.
Additionally, how can naturalistic explanations meet the criterion’s standard when it is openly
admitted, by naturalists, that the proof of their claims are yet to arrive. This suggests that they are
stating their explanation on the basis of future hopes, not present reality. Explanations based on
verification yet to be obtained are not cogent explanations. Finally, to answer a question with no
answer is not to answer the question. If naturalism is built on a presupposition that there is no
supernaturalism, and evidence abounds which supports the existence of the supernatural, to
dismiss this evidence because it does not fit their presupposition is to answer by not answering.
Their presupposition so binds them that it is impossible for them to consider non-natural
explanations simply because they are not naturalistic. This is a striking lack of cogency.
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The Need for Conclusiveness
The fourth element of this criterion seeks evidence that their explanations are conclusive
in that they clearly offer an irrefutable explanation. There are those within academia who are not
supernaturalists who raising doubts “as to whether evolutionary claims, by their very nature
incapable of falsification, can properly be classed as truly scientific hypothesis.” 246 Such doubts
are adequate grounds for assessing their explanations as failing to meet the conclusiveness
element of the criterion. If an explanation cannot meet or exceed the standard of conclusiveness
presented by alternate views, it must be dismissed as the best explanation. Since there is within
the worldview of naturalism those who disagree with Darwinian claims, while remaining nontheistic in their views, one could argue that if naturalism is able to entertain multiple views why
can’t naturalism accept even the possibility of supernaturalism as well. Their lack of
conclusiveness does not offer a stable refutation of theistic causation of man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value. The application of the above criterion reveals serious shortages in the
naturalist’s explanation of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.
The Supernatural Explanation of Man’s
Capacity for Aesthetic Apprehension
Having demonstrated that naturalism’s explanation for man’s ability to apprehend
aesthetic value fails to meet either the standards of explanation set out by Walton or the proposed
criterion for adequate explanations, it is apparent that naturalistic explanations for man’s
capacity to apprehend aesthetic is questionable. Yet, that realization that the views of naturalism
have weaknesses does not, by itself, establish supernaturalism’s explanation as the best.
Determining this requires presenting a viable argument for the superiority of the supernatural
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explanation. The goal of the following section offers this argument and demonstrates that the
best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is divine causation. In so doing,
this section demonstrates the soundness of the second premise of the aesthetic argument.
This demonstration is presented in several stages. In the first stage, there is an obvious
need to present a sufficient argument for whether or not acceptance of supernaturalism is rational
or reasonable. Sufficient evidence and reason is required to affirm a justifiable belief in the
existence of supernaturalism. In the second, after justifying the existence of supernaturalism,
there remains the matter of determining it qualifies as an adequate explanation for the causation
of man’s ability to apprehend aesthetic value. The third stage offers justification in believing
divine causation is the best explanation for man’s aesthetic apprehension. The final stage will be
a review of how well the supernatural explanation meets Walton’s standards for explanation and
the same criterion applied to the naturalistic explanations. The conclusion of this chapter will be
a brief summary of how the second premise is validated.

The Possibility of Supernaturalism
Several approaches could be taken in an effort to demonstrate the justification for belief
in God’s existence. However, because of the particular focus on the apprehension of aesthetics, it
is appropriate to limit the number of approaches so as to not get too off course, while at the same
time sufficiently demonstrating the possibility of supernaturalism. To this end, three approaches
are used to present sufficient evidences. The first reviews philosophical arguments. The second
reviews evidence which argues for the miraculous, particularly the resurrection. The third
reviews what some scientists are really saying about the theory of Darwinian naturalism.
Particularly, this third approach will focus on noted scholars who see naturalism as scientifically
invalid. In so doing, the particular point will be made that the deficiencies of the anti137

supernatural views open the door for the consideration of the supernatural or divine causation as
the best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value.

Philosophical Argument
In the interest of brevity, the Classical Apologetic Method includes multiple theistic
arguments. Each of which offers significant reason for justifying belief in the existence of God.
Since God has been described by both naturalists and supernaturalists as a supernatural entity, it
is reasonable to assume that any argument for God’s existence is, by default, an argument for the
supernatural. Equally true, and the point being made here, is that any argument for the
supernatural is an argument for the possibility of God’s existence. This is a foundational notion
and need not be defended further. Most naturalists simply do not except the existence of God
because they cannot, and subsequently do not, accept the notion of the supernatural. If they ever
opened their minds to the possibility of supernaturalism, they would cease being true naturalists.
This realization makes it apparent that to argue for theism, by default, is to argue for the
supernatural. The reverse is also true. This opens the door to the realization that any theistic
argument is, by default, an argument for supernaturalism.
The theistic arguments, verbalized specifically in Appendix 1, are meant to demonstrate a
justifiable belief in God’s existence. Hence, they demonstrate a justifiable belief in
supernaturalism. The ontological theistic argument, for example, has been deemed reasonable
since Anselm. The teleological theistic argument, originally introduced by Kant, opens the door
for the possibility of a divine or supernatural purpose or design for all things. This further affirms
the possibility of supernaturalism. The same can be said of the cosmological theistic argument,
especially the Kalam version of it. Since everything which began to exist has a cause, the cause
of the universe and the nature within it must come from outside the realm of the natural for it is
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unreasonable to hold that nature can cause itself to begin to exist. Thus, supernaturalism is a
reasonable explanation for the existence of everything that is. C. S. Lewis’s verbalization of a
moral argument, later discussed by Baggett and Walls, is a reflection of the notion that because
man is the only animal on this earth capable of discerning what is good, moral, or ethical, and
this human capacity is universal, there needs to be an explanation. Baggett and Walls
demonstrate that the best explanation is divine causation. Similarly, the objective of this study is
to add the aesthetic theistic argument to this list. This study seeks to demonstrate that divine
causation offers the best explanation for the apprehension of aesthetic value over other
naturalistic explanations.
While it has been claimed that weaknesses exist in each of these classical arguments, as
previously referenced in Dawkins’ work The God Delusion, he, like most others, reviewed them
for assumed weaknesses one at a time. His failure to undermine their individual validity has been
demonstrated by Craig and McGrath.247 Yet, it is significant to realize that when these arguments
are taken cumulatively, they present even a more formidable affirmation for the existence of the
supernatural. Feinberg’s cumulative case apologetic methodology reflects this principle. He
observes:
[T]he kind of cumulative case that I am defending, [demonstrates that] the elements of
the theist’s case may tend to reinforce one another. Not all arguments may fail as proofs
at just the same point. It is possible that one element reinforces an argument just at the
point of its weakness. For instance, one may pose psychological explanations for
someone’s belief that he or she has a sense of God’s presence because one thinks that
God’s existence is doubtful. But the theistic arguments may be advanced to show that
God’s existence is not contrary to reason. To use Plantinga’s terms, it is rationally
acceptable to believe that there is a God. Or put in terms of buckets, unless the holes in
all ten buckets line up perfectly so that the water will spill out, one bucket may so
reinforce another bucket so that the ten leaky buckets will indeed make a bucket that will
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carry water. The apologist is arguing that Christian theism is the best explanation of all
available evidence taken together.248
So as to avoid any potential for confusion, it is acknowledged that each of these classical
arguments, even taken one at a time, make a formidable claim for the existence of God. It must
not be taken that Feinberg is suggesting otherwise. The concept of “leaky buckets” does not
suggest any of these arguments fail in their purpose for presenting a justifiable reason for God’s
existence. But whatever ‘leaks’ are claimed to exist, that leak does not invalidate the belief in
God’s existence. In contrast, neither do of the theistic arguments establish proof of God’s
existence. It has already been demonstrated that this is not their intent.249 Reason alone does not
result in belief. That requires surrender on the part of the believer. Yet, in observing Plantinga’s
statement, as Feinberg, when theistic arguments are used in combination with each other, an
even stronger cumulative argument emerges whereby it becomes even more obvious that “it is
rationally acceptable to believe that there is a God.”250 Thus, supernaturalism can be even more
affirmed by using the theistic arguments cumulatively. As significant as this is, there is more
within the realm of philosophy to which one can appeal for affirming both the existence of God
and the subsequent existence of supernaturalism.
Returning to Plantinga’s work Warrant and Proper Function, mentioned earlier. As
stated, this work is an effort to identify a reasonable causation for belief. That is to say, he
desires to validate the notion that a belief which has “warrant” (loosely this term would imply
that such a belief is justified), is the result first of all of a “cognitive apparatus which is

248

Cowan, Five Views on Apologetics, loc. 2448-2460, Kindle.

249

See Introduction.

250

Ibid.

140

functioning properly.”251 To briefly reiterate, for the purpose of making an additional
observation, Plantinga specifically defines this concept of properly functioning as “working the
way it ought to work in producing and sustaining it.”252 This demonstrates that cognition, even
that which is functioning properly, may fall short of warrant. Many people, even while having
their cognition in good working order, can claim to see something which is not really there.
Every human being has probably had such an experience which explains that properly working
cognition, by itself, is not sufficient for true warrant. This is why Plantinga adds the following to
the necessary conditions for warrant: “your faculties must be in good working order, and the
environment must be appropriate for your particular repertoire of epistemic powers. It must be
the environment for which your faculties were designed.”253 For example, the human body is
comprised of organs, all of which have appropriate design, and when functioning as designed,
the body is cognitively demonstrating the warranted belief that these organs are doing as they
were designed to do. However, if one subjects the human body to the freezing temperatures of
the Antarctic, it will not be long before organs are not functioning properly. Is this because they
were not designed properly or is it because they were designed to function properly in an
“environment appropriate for proper function?” Hence, for a belief to have warrant, it must not
only be the result of a sufficient cognition of a mind or consciousness which is functioning
properly, but that mind or consciousness must be in an environment conducive to proper
cognitive function.
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One may continue down this path of rationalization one tedious step at a time. However,
if one fast-forwards to the destination of this exercise on can make a new observation. Having
established that belief is the result of properly functioning cognitive abilities which are
functioning within an environment conducive to that proper function, one comes to the question
of how it is possible for mutation to take place from one species to another. One must recognize
that even natural selection demonstrates a measure of design. Someone or something has given
everything in this universe purpose, a design which determines proper or improper functioning.
Belief is intertwined within the notion that one can recognize what is and is not proper function,
and those things which are functioning properly are doing as they were intended within the
environment conducive to their function. One later recognizes that human beings, including their
capacity for cognition, are “constructed according to a design plan.”254 In other words, one can
claim that a warranted belief requires not only a properly functioning cognition which is at work
within a conducive environment for that working, but that this capacity is the result of how man
is constructed or designed. In other words, warranted belief requires a recognition that man has
the capacity to comprehend his design and the purpose of that design. This understanding allows
the conclusion that those who reject God’s existence, specifically his role in the design and
development of all life, are not functioning properly. God designed man to know him and be
known by him. In short, supernaturalism offers rational purpose for man’s existence while
naturalism offers only the purpose of existence. The warrant for man’s existence comes through
properly functioning cognition, comprehending the purpose of his existence. This warrant for
existence is only feasible through the realization of a divine cause. The result of this exercise is
the realization that belief in the supernatural is more rational than the belief in naturalism. Only
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in supernaturalism does man have purpose for existence, the longing for which is characteristic
of human beings. Naturalism, on the other hand, can only offer the purpose to exist.
At this point, it is necessary to once again return to C. F. H. Henry for some much needed
counsel regarding the very notion that one can prove God’s existence by reason.
Without allowing a higher role to reason, and to revelation in the context of reason, the
countercultural alternative can only take the form of a counter-myth, another pretentious
construct which, as a further transitional episode in the history of man, affirms in its case
the central importance of personal and community values255
Henry’s argument here is that both reason and revelation are necessary if one is going to
effectively comprehend value and need of redemption. This argues the case for supernaturalism.
He insists that one must not suggest that philosophical reasoning alone is the pathway for
proving supernaturalism or the existence of God. Nor is it likely, in spite of the a priori positions
of reformed epistemological and presuppositional apologetic methods, that simply assuming the
existence of God or the inerrancy and authority of the Bible, has persuasive impact on a culture
which increasingly denies the validity of both. If one seeks to impact the world with the message
of the truth about God, one must consider Paul’s example, as demonstrated in 1 Corinthians 15,
wherein he helped people to see the validity of his proclamation by using an argument for the
supernatural event of the resurrection. That is, by appealing to evidence and reason. In that
chapter, Paul appeals to the monumental evidence for the resurrection, an act which demands the
recognition of a supernatural being. He also conveys the theological and philosophical reasoning
behind the event. In other Pauline writings, he is consistently presenting rational explanations for
why divine revelation is the most rational standard for life (see Romans 8:1; 12:1).
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In addition, one could consider Plantinga’s argument mentioned earlier. He posits that
properly functioning cognition, requires that cognition to function in the way in which it was
designed and that this cognition takes place in an environment which allows or encourages its
designed function. While it is true that no amount of cognition of itself results in religious faith
without divine revelation, claiming the fact of God’s existence and thereby claiming the reality
of the supernatural to be a priori is, to those who have not experienced divine revelation,
difficult to grasp. It actually suggests that a lack of recognition or a lack of willingness to
recognize God’s revelation of himself, his purposes and ways, suggests a cognition which is not
functioning properly. To explain this suggestion further, Henry’s great five-volume tome God
Revelation and Authority, demonstrates that God has been revealing and continues to reveal
himself to man out of a desire to know and be known by man. Assuming for a moment that this
is true, only the impaired would refuse to acknowledge that if God’s desire for man is to know
him and be known by him, God would most assuredly have given man the cognitive capacity to
experience him. It is not, therefore, too much of a stretch to claim that God designed man so
that, when functioning properly, as he was designed by the Creator, he experiences God. The
warrant for man’s belief, therefore, is to recognize and trust in the reality that he was designed to
recognize and receive the revelation of God. Both faith and reason or cognition is the means by
which man trusts this fact. When man is functioning as he was designed to function, he will see
and know the truth of God’s existence. Supernaturalism is not anathema to those who have
experienced the supernatural. This seeing and knowing the supernatural is the result of both
reasoning, revelation and belief. To have either without the rest does not bring one into a
comprehension of God. Proper function, therefore, which includes man exercising his intended
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purpose of knowing and being known by the Father, is itself a justification for belief in a
supernatural God.

The Evidence for Miracles
In addition to the philosophical evidence for the supernatural the evidence for the
phenomena known as miracles also adds to the justification of belief in God. The work of Gary
Habermas, in collecting voluminous data which evidentially supports the historicity of the
resurrection, and Craig Keener’s work, providing abundant medical evidence for events
unexplained by laws of nature, gives significant support for the high probability of the existence
of the supernatural. In addition to these luminaries Richard Swinburne, in his work, The Concept
of Miracle, offers his view regarding the nature of the miraculous.
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience
has established these laws. The proof against a miracle from the very nature of the fact, is
as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than
probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air;
that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that those events are
found agreeable to the laws of nature and there is required a violation of these laws, or in
other words, a miracle to prevent them. 256
Though also affirming the existence of the miraculous, C. S. Lewis offers a contrasting view, “If
the laws of Nature are necessary truths, no miracle can break them: but then no miracle needs to
break them. It is with them as with the laws of arithmetic.”257 Lewis then illustrates his view:
If I put six pennies into a drawer on Monday and six more on Tuesday, the laws decree
that— other things being equal— I shall find twelve pennies there on Wednesday. But if
the drawer has been robbed I may in fact find only two. Something will have been broken
(the lock of the drawer or the laws of England) but the laws of arithmetic will not have
been broken.258
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Lewis uses this example to explain that no laws of arithmetic were violated. Instead, an outside
influence, caused unexpected results. The law of arithmetic was not violated. Instead, the result
that law mandates was not the result which occurred. An outside influence changed the results.
Lewis uses this to discourage the view that miracles are a violation of the laws of nature. In the
case of the miraculous, laws of nature remain intact. A miracle occurs when a force outside those
laws influences the conditions making for a different result than what the laws of nature predict.
How do these definitions help explain the resurrection? Is it more feasible to approach the
resurrection with such absolutism towards the laws of nature that no amount of evidence could
justify the claim that they were broken on that day? Or, is it possible that the laws of nature are
themselves subordinate to some supernatural entity? The answer to these questions would require
sufficient evidence that some outside influence, greater than the laws of nature, caused
something to result which is different than the expectation governed by the laws of nature.
Since the naturalist holds that Scriptural evidence for the resurrection is circular
reasoning in that the claim for the resurrection would in effect be the Bible arguing itself, it is
helpful to offer non-biblical or para-biblical evidence denying the miraculous, including that of
the resurrection. As has already been mentioned, evidence has been presented by Craig Keener
and Gary Habermas, which establishes a high probability of the historicity of the resurrection. A
brief review of those who have reviewed the work of Keener and Habermas, support the
respectability of their work among academics. For instance, Michael Kruger of the Reformed
Theological Seminary in Charlotte NC, published the following in Themolios:
Every once in a while a book comes along that is long overdue within the academic
community. Craig Keener’s Miracles is just such a book. Ever since the rise of the
Enlightenment, academic circles have been inculcated with a naturalistic, antisupernatural bias that pervades almost every discipline, from sociology to anthropology
to psychology. And the discipline of biblical studies is no exception to that rule. When it
comes to the miracles contained in the NT accounts, scholars have been chronically
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skeptical of their veracity and credibility. Keener’s work is designed to challenge that
bias. His intent is not to prove the truth of the NT miracles, nor of modern ones, but
simply to show that the accepted predisposition against the possibility of miracles is
intellectually indefensible.259
Gilbert Bilezikian of Wheaton College comments further on the respect Keener within the
academic community:
Craig Keener has won respect within the evangelical precincts of NT scholarship on the
merits of his vast encyclopedic knowledge within his areas of research, his seemingly
inexhaustible command of bibliographic resources, the meticulously conscientious
quality of his scholarly endeavors, the reliability of his exegesis, and the fresh insights he
has brought to several arenas of ongoing discussion. 260
Suffice it to say that Keener is not some peripheral pseudointellectual lunatic emblazoned with a
passion to prove the miraculous. As a seriously respected scholar, he has chronicled massive
evidence to establish the notion that anti-supernatural assumptions about the impossibility of
miracles is simply not defendable.
In regard to the respectability of Habermas’ work, Norman Geisler of Southern
Evangelical Seminary offers a critique of New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics edited by W.
C. Campbell, Jack and Gavin McGrath, and C. Stephen Evans. The critique is in the form of a
book review published in the peer-reviewed Christian Apologetic Journal. In this critique,
Geisler mentions a “striking lack of recognition of some of the top evangelical apologists and
their works. In the article on ‘Jesus Historical’ the crucial work by Gary Habermas is not
mentioned.”261 This lack is mentioned again later in the review as Geisler comments, “The major

Michael J. Kruger, “Review of Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts by Craig S.
Keener,” Themelios: Volume 37, no. 1, (2012), 67.
259

Gilbert Bilezikian, “A Review of Gift Giver: The Holy Spirit for Today. By Craig S. Keener” Journal of
the Evangelical Theological Society 45, no. 3, (2002), 535.
260

Norman Geisler, “A Review of New Dictionary of Christian Apologetic,” Christian Apologetics Journal
6, no. 1, (2007), 125.
261

147

apologetic view called Evidentialism omits references to major proponents of it like John
Montgomery and Gary Habermas when the latter even wrote an article for this Encyclopedia.”262
In these two statements by the academic luminary Norman Geisler, he is critical of the work he is
reviewing because he considers a discussion of Christian evidential apologetics without
mentioning or referring to the work of Gary Habermas to be a striking omission. In another
journal, Daniel Akin263 offers a book review of Jesus Under Fire, edited by Michael Wilkins and
J. P. Moreland. Akin’s favorable review of the work includes another affirmation of the
academic reputation of Gary Habermas.
Gary Habermas of Liberty University addresses the issue, “Did Jesus Perform Miracles?”
He addresses such issues as ancient parallels of other miracle workers, the historicity of
their historicity. Habermas points out the importance that worldview considerations play
in one’s acceptance or denial of the supernatural, and that clearly the JS takes a
naturalistic approach to these kinds of issues. Habermas goes on to point out that unless
one in an a priori manner has ruled out the miraculous, there is no real reason for
rejecting the miracles as they are recorded in Scripture.264
In addition to his recognition of Habermas’ standing among evangelical apologists, Akin also
offers a review of Habermas’ contribution to the work being reviewed. Akin affirms Habermas’
work when he points out that “unless one in an a priori manner has ruled out the miraculous,
there is no real reason for rejecting the miracles as they are recorded in Scripture.” 265
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Scientific Review of Naturalism
In addition to the philosophical and evidential support for supernaturalism, it could be
surprising to some that there is also scientific evidence for supernaturalism. For example,
molecular biologist Michael Denton of Australia, in his 1986 work Evolution: A Theory in
Crisis, cites and responds to a 1959 quote of Thomas Huxley, a renowned naturalist and atheist.
Huxley is quoted as saying, “The first point to make about Darwin’s Theory is that it is no longer
a theory but a fact . . . Darwinianism has come of age so to speak. We are no longer having to
bother about establishing the fact of evolution.”266 In response to this Denton states, “Now of
course such claims are simply nonsense. For Darwin’s model of evolution is still very much a
theory and still very much in doubt when it comes to macro-evolutionary phenomena.”267 To
fully comprehend what Denton is stating, one must comprehend the difference between
microevolution and macroevolution. The first designates an evolution or adaptation within
species which is not challengeable. When insects or birds are forced into different climates, for
whatever reasons, over time birds of the same species will develop different anomalies as will
insects. Evolution within the parameters of each species is common enough to observe and
verify. What has not been observed is the mutation from one species to another species. This is
called macroevolution, and there is little or no evidence to substantiate this phenomenon. It is to
this distinction that Denton is referring. As such, evolution is yet a theory, and it is, as Denton
suggests in the title of his book, in crisis. It is this point to which Denton is referring when he
speaks of there being great doubt when it comes to macro-evolutionary phenomenon.268

266

Michael Denton, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, (Bethesda, MD: Adler and Adler Publishers Inc. 1986),

267

Ibid.

268

Denton, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis. 75.

75.

149

What this implies is not only the great weakness of the argument for naturalism, but it is a
strong support for the claim that there has to be a better explanation. Alister McGrath offers a
real insight into how this better explanation might be found. In responding to Dawkins’ The God
Delusion¸ McGrath and his wife have offered The Dawkins’ Delusion which is a refutation of
Dawkins’ atheistic claims. For this task, McGrath is uniquely qualified as he explains in the
following:
Dawkins and I have thus traveled in totally different directions but for substantially the
same reasons. We are both Oxford academics who love the natural sciences. Both of us
believe passionately in evidence-based thinking and are critical of those who hold
passionate beliefs for inadequate reasons. We would both like to think that we could
change our minds about God if the evidence demanded it. Yet, on the basis of our
experience and analysis of the same world we have reached radically different
conclusions about God. The comparison between us is instructive, yet it raises some
difficult questions for Dawkins.269
As he addresses the claims Dawkins made in God Delusion McGrath states the following in
regard to scientific validation of God and supernaturalism:
The one inescapable and highly improbable fact about the world is that we, as reflective
human beings, are in fact here. Now it is virtually impossible to quantify how improbable
the existence of humanity is. Dawkins himself is clear, especially in Climbing Mount
Improbable, that it is very, very improbable. But we are here. The very fact that we are
puzzling about how we came to be here is dependent on the fact that we are here and are
thus able to reflect on the likelihood of this actuality. Perhaps we need to appreciate that
there are many things that seem improbable—but improbability does not, and never has,
entailed nonexistence. We may be highly improbable—yet, we are here. The issue, then,
is not whether God is probable but whether God is actual.
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In this brilliant observation, McGrath is scientifically and philosophically asserting that since the
highly improbable reality of man’s existence is in fact a reality, it seems ill-advised to question
the probability of God in light of the substantial evidence which has been given for his existence.
One of the more potent scientific examples of the possibility of supernaturalism and the divine is
found in the science of Intelligent Design. In speaking to the matter of Intelligent Design,
Michael Behe offers the following:
There is an elephant in the roomful of scientists who are trying to explain the
development of life. The elephant is labeled “intelligent design.” To a person who does
not feel obliged to restrict his search to unintelligent causes, the straightforward
conclusion is that many biochemical systems were designed. They were designed not by
the laws of nature, not by chance and necessity; rather, they were planned.270
Behe wants his readers to comprehend that scientifically, not theologically, there is an
unavoidable “elephant” which needs to be addressed, and science is simply not addressing it. His
claim could not be simpler nor more direct. All the evidence he has gained as a molecular
biologist and all the evidence from others in similar fields establish the fact that there was a
Master Designer at work in the development of biological life. The intricacies that demonstrate
this principle are largely microscopic hence Darwin could not have known. However, the
evidence has been there and only recently discovered.
Could one claim that philosophical arguments, historical evidence and scientific
investigations stand together as proof of God’s existence? To do so would be a mistake. What it
does demonstrate is the probability that something heretofore considered improbable by
scientists, is now probable and that life was designed by someone or something which is vastly
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intelligent and powerful. Few things could be more appropriate here than to quote Antony Flew
as he gives the reason for his conversion from atheism to theism:
Why do I believe this, given that I expounded and defended atheism for more than a half
century? The short answer is this: this is the world picture, as I see it, that has emerged
from modern science. Science spotlights three dimensions of nature that point to God.
The first is the fact that nature obeys laws. The second is the dimension of life, of
intelligently organized and purpose-driven beings, which arose from matter. The third is
the very existence of nature. But it is not science alone that has guided me. I have also
been helped by a renewed study of the classical philosophical arguments.271
It is fascinating to see Flew’s three-point reasoning for his change of heart. He lists three
scientific reasons: 1. Nature obeys laws, 2. Intelligent Design, and 3. The very existence of
nature. Secondly he lists classical philosophical arguments. It should be noticed that these are
the precise arguments as the one being proposed by this study.
The result of these revelations is the obvious conclusion that if one is not committed to an
a priori excluding the possibility of supernaturalism, it is possible if not likely, that a divine
cause is responsible for the design found in nature. This design includes the capacity for man’s
apprehension of aesthetics. Likewise, miracles can be best understood as the result of
supernatural forces invading and interrupting natural processes. The philosophical possibility of
God’s existence is not only a true possibility, but God’s existence is a better explanation for
these anomalies than the natural explanations mentioned previously. Yet, before ending this
discussion there is one more source of evidence which should be considered. If, as has been
demonstrated, supernaturalism or a divine cause is a better explanation than a natural cause for
man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value, then it is only reasonable to consider the teachings
of Scripture.
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Summary of the Supernatural Explanation
Two questions are vital in determining the validity of the supernatural explanation for
man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. First, has it made a sufficient explanation so that its
message is a sufficient explanation? Second, has it excelled the naturalistic explanation in
meeting the criterion presented above? The answers to these questions are critical to the success
or failure of this study’s thesis. Each of these will be considered below.

The Explanation Question
In accord with Walton’s description of explanation cited earlier, in order for explanation
to be sufficient, one who knows more about a particular subject must communicate that
knowledge in such a way that the one to whom the information is directed has opportunity to
gain the same understanding. Explanation is clearly communicating information from one party
to another so that the second party has equal understanding of the information as that possessed
by the first party. This does not require the second party to agree, but it does require that the
second party sufficiently understand the purpose or claims of the first party. With this standard in
mind, one must ask if the supernatural explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value presented is sufficient to qualify as an explanation. It is obvious that the answer to the
question is affirmative. Because a supernatural God exists and He desires man to know Him, it is
reasonable to believe that He, as the Supernatural One created nature, including man.
Specifically, he created man according to a design which intends for man to seek and know God.
Apart from believing the supernatural does not exist, this explanation is far more sufficient as an
explanation than that which is offered by either of the naturalistic explanations mentioned above.
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Applying the Criterion
To argue that supernatural causation is the best explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value further requires an assurance of the existence of the supernatural in
light of naturalism’s claim to the contrary. Sufficient evidence has been set forth to reject the
naturalistic claim. By demonstrating philosophically, evidentially, and scientifically the claims of
anti-theism are weak, one is then able to allow for the existence of the supernatural. The next
question is whether or not the explanation is better than naturalism’s explanation thereby making
it the best explanation. For this evaluation, the supernatural explanation is reviewed under the
same criterion to which the naturalist views were submitted.

The Need for Clarity
The need for a clearly stated explanation has been presented. The explanation is of the
second premise of the argument being presented. “The best explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value is divine causation.” Naturalists have negated this premise sighting
either the classical argument for Darwinian naturalism or their newer idea based on the
Darwinian model, psychological evolution. The supernatural position has used philosophy,
evidence, and science to refute those explanations. Hence, both the natural and the supernatural
views are expressed clearly. But the clarity of the supernatural explanation exceeds the clarity of
the naturalistic explanation. This is realized when one regards the fact that clarity must include
sufficient explanation. Both naturalistic explanations for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value are clear. Yet neither present sufficient explanation in light of the obvious rejection of
those who are scientists.

154

The Need for Consistency
There are two things which must be considered when using this element of the criterion.
First, is the question of whether or not the explanation is consistent with known facts. Second, is
the question of whether or not the explanation is logically consistent in that it logically flows
from one point to the next. It has been demonstrated that the naturalist explanation struggles in
this regard as many of their claims do not correspond with facts that actually exist. Their claim is
based on vital facts which are yet forthcoming. The supernatural explanation, on the other hand,
based on the assumption of God’s existence is very consistent. God, as supernatural creator of all
that is, uniquely designed man to have the capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. In regard to the
need for consistency with the facts presented, the supernatural explanation has advantage over
the naturalistic explanation.

The Need for Cogency
In the criterion above, the concept of cogency has to do with its being persuasive or
convincing. That the supernatural explanation excels in this element of the criterion can be
demonstrated in several ways. First, as has been demonstrated, it aligns more consistently with
the facts and is thus is more cogent. Second, the supernatural explanation has been enough to see
such atheistic scholars like Antony Flew, who rejected fifty years of defending atheism to admit
the existence of God, to Alister McGrath, who began as an atheist in Oxford, only to see the
cogency of the argument for God, ultimately becoming a Christian apologist today. Thirdly,
there are many scholars who deny the dogma of Richard Dawkins, even those who are professed
atheists. These facts make for a significant claim that the supernatural explanation for man’s
capacity to apprehend aesthetic value has more cogency than that of the naturalist explanation.
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In addition to the arguments for supernaturalism presented by these brilliant men, the
facts, data and multiple arguments which affirm it demonstrate the superior cogency of
supernaturalism over naturalism. From the eyewitness accounts of Scripture to the volumes of
evidence presented in the work of Keener and Habermas, the cogency of supernaturalism is
superior. From the writings of Augustine, Anselm, Edwards, Lewis, Plantinga and Craig, and
many others, there is powerful argumentation for the cogency of supernaturalism. Thus, the
supernatural explanation seems to demonstrate superior cogency over that of the naturalist
explanation.

The Need for Conclusiveness
According to the criterion stated above, the need for conclusiveness refers to the
expectation that the explanation being reviewed is not vulnerable to honest refutation. Clearly, if
an explanation is able to be sufficiently refuted, it is not a sufficient explanation. One has to
consider the endurance supernaturalism has displayed against the arguments of naturalists since
Darwin’s publication of Origin of the Species in 1859. Since Plato, supernaturalism has been
accepted and continues to be accepted as a viable reality. Philosophers have consistently called
supernaturalism into question, especially since the Enlightenment. Yet, while science struggles
with the inexplicable inconsistencies of Darwinian naturalism, theists have consistently and
vocally defended the rational, reasonable and powerful arguments for supernaturalism and the
divine. From Anselm to Plantinga, Augustine to Craig and Habermas, there has been a consistent
argument for a supernatural God. Some might say it is overwhelming, but it is, at the very least,
worthy of consideration. On the other hand, the case for naturalism which once seemed to be a
house to stand forever, has seen its foundations begin to crumble. It has been demonstrated, as
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even those sympathetic to atheism find, that naturalism is unsustainable. Hence, supernaturalism
seems to have superior conclusiveness over naturalism.

Concluding Thoughts Regarding the Second Premise
It would seem that the second premise of the proposed aesthetic argument passes the test
as the best of those offered. It is because naturalism has been demonstrated to be inadequate for
withstanding the scrutiny of those willing to ask the needed questions. Clearly, not all things
popular are correct or valid. Popularity does not make a position valid. In a society which holds
such value on how one feels about something, it is needful to remember that feelings and truth
are two different things. Just because one feels like naturalism should be the correct path to
follow, does not mean it is the correct path to follow. As has been presented in this chapter,
naturalism is not the best explanation for man’s existence and is thereby not the best explanation
for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. Supernatural, Divine causation has been shown
to be the best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value and this demonstration
validates the second premise of the aesthetic argument.
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Chapter 4
The Conclusion and Its Justification
Having established the validity of the first and second premise, it remains only to
acknowledge that the two validated premises result in a valid conclusion. The argument stands as
valid. God’s existence best explains man’s ability to apprehend beauty. God who is both divine
and supernatural in his nature is the best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value. This realization is due to the fact that it is the best explanation of those known
explanations. Theism is the best explanation for the existence of the universe and all that is
within it. This conclusion is justifiably based on the information in the previous chapters.

Why This Argument Matters
A resulting question to consider has to do with why this effort was ever attempted in the
first place. Does it matter that theism can be validated by an aesthetic argument? Does it matter
that one can argue for the existence of God? This apologetic question deserves particular
consideration. As is obvious, apologetics is the focus, the primary discipline of this study.
Remembering that not all theologians see the priority of apologetics (see introduction), there are
those who identify themselves as scholars who would claim apologetics as not necessary,
believing faith alone is sufficient. These would be called irrational fideists. According to
Kenneth Boa and Robert M. Bowman Jr, in their tome Faith Has Its Reasons, such a fideist is
someone who argues that “the truth of faith cannot and should not be justified rationally.” 272
Boa recognizes that there have been distinctions drawn between rational and irrational
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fideism.273 The description he gives of irrational type ascribes an unwillingness to consider
apologetic questions with any other answer than “just believe.”274 Yet, there are fideists, whom
Boa describes as rational, who would simply state that “the truths of faith cannot and should not
be justified rationally.”275
On the other side of the theistic spectrum are those who hold reason and rationality as
essentials for the Christian faith. Boa describes this view as Classical Apologetics.276
Fortunately, at present, it is the prominent view of Christianity that orthodoxy is the best
defended with a combination of both faith and reason.277 Those whom Boa identifies as utilizing
this approach range from Anselm to B. B. Warfield to the contemporary Craig.278 It is only
proper to note that those who promote a faith which works in conjunction with reason do not
negate the need for logic. Craig makes a significant effort in his work Reasonable Faith to
demonstrate a compatible relationship between reason and faith.279 Yet, he too recognizes that
too often students lean toward the “extremes of fideism or theological rationalism.”280
The point of these observations is that there are several approaches to apologetics and not
all of them are effective even within the Christian community. This is the background upon
which it is just to produce an apologetic work such as this study. There are actually several
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reasons which justify this effort. First, as has been mentioned, the general populace is deeply
entrenched in the error and misguidance of Darwinian naturalists who deny supernaturalism.
While many of the populace still believe in the idea of God, particularly the idea of Jesus Christ,
the acceptance of these ideas is declining generation by generation. The popularity of Richard
Dawkins and others like him is due not to his philosophical expertise but to his appeal as a rebel
against the establishment of religion. McGrath queries as to how “a gifted popularizer of the
natural sciences, who once had such a passionate concern for the objective analysis of evidence,
[could] turn into such an aggressive anti-religious propagandist with an apparent disregard for
evidence which was not favorable to his case.” 281 Dawkins is an iconic figure among naturalists
today. It can be assumed that a study such as this one will not be received well by the present
secular society so dominated by naturalistic thought. Neither will it be received enthusiastically
by those religious thinkers who do not see the need for logic’s defense of faith. To both
naturalists and irrational fideists, religion and science should not mix, and religion and
philosophy contradict each other. To justify the effort inherent to this study, in light of these
circumstances, the following explanations are given. It is hoped these explanations will not only
justify the effort but will demonstrate the need for additional effort.

To Affirm and Defend the Role of Apologetics
It is disturbing to realize that there are academics who seem to view apologetics as some
kind of benevolent tumor sucking the attention of students away from the more needed
objectives like prioritizing evangelism and missions. With all due respect to vital theological and
missional areas of study, if students do not realize the need to verbalize why they believe what
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they believe and why it is more rational to believe the Word of God than not, they are simply not
relating to the mindset of this post-Christian society.282 There may have been a time, in the not
too distant past, where a higher regard for Scripture was held in Western culture. Since that time,
as shall be demonstrated, that luxury is no longer the case. Assuming people once generally
accepted the truths of Scripture would have been acceptable. Reports indicate however, that day
is surely passing if not already passed. George Barna, for example, regularly polls the populace
regarding their shifts in religious opinions. His research demonstrates that 52% of American
society now believes Jesus was not sinless and that he committed sins while here on earth.283 In
addition, fewer than half of those millennials (late teens to 25 years of age) surveyed stated that
they had made some kind of commitment to following Jesus Christ. This compares to 71% of
Elders (those over 65 years of age), 65% of Boomers (40-65 years of age), and 59% of
Generation Xers (25-40 years of age).284 This demonstrates a slow but steady decline in the
acceptance of Christian ideals from one generation to the next. In response to this decline, it is
possible that the time has come for some of the truths of this study to be revealed so that the
coming generation might understand that something which is popular is no assurance that it is
correct.
It would seem obvious that one of the motivators for this decline of interest in the things
of God is due, at least in part, to the indoctrination students are receiving as implied by the
National Association of Biology Teachers mentioned earlier. These organizations’ governing
documents establish themselves to be opposed to anything which contradicts Darwinian
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naturalism.285 Such a presupposition strongly implies there no need to consider God as Creator or
anything else, as he had no role in the development of the universe. They hold that all which
exists is has come about by a process known as natural selection. When suggesting a query as to
why this study matters, one might be driven by the view that the whole notion of creation versus
evolution is an old problem which doesn’t have any real relevance anymore. Stuart Hackett
offers strong counsel for such intellectual laziness:
Unless we are prepared to surrender the validity of our highest ideals of knowledge,
beauty, and morality, we must posit, beyond the nonrational origins which determine
belief, a guiding intelligence, a “Supreme Reason” in whom we must thus believe, if we
are to believe in anything. The choice then must be determined on valuation grounds:
either we believe in God, or the whole structure or all our beliefs sinks to nonrational
dimensions.286
Based on Hackett’s statement, the naturalism presupposition is not only in error, it is potentially
dangerous. Such revelations provide a strong justification for this study which in essence
contrasts the error of naturalism with justified belief in theism. In addressing these concerns,
there is justification to provide this information and more to coming generations so as to enable
them to make more well-informed choices concerning their purpose for existence and the design
of all that exists. It is both personally and eternally risky to believe there is no God or that there
is no accountability to a Designer who gave each person a purpose, design, and function.
Addressing these concerns is one of the roles of Christian apologetics, and as such the effort to
develop this study is defendable and justified. Secondly, it is not only those who do not have
faith who need this awareness. Those who do have faith need to be equipped with this awareness
not only for their own personal growth in faith but so that more believers are made able and
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available to help non-believers in knowing the truth. Thus, from the standpoint of meeting these
needs, the goals of this project are justified.

To Affirm and Append Classical Apologetics
Further justification for this study begins with the observation that there are several good
apologetic methodologies presently available. That is, there are several effective methods
available to accomplish apologetic goals. Some might be considered stronger than others,
depending on one’s theological sensitivities, but several are identified as effective.287 One of
those methods is the classical apologetic method. This method is identified by its primary use of
theistic arguments ranging from Anselm to present day. As noted earlier, while he was an atheist,
Antony Flew compared these several theistic arguments to “leaky buckets.” Boa quotes his exact
statement, “If one leaky bucket will not hold water there is no reason to think that ten can.” 288
Richard Swinburne responded to this critique by noting that it is possible to jam 10 leaky buckets
together in such a way that the holes do not line up, thus allowing the jammed buckets to hold
water.289 This leaky bucket exchange between Flew and Swinburne has been referenced in
demonstrating the philosophical support of premise 2 found in Chapter 3. It is this cumulative
potential, demonstrated in the exchange between Flew and Swinburne, which strengthens the
already formidable theistic arguments. The additional justification for this study is demonstrated
by the fact that not only does the cumulative use of theistic argument strengthen their potential
but adding another theistic argument and using all of them cumulatively strengthens classical
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apologetic methodology even more. By formalizing aesthetic apprehension into a theistic
argument strengthening classical apologetics is possible.
It is important to note, as Boa properly points out, that classical apologetics, particularly
the theistic arguments, are most effective when their limitations are properly understood. It has
already been made clear that theistic arguments are not intended to provide a proof of God’s
existence but to offer a justifiable belief in His existence. Theistic arguments provide an
opportunity to engage non-believers where they are. That is to say, the great strengths of theistic
arguments is that they “affirms the applicability of reason.”290 In other words, this method
“emphasizes the inescapable character of logic and reason.”291 Stuart C. Hackett,292 defends that
assertion, “[T]he Christian faith should be defended in terms of criteria which center in rational
objectivity as the norm of truth and evaluation.”293 The aesthetic theistic argument identifies with
and strengthens classical apologetic methodology because it also defends theism using rational
objectivity as the norm of truth and evaluation.
Another justification for this study is that it engages in the “unavoidable role of
worldviews.”294 As Christianity is more and more challenged by the differing cultures and
worldviews, it is important to have every possible tool for openly and honestly engaging in those
worldviews using language and processes that are universally logical and rational. Again, this
can only be successful when the goal is to assert the justifiable belief in God’s existence. The
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next step toward faith can only be made by the individual under the leading of God’s Holy Spirit
using the revelation of Scripture (Rom. 10:17).
The justification of this project is due in part, to its strengthening of classical
methodology by appending it with an additional argument. One of the reasons for using
abductive reasoning is that its use seeks the best argument for man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value. This seeking of the best explanation allows the door to remain open for other
views but requires that those other views demonstrate how or why they are a better explanation
for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. To this end, the justification of this study
includes the realization that the aesthetic theistic argument not only appends the present theistic
arguments, but by itself, offers strong justification for the belief in God’s existence.
To Contribute to the Argument for Theism’s Cogency
As defined in the previous chapter, cogency has to do with being forceful, convincing, or
persuasive. Conceding the cogency of the other theistic arguments, justification for this study
includes not only support for theistic arguments generally, but specifically, it strengthens to
cogency of all. Since theism among the populace today is reducing in popularity, it is necessary
to call on all available resources which demonstrate the superior cogency of theism. While some
object to this idea because of their belief that all that is needed is faith, stronger persuasion of the
masses is more likely by using rational reasons to encourage their receptivity to the biblical
message, beyond the notion that the Bible says so. Hackett clarifies this assertion, “The Christian
worldview both needs and embodies a thoroughgoing, rational apologetic as a manifestation of
its relevance to the contemporary mind, together with the companion conviction that no existent
system of Christian apology adequately meets this need.” 295 An apparent undercurrent in what

295

Hackett, The Resurrection of Theism, 7.

165

motivates Hackett is a clear passionate desire to persuade his readers of the need for a Christian
worldview which is able to withstand honest, but intense rational scrutiny. One might conclude
that he assumes that any truth worthy of faith is worthy of a such a cogent defense. This study is
further justified as it has demonstrated that passion for cogency in the presentation of the
aesthetic theistic argument.
To Offer Another Argument for God’s Existence
One more justification for this study is its obvious intent simply to offer another strong
argument for God’s existence. Once the claim that the capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is
common among all human cultures, the inevitable question surfaces as to the origin of that
capacity to apprehend. Previous philosophical approaches to the matter of aesthetics is limited to
identifying the nature of aesthetics and the theological potential of such studies. The resulting
quagmire of differing opinions is yet to offer the theistic impact desired. Clearly, the beauty of
God, the Glory of God, the wonder of creation, and even the beauty of the prophetic and
theological synthesis which is apparent in Scripture should be a project for present and future
consideration. However, the omnicultural capacity of man to apprehend aesthetic value, and the
theistic implications of that common apprehension, is a potential no longer waiting to be
reviewed. This study is justified in offering a theistic argument based on the notion that the best
explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value is divine causation. Belief in God’s
existence is further justified by this argument. The very uniqueness of humanity’s capacity to
apprehend truth, goodness, and beauty is best explained by divine causation. The effort
demonstrated in executing and presenting this study is, therefore, adequately justified.
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Summary of Why the Argument Matters
The conclusion resulting from the two premises of the aesthetic theistic argument is that
God exists. That is, the non-existence of God is implausible. God’s existence is the best
explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. The justification for this study has
been made by making the following observations. First, the study is justified because it affirms
and defends the role of apologetics. Both among those who profess a Christian worldview and
those who do not have verbalized doubts regarding the role of apologetics. Part of the
justification of this project, i.e. why it matters, is that it addresses these concerns and affirms and
appends the role of apologetics within Christian theology.
Second, the justification for this project has been affirmed by its role in appending and
affirming the effectiveness of the Classical methodology of apologetics. Offering the
verbalization of an additional theistic argument does not negate the other arguments but lends
further strengthening to the whole. Doubtlessly, weaknesses will be proposed regarding the
aesthetic theistic argument. Yet, in addition to responsible defense of each individual argument
against such claims, consideration of the cumulative strength of all theistic arguments offers
significant resistance to these individual claims of weakness. Adding to that cumulative
approach another theistic argument offers even greater potential for logistic strength. This
potential for strengthening the cumulative impact offers further justification for this study.
Third, it has been demonstrated that the study offers a contribution to the cogency of the
arguments for theism. Affirming the present strength of a justified belief in theism in the present
theistic arguments is substantiated. This study demonstrates augmentation to the cogency of
theism. This is particularly the case in regard to the ongoing theism versus atheism debate
motivated by the present neo-Darwinian naturalism yet existing in several academic circles. In
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light of the general affirmation of academia’s tendencies toward naturalism, this study’s cogent
denial of the validity of naturalism helps to justify the need of this study and others like it.
Finally, the study simply offers a rational argument for the existence of God. Never
meaning to suggest that belief in God is the result of anything other than by God’s grace through
faith, it is nonetheless true, especially in the present post-Christian culture, that being able to
verbalize a rational argument for God’s existence is helpful in encouraging people to see their
need to reach out in faith. For these reasons, this project is considered justified.
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Conclusion
This study has dealt with many academic disciplines in its effort to present an aesthetic
theist argument. This multi-disciplined study is necessary due to the nature of the topic and the
desire for a sufficient precision of thought. The thesis of this study is based on the notion that all
human cultures demonstrate a capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. Upon that basis, a proposed
theistic argument was presented and defended. This theistic argument has two premises and a
conclusion:
(P1) Every human culture demonstrates a capacity to apprehend aesthetic value
(P2) The best explanation for this capacity is supernatural causation.
(C) God existence is the supernatural cause of man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic
value
As has been noted, the form in which this argument is presented is abductive reasoning. Hence,
the thesis of this study, God’s existence, can be rationally justified through the abductive
reasoning used in presenting this argument. As with the case of other forms of logical reference,
when premises are stated, resulting in a claim, all those premises must be true in order for the
claim to be valid. This need dictated much of the content of this study. The premises have been
validated and the conclusion stands as sound.
Since the need for identifying and justifying the use of abductive inference was obvious,
the first chapter focused on that task. Relying heavily on Douglas Walton, this chapter identified
three prominent forms of logical inference, deductive, inductive, and abductive, offering a
review of the strengths and weaknesses of each. The chapter concluded that abductive form of
inference was the most suited form in which to present the aesthetic theistic argument.
The second chapter sought to affirm the validity of the first premise. Since the premise
centers on the terminology apprehending aesthetic value this chapter identified and clarified that
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terminology. Through the use of multiple sources, apprehending was discovered to represent the
value of seizing, becoming aware of, or understanding the meaning of some concept or thought.
Four features were presented as being necessary for apprehension to take place: cognition,
experience, choice, and sentience. These features were each identified, explained, and justified as
sufficiently necessary to the process of apprehension. In addition, different categories of
apprehension were identified and defined. The four categories were: objective, intra-subjective,
associative, and character. The meaning of apprehension was established.
The second focus of the second chapter was toward ascertaining the concept of aesthetic
value. Since the locution aesthetic value describes all human cultures are able to apprehend, it is
necessary to identify what is represented by the term. The study revealed aesthetic value to be
very difficult to identify with precision. Several definitions, theories, and philosophical views
were identified and discussed. A proposed definition of aesthetic value rose from an attempt to
formalize the many views into a sense of unity. The proposed definition consisted of three
potential views of attaining aesthetic value: the formal theory, the emotional or psychological
theory, and the relational view. Each of these theories was identified and discussed. The chapter
ended with a rigorous discussion of the premise’s conclusion that attaining aesthetic value was
actually common to all known cultures. This claim was validated by considering the historical,
philosophical and theological evidence for the claim. Upon the consideration of the presentation
of chapter 2, the first premise was validated.
The goal of the third chapter is to validate the second premise. Since this is the central
premise of the argument and the feasibility of the argument rested significantly on whether or not
this premise could be validated, significant attention was focused toward attaining that objective.
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Inherent to that effort was to recognize that this premise required a review and comparison of the
claims of naturalism and supernaturalism.
Since abductive reasoning requires the identity of the best explanation, attention was
directed toward specifically identifying the meaning of the concept of “explanations.” Returning
to the writings of Walton et.al. for insight into the concept of explanation, the chapter established
that not much had been done to formally recognize this concept within the scope of logical
argumentation. Walton’s recognition of this deficiency resulted in his offering a formalized
definition of “explanation.” This definition was used for this study. In essence, a model for
explanation requires a minimum of two people, wherein one has information or understanding
which the other does not. Communicating the content of that information in such a way that the
second person is able to receive or understand the same information was identified as an
explanation.
After demonstrating this model for explanation it was then necessary to establish a
criterion whereby it could be determined which explanation was best. This criterion had four
elements within it: the need for clarity, the need for consistency, the need for cogency, and the
need for conclusiveness. Each of these elements of the criterion were also identified and
explained.
The focus of the discussion was then turned to three explanations which had been
identified as all known explanations for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. It was at
this point that the study became focused on the theism/atheism debate which has formally
occupied philosophers and theologians since the Enlightenment. This discussion, however, was
more particularly focused on the naturalism versus supernaturalism facet of the debate which
rose to prominence after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859.
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The first explanation to be discussed was labeled the classical naturalistic explanation.
This view holds that all of life began as “stuff” and that this “stuff” has evolved over the billions
and billions of years into life as it is presently known. Several weaknesses of this explanation
were identified as it was reviewed through the spectrum of Walton’s formal definition of
explanation and the criterion previously mentioned. The second explanation to be reviewed was
labeled evolutionary psychology. This view is an extension of the previous view and is
admittedly built upon the Darwinian natural selection model. This view assumes that just as the
stuff which resulted in the development of biological complexities known today, so this same
stuff eventually developed mind which itself is the result of psychological mechanisms which
themselves evolve in the same manner as do biological mechanisms. Using the same standards as
those used to evaluate the classical naturalistic explanation were used to evaluate the
evolutionary psychology explanation. Several weaknesses were identified within this second
proposed naturalistic explanation as well. The criterion identified significant weaknesses in these
two explanations.
The supernatural explanation was then similarly reviewed. This explanation was also
labeled the theistic model. Before dealing with the specific question, an argument for
supernaturalism was presented. This was accomplished with a three-fold argumentation: the
philosophical support, the evidence for miracles, and the scientific support for supernaturalism.
These three elements of support for supernaturalism also identified divine causation as an
explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend aesthetic value. The supernatural explanation was
then subjected to the same criterion as that of the naturalistic explanation. The results made it
clear that a supernatural, divine causation, (God) was the best explanation for man’s capacity to
apprehend aesthetic value.
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The fourth chapter briefly recognized that with the two premises having been validated,
the resulting claim was also valid. Hence, best explanation for man’s capacity to apprehend
aesthetic value is God’s existence. At that point, the thesis was validated.
In addition to this brief summary of results of the study, the fourth chapter also affirms
the justification of effort given to execute this study. Specifically, the question of what benefit
there might be to the completion of the study. Several reasons were given. Among these were: to
affirm and defend the role of apologetics, to affirm and append the classical method of
apologetics, to contribute to the perceived cogency of theism, and to offer another argument for
God’s existence. The parameters and goals of the study, including both its thesis and its
justification as set out in the introduction of the paper, have been accomplished.
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Appendix 1
Theistic Arguments

Since the aesthetic theistic argument is designed to append and strengthen present theistic
arguments, a presentation of the more popular forms of theistic arguments is appropriate. Louis
Berkhof identifies several “So-Called Rational Proofs for the Existence of God.”296 He describes
these arguments reverently, “They are important as interpretations of God’s general revelation
and as exhibiting the reasonableness of belief in a divine Being.”297 According to Berkhof, the
most popular among these are the Ontological, Cosmological, Teleological and Moral
Arguments.298 A brief description of each of these provides a helpful background for the study as
well as identifying the locus of the Aesthetic Argument presented by this study.

Ontological Argument
Though Berkhof mentions Descartes, Samuel Clarke and Hegel as proponents of this
argument, he recognizes Anselm as the originator of it. Anselm states the view, “We have in
ourselves the idea of an absolutely perfect being. Now, perfection implies existence. Hence, God
exists.”299 A formal view of the argument is as follows:
(P1) A being whose non-existence is inconceivable is greater than a being whose nonexistence is conceivable
(P2) God is the greatest conceivable being
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(C) God’s non-existence is inconceivable: God exists.
One must remember that while theistic arguments offer meaningful justification for belief in
God, they do not prove the existence of the Christian God of the Scriptures. Clearly, evidence for
the innate idea of such perfection may imply many things. Additionally, there is some distance
left to go before one can use this argument to justify belief in the Christian truth claims.300 In
spite of this, this theistic argument is a very sound justification for belief in God’s existence.

Cosmological Argument
The Cosmological Argument has “appeared in several forms.”301 Yet, in general, they
each imply that everything which exists has a cause. The universe exists, therefore it has a cause.
The weakness of this particular brand of the Cosmological Argument is found in recognizing that
if all things have a cause, then God’s existence must have a cause and that would call into
question the biblical claim of His eternality.302 A more appropriate and justified form of the
cosmological argument is the Kalam Cosmological Argument popularized by Craig.303 Craig
cites this form of the cosmological argument as follows:
(P1) That which begins to exist has a cause
(P2) The universe began to exist
(C) The existence of the universe must be due to a cause. (God is implied as this cause)

Lewis Sperry Chafer, “Theology Proper,” Bibliotheca Sacra 95 (1938): 267ff. In this article Chafer
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Craig summarizes, “That which begins to exist has a cause. The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the existence of the universe has a cause.304 By adding the term begins the Kalam
version of the cosmological argument avoids the need to address the thorny question of the cause
of God’s eternality. He has always existed and as such has no beginning. Craig uses this
argument effectively to validate the justification for believing the cause of all, which began to
exist, is God.

Teleological Argument
Berkhof reveals that Immanuel Kant saw this argument as superior to the previous two.
Yet, Kant did not believe it proved the existence of God nor a Creator, but “only a great architect
who fashioned the world.” 305 Berkhof verbalized this argument in the following way, “The
world everywhere reveals intelligence, order, harmony, and purpose.” .306 Using this observation
he claims it to imply the existence of an intelligent and purposeful being capable of producing
such a world. Yet, in spite of his affirmation, Kant points out that this argument does not prove
the existence of God nor does it prove a Creator. All it argues is that a great architect fashioned
the world.307
A contemporary theistic demonstration of this argument can be found in the Intelligent
Design movement which has been promoted by such academic luminaries as Michael Behe,308
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Philip E. Johnson,309 Michael Denton,310 and William Dembski311. These men argue that because
there is so much evidence of design in the universe, there must be a designer. Behe was
previously quoted in his remark that among naturalists, Intelligent Design is “the great elephant
in the room.”312 By this he seems to imply that scientists’ avoidance of the issue is quite obvious.
Yet, the presence of design offers a strong basis for justifying belief in a divine
Creator/Designer.

Moral Argument
Developed from the thoughts of C. S. Lewis and others, and reflected in the excellent
works Good God and God and Cosmos, by David Baggett and Jerry Walls,313 the moral
argument has been recognized as another significant theistic argument. Together, these authors
establish the notion that morality of some kind is a properly basic notion. They cite such
evidence as “No culture believes it appropriate to torture children for fun,” establishes this
premise.314 From this notion, they proceed to argue theism as the best explanation for this
universal morality. They discuss some of the many alternatives proposed by both naturalists and
theists, but Walls and Baggett demonstrate that the best answer for universal morality is its
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divine origin. 315 This argument, like the other theistic arguments, does not settle the matter of
theism completely, but it does adequately argue that the best answer for the origin of morality is
God.
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Appendix 2
Apologetic Methodologies

Since it is appropriate to know why Christians believe what they believe, it would be
helpful to identify and comprehend certain methods for attaining this goal. A recent work which
supplies this need is a published series of discussions and counter discussions between five noted
apologists and theologians. The editor of the work is Stephen B. Cowan entitled, simply enough,
Five Views of Apologetics.316 The five contributors are William Lane Craig, Gary R. Habermas,
Paul Feinberg, John Frame and Kelly James Clark. Craig presents his argument for the Classical
Method of apologetics. Habermas presents his evidential methodology. Feinberg presents an
approach which he defines as Cumulative Case. Frame offers the Presuppositional Method and
Clark presents what he describes as Reformed Epistemology. A brief description of each of these
methods provides a helpful overview of apologetic methodology.

Classical Apologetic Methodology
The Classical Apologetic Methodology as presented by Craig,317 is largely a
philosophical approach. The theistic arguments associated with this method identifies it as such.
A brief overview of some of the more popular of these arguments will demonstrate this. They are
the ontological argument, the teleological argument, the cosmological argument, and the moral
argument. The aesthetic argument being proposed adds to this particular list.
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Evidential Apologetic Methodology
The Evidential Apologetic Methodology, presented by Gary Habermas,318 is also
effective and bears a great resemblance to the arguments for the resurrection used by Paul in 1
Cor. 15. Therein Paul lists eyewitnesses or groups of eyewitnesses to the resurrected Christ. In
essence, this method seeks out and presents evidence for validating the biblical and
Christological claims of Christianity. Examples of this method would include the way
archaeology and historical evidence demonstrate significant probability for Christian truth
claims. These offer rational justification for belief in those truth claims. Interestingly, in Five
Views, Cowan states Habermas to believe that anyone who “grants that miracles can be used to
prove God’s existence is an evidentialist.”319 This observation sometimes results in a potential
clouding of the distinction between examples of classical and evidential methodology used by
Craig and Habermas. This contributes to the belief that while the classical and evidential
methodologies could be the strongest of the five, a clear distinction between the two may not
always be possible.

Cumulative Case Apologetic Methodology
The Cumulative Case Apologetic Methodology is somewhat difficult to define briefly as
it seems to be more a collection or drafting of several apologetic methods together with other
relevant evidence, depending on which combination might best suit the particular discussion. A
proposed justification for this methodology is presented by Joseph Wooddell who explains the
value of the cumulative case by pointing to an encounter Antony Flew had with Basil Mitchell.
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In that encounter, Flew is said to have equated this approach to that of using ten leaky buckets
with the expectation of holding water.320 Feinberg, in his contribution to the Cowan work,321
agrees with Mitchell’s response that such buckets could hold water if they were jammed together
in such a way that the holes did not line up.322 While this is a reasonable assertion by Mitchell
and Feinberg and deserves significant consideration, it suggests the idea that this methodology is
more a combination of other methods, rather than offering a unique individual methodology. The
limitation of space and purpose of this project prohibits commenting on this methodology
further. However, it should be noted that Craig’s response to this method seems
uncharacteristically critical. This raises some concern.323 Yet, it is clear that Feinberg brings
some significant thoughts to the table in Cowan’s work. However, a general consensus could
suggest that the cumulative case method for apologetics needs further consideration.

The Presuppositional Apologetic Methodology
The Presuppositional Apologetic Methodology presented by John Frame324 is built upon
the presupposition that the Bible, in its original autographs, is God’s Word, inspired and
inerrant.325 From that presupposition, Frame argues all apologetics should be by, and through,
the Bible. Since the Bible’s accuracy and authority is the foundation upon which all apologetics
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should be based, according to Frame, that which appeals to philosophical reasoning, formal
argumentation or historical evidence is unnecessary or of secondary consequence at best.
While the position of this study both affirms and supports an inerrant view of Scriptures,
one must recognize that the naturalist rejects anything which is called “supernatural.”326
Subsequently, if the goal of apologetics is to persuade non-theists to accept the notion that belief
in God is justifiable, and the naturalist does not accept the Scripture’s inerrancy as a properly
basic notion, as does Frame, the naturalist will perceive this methodology as circular or
inadequate in its reasoning. He would claim that this presupposition about the Bible is using the
object of the debate as a means to justify itself. Stated in these terms, one must confess there is a
circular nature to this reasoning. For the naturalist, this circular reasoning is clearly problematic.
While there is much for presuppositional apologetics to contribute to those who are already
theists, it is suggested that as an apologetic methodology, when used to confront naturalism, has
limitations.

Reformed Epistemology Apologetics Method
A similar observation can be made regarding Reformed Epistemology Apologetics
Methodology. In presenting this method, Clark contends, similarly to Frame above, that evidence
and argument is not necessary for knowing something to be true.327 Instead he asserts that there
are many things one can know without reliance or requirement of evidence. He contends that the
knowledge that there is a God is one of them. In short, the whole presentation of theistic
arguments and much of classical methodology is not necessary due to the fact, according to
Clark’s perception, that the knowledge that the knowledge of God’s existence is a properly basic

326

Huxley, Evolutionary Humanism, loc. 825-826, Kindle.

327

Cowan, Five Views, loc. 3885, Kindle.

182

notion.328 Since naturalism is built on the premise that there is nothing supernatural, this method
is likely to be perceived by them as possessing the same vulnerability of circular reasoning as
that of the presuppositional method just discussed. Again, as with the presuppositional method,
those who are theists can be greatly benefited by a knowledge of this methodology when
confronting one another. a, on the other hand, could regard this methodology as circular in its
reasoning, failing to be persuaded by it.
As a result of this overview, it seems apparent that the most persuasive methodology for
attaining the goal of persuading naturalists or atheists that a belief in the existence of God is
justifiable is the classical or evidential apologetic methodology, or some combination of the two.
This, of course, is dependent upon one’s definition of the evidential apologetic methodology,
which, as was noted by Cowan above, is perceived differently between Craig and Habermas.
Understanding this makes it understandable as to why this project seeks to be associated
primarily, with the classical apologetic methodology.
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Appendix 3
The Relevance of This Study to Worldviews

In the introduction of his work Global Theory from Kant to Hardt and Negri, Gary
Browning observes:
Global theory provides the mood music of contemporary academic and political
commentary. . . . Theoretical understandings of the world can take many forms,
embracing causal analysis, historical periodization, ethical and ideological appraisal and
conceptual clarification.329
Since worldviews are examples of “global theory,” in that they meet the definition “theoretical
understanding of the world,” it is obvious that Browning believes one’s worldview or global
theory acts as a filter through which one come to apprehend history, ethics, moral values,
ideologies etc. One’s worldview significantly influences the basis of one’s moral and ethical
values, or whether such concepts are even valid. It would be difficult to deny that worldviews
exist and it would also be difficult to deny that every person has not apprehended a worldview of
some kind, even if he is unaware of it. Consequently, awareness of one’s foundational notions,
one’s worldview, should be a concern for every person, especially those seeking to be critical
thinkers. The obvious question is: How might one choose, or come to adopt, his worldview? That
is, how does one come to have a worldview? Secondly, how does one come to trust or be assured
of the validity of his or any worldview? For example, should one simply accept that view which
is most popular assuming that its popularity establishes it as worthy? Is there a standard by which
one comes to know the validity of a worldview?
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In the post-Christian, multicultural environment of the present day, there exists a growing
demand for tolerance and relativism.330 Yet within this environment there are challenges for
those who identify themselves as being of the Christian faith. For instance, the secular culture
questions why one would prefer a Christian worldview over naturalism and its derivative,
humanism, since these are becoming more popular? The more popular worldview, especially
among academia. Seems to lean toward atheistic naturalism. In light of the potential for rejection
or even persecution, why should one accept an opposing, unpopular view? Such questions, or
similar ones are being directed toward Christian college students attending secular schools today.
As a result, these students face serious challenges regarding the rationality of their Christian
heritage. After all, Christianity requires belief in a God who claims to be the Truth. Naturalism,
on the other hand, held by most modern academics, consider absolute truth to be impossible or
irrelevant and archaic. Between the naturalistic and Christian worldviews, many academics have
chosen naturalism.331 Is it feasible to think that current college students with faith in Christ are
adequately equipped with sufficient critical thinking skills to address or stand against the
temptation to yield to the pressure of the popular naturalistic academics? Central to this question
is an awareness that naturalism is not the most rational and verifiable worldview. Do college
students, especially Christian college students, have this awareness? Theistic arguments, along
with other elements of critical thinking, can help these students see better and more viable

A thorough discussion of the views expressed here is found in Craig’s response to Feinburg’s
presentation of “Cumulative Case Apologetic Method” in Cowan’s Five Views on Apologetics, loc. 2678ff, Kindle.
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alternatives to naturalism. They can and should be shown that popularity is not the best criterion
for determining the soundness of an idea.
One of the many opportunities facing evangelical Christianity today is to reverse the
present popularity of naturalism. Its presence has infiltrated both the general public, and even the
church.332 Evangelicals, especially evangelical academics, hold that it is indeed rational to
believe that truth is correctly rooted in theism. This project stands as a reflection of this belief.
The task of sharing this message with both the world and the church is both necessary and
possible. Additionally, this can be done in a reasonable, supportable and compassionate way. In
contrast to the present atmosphere wherein the majority of academia chooses to prefer nontheistic views, this study reflects the belief that the theistic, supernatural worldview is more
reasonable and more justifiable than the naturalistic and atheistic worldview. For this reason, this
project emphasizes the contrasts between the worldviews of theism and atheism, or naturalism
and supernaturalism.
The primary point of conflict between these two views centers on the fact that the theistic
worldview assumes supernaturalism. It holds to the belief that there is a divine entity existing
outside the boundaries of nature. Naturalists, on the other hand, reject the possibility of such
beings as they reject supernaturalism. Additionally, Christians believe that God is personal,

R. J. Berry, God’s Book of Works: The Nature and Theology of Nature, Glasgow Gifford Lectures
(London; New York: T&T Clark, 2003), 10. Berry states, “Darwin had made belief about God all or nothing: either
God was an active participant, immanent in the world, or completely absent. Since present academia affirms
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he states: “Besides being a natural scientist, I am a Christian. Although I am prepared to believe in religion without
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to be both a natural scientist and a Christian? The fact that he believes this self-description to be important enough to
state publicly, suggests that he has somehow managed to synthesize naturalism and Christianity. This seems to
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supremely intelligent, responsible for creating all that is, and rules firmly but graciously over
creation. Naturalists deny such claims.
The Naturalistic worldview claims that all phenomena related to life can be scientifically,
empirically or rationally explained within the purviews of natural selection or evolution and that
there is no existence outside the boundaries of nature. Hence, naturalists are generally atheistic as
they cannot allow for the existence of a supernatural being. They also hold to Darwinian or, more
recently, Neo-Darwinian concepts and secular humanism. They encourage and demand that their
values are uniquely valid for inclusion within educational curriculum. 333
Relating what has been said to the purpose at hand, this study affirms theism as superior
to other worldviews as it provides a more rational basis for belief. Sufficient evidence and
arguments given with the study validate this claim. Since identifying, clarifying and explaining
the reasoning and evidences supporting such a statement is the role of apologetics, it is accurate
to identify the following study as such. In particular, this study identifies with the classical
apologetic methodology.334 It verbalizes and affirms a theistic argument based on man’s ability
to apprehend aesthetics.

Huxley, Evolutionary Humanism, loc. 1463, Kindle. Huxley states, “Thus the evolutionary idea must
provide the main unifying approach for a humanist educational system, and evolutionary biology could and should
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